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 "Addressing youth unemployment, long-term unemployment and 
evolving skills needs are among the key priorities of the jobs and growth agenda of the 
Juncker Commission. This report shows that the EU labour market continued to improve in 
2015 and 2016, with unemployment rates getting closer to pre-recession levels. While these 
results are encouraging and reflect the reforms implemented over last years, we must not 
forget that about half of the unemployed in the EU and in the euro area are long term 
unemployed. The figures show we are moving in the right direction but we need to speed up 
and continue our common efforts."  
 
Marianne Thyssen 
Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labour Mobility 
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SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS 
 
1 
The labour market in Europe has continued to improve during 2015 and 
2016, with unemployment rates moving closer to pre-recession levels.  In 
August 2016, it reached 10.1% in the euro area and 8.6% in the EU, 
respectively about 2.5 and 2 percentage points below the peak reached in 
2013 but still about 3 and 1.5 percentage points above pre-crisis levels. 
Labour market disparities across the EU and the euro area continued to fall 
from very high levels. 
In 2015, economic activity expanded by 2.2% in the EU (by 2% in the euro 
area), buoyed by the dynamism of private consumption, supportive 
macroeconomic policies, and low although rising energy prices. In the first 
half of 2016, real GDP growth slowed slightly to 1.8% and 1.6% for the EU 
and the euro area respectively, while unemployment kept falling at about the 
same rate as one year earlier. The reaction of unemployment to the moderate 
but steady economic recovery has been stronger than expected. This outcome 
could be linked to stronger job creation in the services sector, which is more 
labour intensive and more reactive to the dynamics of consumption. The 
materialisation of the effects of the large number of policy changes enacted 
since the onset of the crisis may have also contributed to the stronger 
employment response. The analysis suggests that an upward shift in 
expectations and the revival of domestic consumption after years of 
contraction and continuous job destruction have contributed to the recent 
positive employment developments. The increase in households' disposable 
income benefitted from employment gains, while wage growth remained 
moderate. In contrast, subdued capital spending, weaker growth in emerging 
economies, pervasive rebalancing needs in a number of Member States, are 
factors holding back the recovery. 
The decline in the unemployment rate observed at the onset of the 2013 
recovery was linked mostly to reductions in the job separation rates (i.e. the 
rate at which job losses occur). Job finding rates have started to recover from 
early 2013, in particular for jobseekers with spells of unemployment shorter 
than 12 months, while for those with longer durations they started to pick up 
only in the second half of 2015, reaching in the first quarter of 2016 a level 
below the pre-crisis peak. Although recovering, in early 2016, job finding 
rates remained well below the pre-crisis level, and, as a consequence, the 
average unemployment duration continued to rise. In countries where job 
separation had increased the most during the crisis - especially Greece, 
Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the Baltics -, the fall in the separation rates since 
the onset of the current recovery was particularly sizeable. Conversely, 
improvements in job finding rates have been the strongest, especially in 
countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis. As a consequence, the share of the 
long-term unemployed in these countries also started to decline, often from 
very high levels.  
Between mid-2011 and 2012, the euro-area Beveridge curve (the negative 
relation between vacancies and unemployment) shifted outward pointing to a 
potential increase in labour market mismatches. As the recovery gained 
momentum in 2014 and 2015, unemployment started to decline 
simultaneously with the increase in job vacancies. This is unusual as 
unemployment usually reacts with a time lag to the increase in vacancies. 
One explanation of this pattern is that the short-term unemployed have 
initially benefitted more from the recovery than the long-term unemployed. 
The labour market 
continues to recover  
Unemployment in the 
EU continued to fall in 
line with a gradual 
economic recovery 
supported mainly by 
the growth of private 
consumption  
 
Job finding rates have 
improved, especially 
for people with short 
unemployment 
durations, while the 
rate at which jobs 
losses occur is close to 
the level prevailing 
before the crisis 
 
The drop in the jobless 
rate reflect cyclical 
improvements while 
the low hiring rate 
may reflect possible 
labour market 
mismatches  
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In the second quarter of 2016, vacancies grew without producing a decline of 
unemployment comparable to that of 2015. This may point to unemployment 
becoming entrenched. It is possible that further policy actions will be needed 
to absorb unemployment, even if economic growth continues. The challenge 
is to avoid the self-perpetuating cycle whereby protracted joblessness makes 
employers reluctant to hire workers with long unemployment spells, further 
worsening their employment chances, which in turn could lead to an increase 
in structural unemployment (i.e. unemployment that remains also in good 
economic times). To prevent joblessness becoming entrenched, activation 
and job-search assistance measures need to be adequate to cope with still 
high number of unemployed and accompanied by measures that encourage 
job creation. The response to long-term unemployment involves a broader 
reform agenda of labour and product markets, taxation and benefit reform, as 
well as specific support measures such as training and up-skilling, and social 
policies. Yet, not all the long-term unemployed are detached from the labour 
market, as suggested by the lack of any visible signs of wage pressures, in 
particular in high unemployment countries.  
In the second quarter of 2016, labour market activity rates in the EU and the 
euro area were close to 73%; about 3 and 2 percentage points respectively 
above the pre-crisis level. Activity rates continued to increase, reflecting 
longer term trends in the rising participation of women and older workers. 
During the crisis period, the increased activity of family members willing to 
contribute to household income in a situation of increased uncertainty offset 
the decline by those who dropped out of the labour force because they 
became discouraged by their job prospects. Analysis in the report suggests 
that the entry into the labour market when the economy is running below its 
potential results in a stronger attachment during recoveries. Indirect evidence 
of this asymmetry is the observation that the share of discouraged workers 
dropped in 2015 in the large majority of countries.  
Compared to past recoveries, the drop in unemployment in the recovery that 
took hold in 2013 was swifter and stronger, with employment falling in a 
large number of countries. In 2015 and the first half of 2016, the divergence 
of unemployment rates across the EU and the euro continued to decline from 
high levels on account of stronger than expected falls in unemployment in 
countries hardly hit by the debt crisis and persistent rebalancing needs, and 
supportive real unit labour cost developments. In 2015, positive job creation 
prevailed in nearly all Member States – only not in Cyprus, Romania and 
Finland; employment growth of at least 2% was reported in eight Member 
States, including Ireland, Estonia, Spain, and Greece. Developments in the 
first half of 2016 were also often positive. As a consequence of broad 
unemployment reductions, labour markets have become tighter in countries 
that already had relatively low unemployment rates. Despite these 
improvements, large differences in unemployment rates still persist, 
reflecting the intensity of the rebalancing and deleveraging challenges.  
Participation in the 
labour market kept 
rising, reflecting long-
term trends but also 
increased labour 
market attachment of 
those that entered the 
labour force during 
the recession 
 
The dispersion of 
unemployment rates 
continued to decline 
largely reflecting the 
breadth of the 
recovery…  
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Wage gains have been limited in spite of the reduction of unemployment. In 
2015, wage growth in the euro area was essentially unchanged at 1.2%. In the 
first half of 2016, unemployment fell by 0.8 percentage points, while wages 
remained flat and well below the growth rate implied by the pre-crisis 
Phillips curve (the relation linking wage growth to unemployment). Nominal 
wages (compensation per employee) declined in Greece, Cyprus and 
Portugal; wage growth below 1% was recorded in eight countries including 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Ireland, and France. The low wage 
and price growth since the onset of the recovery can be seen as a response to 
the spare capacity that built up over time in these countries. In a number of 
countries, low wage growth reflects low productivity growth and low 
inflation. In contrast, relatively large increases, above 2.5%, were observed in 
Germany, Malta and, especially, the Baltics where robust wage growth was 
the combined result of tightening labour market and flexible wage bargaining 
institutions. After substantial declines during the recession years, real unit 
labour costs in high unemployment countries have become less sensitive to 
unemployment levels. 
The rebalancing process, which had advanced in previous years on the back 
of sizeable labour cost realignments, in particular on the side of deficit 
countries, slowed down in 2015. The weakening of the relationship between 
external imbalances and changes in competitiveness followed the substantial 
adjustments in current accounts and competitiveness of previous years, not 
only by countries previously characterised by current account deficits. The 
decline in unit labour costs in euro-area countries facing stronger rebalancing 
needs led to gains in cost competitiveness – measured by the unit labour cost 
deflated real effective exchange rate (REER). While improvements in cost 
competitiveness have been helpful for external rebalancing, adjustment in 
relative prices are also needed not only to support export demand via reduced 
export prices but also to induce the necessary shift from the non-tradable 
toward tradable activities. Although profit margins narrowed in 2015, the 
adjustment of competitiveness indicators based on prices remained more 
limited than the adjustment of those based on labour costs. In this respect, 
product market reforms could contribute to reduce mark-ups in the non-
tradable sector. 
In 2015, employment in non-tradable activities expanded at a higher rate than 
in tradable ones in most EU countries, in the wake of the revival of domestic 
demand. Thus, the shift of resources from non-tradable to tradable sectors 
necessary to spur exports and reduce external debt was milder than in 
previous years. As the consumption-based recovery proceeds, it is unlikely 
that wage growth in the non-tradable sector will remain below wage growth 
in the tradable sector, which might slow the reallocation of labour toward 
tradable activities. More dynamic domestic demand in countries previously 
characterised by current account surpluses, possibly supported by favourable 
macroeconomic policies and productivity enhancing reforms in all countries, 
would facilitate the continuation of the rebalancing process. 
This report includes an analytical chapter focusing on the macroeconomic 
implications of statutory minimum wages. The minimum wage is a tool to 
improve the distribution of income and reduce wage inequality. If set at a 
level that is not too high, it may contribute to guarantee a fair wage and 
address cases in which workers are in a weak bargaining position with 
… and supportive 
developments in 
wages and real unit 
labour costs 
 
After years of 
adjustment the 
rebalancing process 
has slowed down  
The reallocation from 
non-tradable to 
tradable activities has 
become less intense 
The macroeconomic 
implications of 
statutory minimum 
wages 
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4 
limited effects on employment. The findings in the report suggest that 
changes in the minimum wages may have had negative but small effects on 
youth and low-skilled employment. The effect on wages is only partly offset 
by increases in consumption prices; improvements in the purchasing power 
of minimum wage workers have positive effects on consumption, mainly for 
lower income groups.  
Key dimensions of minimum wage setting institutions include the scope of 
government intervention, the criteria taken into account and the actors 
involved in the revisions, as well as the scope of automatic adjustment rules. 
Three groups of countries are identified on the basis of these characteristics. 
In a first group, composed of the large majority of Member States, minimum 
wage revisions are framed in a process which requires formal obligations to 
negotiate or consult (through an institutionalised process); in a second group, 
minimum wage revisions occur mainly through indexation systems, which 
differ across countries depending on the strictness of the rule, its scope, the 
frequency of revisions and the possibility of temporary suspensions. In a third 
group, the statutory minimum wage setting is not in a specific framework.  
The codification of these characteristics makes it possible to construct an 
index of institutional stringency of the minimum wage framework. 
According to this method, stringent systems are characterised by limited 
discretion on the part of government, predictable updating rules and broad 
criteria considered or actors involved when updating the minimum wage. 
Econometric evidence presented in this report suggests that the institutional 
design influences both the increase in the minimum wage and its response to 
underlying macroeconomic variables. The findings suggest, first, that 
discretionary (i.e. less predictable) minimum wage setting leads to larger 
revisions of the minimum wage than rule-based systems; second, that the 
response of the minimum wage to changes in the average wage is stronger in 
discretionary systems, in particular in years that follow elections; and third, 
that the effect of prices is larger in rule based systems. Thus, distributional 
concerns appear to play an important role in discretionary systems, 
particularly in years that follow elections, while the maintenance of the 
purchasing power of minimum wage workers plays a larger role in rule-based 
systems.  
Systems where governments can set the minimum wage without early 
consultation of social partners and clear criteria may allow more flexibility to 
respond to unexpected shocks, but at the cost of making the updating 
unpredictable and at the mercy of the electoral cycle. Rule-based systems 
reduce political bias and, being predictable and transparent, allow employers 
and employees to plan. Yet, they may introduce real wage rigidity for low 
wage earners and lead to excessive ripple effects on wages above the 
minimum. A properly designed institutional setting has to balance the need of 
achieving the objectives of a minimum wage policy with the uncertainty that 
an unclear and unpredictable framework may entail. Institutional 
arrangements that allow some flexibility in the minimum wage setting policy 
(e.g. inability-to-pay clauses or temporary suspensions by bipartite or 
tripartite agreements) could provide additional levers to deal with negative 
shocks that hit the most vulnerable workers more strongly.  
The institutional 
dimensions of 
statutory minimum 
wage setting differ 
considerably across 
countries  
The governance of 
statutory minimum 
wage setting 
influences the size of 
minimum wage 
changes and their 
response to underlying 
macroeconomic 
conditions  
The design of the 
statutory minimum 
wage needs to 
balance the objective 
of guaranteeing a fair 
wage with the need 
of predictable 
updating frameworks 
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The labour market reforms implemented since the onset of the 2008-2009 
crisis aimed at enhancing the adjustment capacity and the resilience of labour 
markets against the background of pervasive external and internal 
imbalances. As the recovery gained momentum, more measures have been 
introduced to sustain the demand for labour and strengthen work incentives, 
including in countries without major rebalancing needs. With the significant 
reform activity during the crisis period, the conduct of systematic analyses of 
the effects of enacted or planned reforms is a key condition for early 
identification of further policy needs, including to disentangling the short- 
from the long-term effects of policy measures and their redistributive 
implications. More awareness of the short-term costs of reforms and their 
distributional implications may lead to designing reform packages that 
minimise these costs. This, together with proper communication and 
transparency about both the expected costs and the benefits of policy 
measures in the longer term, might be instrumental to building ownership for 
reforms.  
The EU has shown an ability to play a role as a catalyst of reform. EU 
recommendations have been used as a compass for reforms during the crisis 
years, in particular in vulnerable countries. The challenges ahead are related 
to how best to combine flexibility and security in a changing world of work 
and how to support an effective process of convergence towards resilient 
economies both in the EMU and the EU. Peer reviews and benchmarking in a 
number of well-defined policy areas can also provide powerful leverage to 
support the reform process at national level, by allowing for the cross-
examination of relative performance and the identification of best policy 
practices. The European Pillar of Social Rights is a policy framework to 
achieve renewed convergence in the EU. It expresses a number of essential 
principles common to participating Member States for the conduct of their 
employment and social policy.  
The focus of structural 
reforms is gradually 
moving from measures 
that improve 
macroeconomic 
adjustment capacity 
to measures that 
ensure greater support 
for individuals 
transitioning between 
different labour 
market statuses  
The EU has played a 
key role of a catalyst 
of reforms at national 
level  
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1. GENERAL LABOUR MARKET CONDITIONS IN THE EURO 
AREA AND THE EU 
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The gradual improvement in economic and labour 
market conditions that started in the second half of 
2013 continued throughout 2015 and the 
beginning of 2016 in both the EU and the euro 
area, with a steady reduction in unemployment. 
Employment growth picked up spurred by an 
increase in domestic demand; activity rates 
continued to trend upwards, while the dynamics in 
the average number of hours worked remained 
subdued. The observed reduction in unemployment 
is mainly due to a decline in job separation rates 
(job losses), while job-finding rates improved but 
remain below the historical average. Low job-
finding rates are related to persistently high rates 
of long-term unemployment. Wage gains have been 
limited in spite of the reduction of unemployment. 
1.1. INTRODUCTION  
The EU labour market recovery that started in 
2013 gained further traction in the course of 2015; 
in the first half of 2016 labour markets continued 
to improve, spurred by favourable expectations 
and supportive macroeconomic policies.  
Unemployment continued to get closer to pre-
recession levels, on the back of a modest economic 
recovery supported by domestic demand amid an 
uncertain global outlook. Job separation rates 
continued to fall while job-finding rates kept 
improving from very low levels, while long-term 
unemployment remains at historically high levels. 
Despite the recovery in labour demand, wage 
growth remained moderate throughout 2015. 
Against this background, this first chapter of the 
report analyses the main features of the current 
labour market adjustment by looking at aggregate 
developments in the EU and the euro area. It 
compares the EU labour market performance with 
that of other developed economies and assesses the 
role of cyclical and structural factors in 
unemployment dynamics, labour market flows, 
and the role played by the relevant adjustment 
margins including employment, participation, 
working hours and labour costs.  
The analysis digs deeper into a number of issues. 
The possible reasons behind the recent 
unemployment developments are discussed, and 
the question of the role of domestic demand in 
driving the swift response of unemployment to 
GDP growth is addressed. In light of the recent 
subdued wage dynamics, there is a focus on how 
the relationship between wage growth and 
unemployment has changed over time. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as 
follows. The next section compares aggregate 
labour market developments in the euro area and 
the EU with those taking place in other world 
regions. Section 1.3 analyses employment and 
unemployment dynamics, while section 1.4 
reviews latest trends in wages and labour costs. 
Section 1.5 focuses on salient aspects of European 
unemployment analysing labour market flows, 
long-term unemployment and job matching. 
Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2. SETTING THE SCENE: THE EU LABOUR 
MARKET IN AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE  
1.2.1. Recent EU-level developments 
The economic recovery that followed the 
sovereign debt crisis continued in 2015, driven by 
favourable external conditions and supportive 
macroeconomic policies. The recovery has been 
broad-based and sustained by robust domestic 
demand, in particular consumption, after a period 
of prolonged contraction. Unemployment rates in 
the EU and the euro area fell throughout 2015, 
although the decline was initially more moderate 
in the euro area.  
Labour market conditions improved in 2015 and, 
for the euro area, strengthened further at the 
beginning of 2016, notwithstanding a more 
uncertain external outlook. Since the start of the 
recovery in 2013, the EU unemployment rate has 
fallen by 2.2 percentage points; for the euro area, 
the reduction was 1.8 percentage points over the 
same period. Yet, in the EU and the euro area the 
jobless rate remains above the pre-crisis average 
(at 8.7 per cent and 10.2 per cent respectively in 
the first half of 2016). The unemployment 
recovery has been outpacing the rhythm of the 
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expansion of GDP. Indeed, after swiftly receding 
at the onset of the recovery, unemployment 
continued falling at an unchanged pace despite a 
softening of the growth momentum in the second 
half of 2015. This pattern is quite unusual as 
reductions in the unemployment rate generally 
require GDP to grow above a certain threshold to 
compensate for trends in labour supply and 
productivity growth. (
1
) The reduction of 
unemployment was matched by the strongest 
employment growth since the start of the 2008 
recession. 
Activity rates in the EU have been trending 
upward and also been quite resilient to the 2008-
2009 financial and 2011-2012 sovereign debt 
crisis. As opposed to the US, activity rates 
increased for several EU countries and during the 
crisis they increased even more for individuals 
with low incomes (Box I.1.1). (
2
) Hence, since 
2013, the increase in participation tempered the 
impact of employment growth on the fall of 
unemployment. A number of tentative 
explanations could be put forward for the swift 
response of unemployment to the recovery. First of 
all, consumers' and business confidence continued 
to improve in the first half of 2015. Although 
sentiment indicators worsened slightly in the 
second half of 2015, job separation rates (the rate 
at which job losses occur) still remained well 
below those of 2014. As the economic recovery 
got underway, the job finding rates continued to 
improve from very low levels and picked up 
                                                          
(1) The need for positive growth above a certain threshold to 
ensure unemployment reductions is an observed regularity 
associated with the so-called “Okun law”, the statistical 
relationship between GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate. See also the analysis in (Box I.1.1). 
(2) For the US, there is a trend decline in activity rate, which is 
substantial for higher incomes (Hall and Ptrosky-Nadeau, 
2016).  
strongly in the second half of 2015, following a 
typical hump-shaped pattern responsible for the 
persistence of unemployment and long-term 
unemployment during recoveries (see the response 
of the job finding rate to domestic demand shock 
in Box I.1.2). 
Graph I.1.1: Employment, hours and GDP growth in the EU 
 
Note: Growth rates are defined as percentage change 
compared to the corresponding quarter of the previous 
year. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Second, subdued wage growth contributed to the 
recovery of profit margins, which were squeezed 
during the crisis. After growing mildly in 2013 and 
2014, real product wages (i.e. wages deflated with 
the price of output) were flat in 2015; at the same 
time, productivity growth (both on head-count and 
on hourly basis) kept rising although at a modest 
rate (see section 1.4. below). Third, the dynamics 
of hours worked remained subdued. In response to 
the recessions in 2008-2009 and 2011-2012, 
average hours worked dropped and did not return 
towards the levels prevailing before the shocks. 
The counterpart of this weak growth in average 
hours worked is the increase in part-time 
employment, which typically rises during 
recessions, and the high proportion of those that 
declare working part-time because of the lack of 
full-time job (rising from 22% in 2007 to 29.2 in 
2015). 
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Table I.1.1: Unemployment, compensation per employee and GDP growth in the euro area and European Union 
(seasonally adjusted data) 
 
Note: for unemployment rate percentage point difference.  
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Quarter over quarter of previous year (1), % Quarter over quarter same year, %
2013 2014 2015 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2
EA 12.0 11.6 10.9 -0.6 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
EU28 10.9 10.2 9.4 -0.8 -0.7 -0.8 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2
EA 5.8 -3.1 -6.4 -4.4 -4.2 -6.3 -7.4 -7.4 -7.7 -1.6 -1.4 -2.8 -1.8 -1.6 -1.7
EU28 4.1 -5.7 -7.8 -7.4 -6.6 -8.0 -9.1 -8.8 -9.2 -2.5 -1.7 -2.9 -2.4 -2.2 -2.1
EA 1.7 1.3 1.2 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.2 1.1 -0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2
EU28 0.9 1.7 3.0 2.6 3.5 3.1 2.8 0.9 -0.2 1.1 1.1 0.3 0.2 -0.8 0.1
EA -0.3 1.1 2.0 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.6 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3
EU28 0.2 1.5 2.2 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.8 0.8 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.4
EA -0.9 0.6 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
EU28 -0.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
Unemployment rate
Unemployment growth
Growth of nominal compen-
sation per employee
Employment growth
GDP growth
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box I.1.1: Labour market participation in upswings and downturns
Labour market participation is affected by long-term trends as well as by cyclical factors. In past years, 
structural factors such as the ageing of the workforce coupled with pension reforms that increased the 
statutory pension age led to an increase in the participation of older workers. In parallel, more women 
entered the labour market as a result of, inter alia, changing cultural preferences and the provision of child-
care. Next to such structural factors cyclical developments such as the recent economic downturn would be 
expected to have affected labour market participation. In general, an economic slowdown can be expected to 
lead to a decline in labour market participation as individuals are discouraged from looking for scarce jobs, 
while in periods of economic recovery participation is expected to increase when search efforts are more 
likely to pay off. 
As opposed to the US, where participation increased in the lower half of the income distribution and 
dropped in the upper half (see Hall and Petrosky-Nadeau, 2016), over the past decade the activity rate of 
prime-aged (25-54) individuals increased in the EU for all income quartiles (Table 1). The trend was more 
pronounced for the lowest quartiles, with the largest increase observed after the 2008 financial crisis.  
Table 1: EU activity rates by quartile of household income distribution 
  2004 2008 2013 
1
st
 quartile (lowest income) 74.6% 75.1% 78.9% 
2
nd
 quartile  81.3% 83.0% 84.7% 
3
rd
 quartile  86.6% 87.5% 89.6% 
4
th
 quartile (highest income) 88.0% 88.4% 91.6% 
Note: Bulgaria, Croatia, Malta and Romania not included.  
Source: Commission services, based on data from the EU SILC micro data. 
As suggested by Graph 1, the aggregate pattern conceals important differences across countries. For a first 
group of countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Slovakia) labour market participation 
in the lowest quartile of the household income distribution started decreasing during the 2008-2009 
recession, while for higher income groups it increased or remained stable. For a second group (Germany, 
France, Luxemburg, Latvia, Netherlands and United Kingdom), labour market participation of the poorest 
households evolved in line with the rest of the income distribution. Finally, in the years that followed the 
economic and financial crisis, labour market participation of the lowest quartile increased faster than for 
higher quartiles in Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia. 
How much do changes in labour force participation reflect cyclical fluctuations? How much do these 
changes differ across income quartiles? In a deep and prolonged recession, the activity rate may drop as 
individuals are discouraged from looking for a job. However, labour market participation may also increase 
as individuals are forced to more actively look for jobs in order to support household income (the so-called 
“income effect”). That includes also cases where additional household members (for instance, potential 
second or third earners) join the labour force and start looking for a job. This effect may become important 
in case of prolonged spells of unemployment by primary earners, leading to the exhaustion of 
unemployment benefits. 
Table 1 looks at the impact of the business cycle on the activity rate by household income quartiles. Cyclical 
developments are proxied by the output gap (the difference between actual output and potential output). To 
analyse whether participation behaviour changes over the cycle, a distinction is made between situations in 
which the output gap is positive or negative. The business cycle has a significant impact on labour market 
participation, albeit the impact is limited to specific quartiles. When the economy is running above potential 
(i.e. when the output gap is positive), a further improvement is expected to send a positive signal to the 
labour market and encourage inactive workers to join the labour force. The effect is only statistically 
significant (i.e. measured with precision to exclude that its effect is zero) for the second to fourth quartile; an 
increase in the output gap by one percentage point increases the activity rate by about 0.15 percentage points 
for the second and third quartile and 0.2 percentage points for the fourth quartile. 
When the economy is below potential (i.e. the output gap is negative), the income effect appears to dominate 
and there is a negative relation between the output gap and the change in the activity rate. Thus, during 
periods of economic slack, activity rates increase when conditions worsen. This effect is the largest for the 
Part I 
Labour market and wage developments 
 
11 
However, given the pre-crisis downward trend in 
average hours worked, a reversal toward levels 
prior to the crisis seems unlikely. (
3
) 
Fourth, the employment recovery reflects the 
higher job content of consumption growth. Since 
                                                          
(3) See European Commission (2015,) and Boppart, and 
Krussel  (2016). 
the bulk of consumption expenditure is in labour 
intensive products and services, an increase in 
aggregate consumption has a stronger impact on 
job creation than an increase in more capital 
intensive exports. The analysis in Box I.1.3 
confirms that employment responds more to 
consumption than to investment or export growth. 
However, the lower effect of an increase of 
Box (continued) 
 
 
 
 
lowest income quartile: a 1 percentage point decline in the output gap when demand is weak leads to an 
increase in the activity rate of about 0.6 percentage points. These findings are consistent with the observed 
increase in activity rates of the first quartile in countries hit particularly hard by the crisis. For the second 
and third quartile the effect is 0.2 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively. Conversely, when the economy is 
below potential, the closing of the output gap leads to a decline in the activity rate of low-income 
households.  
Graph 1: Activity rates (25-54) by income quartile: cumulated change over the period 2004-2013  
 
Source: Commission services, based on data from the EU SILC micro data. 
Table 1: Drivers of changes in labour market activity rate by income quartile  
 Household income quartile 
  Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Output gap – when positive  -0.0132 0.146** 0.158*** 0.199*** 
  (0.130) (0.0620) (0.0447) (0.0525) 
Output gap – when negative  -0.558*** -0.235* -0.300** -0.259 
  (0.180) (0.123) (0.116) (0.172) 
Constant 0.555*** 4.178*** 0.885*** 1.488*** 
  (0.150) (0.103) (0.0831) (0.126) 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  230 230 230 230 
R-squared 0.663 0.638 0.520 0.534 
Note: Output gap is the percentage change deviation between actual and potential GDP.  Sample 
period 2004-2013; *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant; Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Source: Authors' analysis based on EU-SILC micro data and AMECO. 
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investment on unemployment has to be weighed 
against the effect of investment on potential output 
and consumption.  
Graph I.1.2: Employment, GDP and Hours worked in the 
EU, levels (index numbers, 2008q1 = 100) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
Despite its recent fall, unemployment remains 
historically high, also reflecting the larger pool of 
active individuals due to the positive developments 
in labour market participation. The number of 
unemployed in the fourth quarter of 2015 was 
about 17 million in the euro area and 22.8 million 
in the EU, 1.5 and 2 million less than at the 
beginning of the year respectively. Although 
employment has come back to its pre-crisis level, 
the volume of work remains below the one reached 
before the crisis (Graph I.1.2). From 2011Q1 to 
2013Q1, the fall in the volume of work mirrored 
the decline in the average hours worked; since 
2013Q1, the pick-up in the volume of hours 
reflects mainly the increase in headcounts.  
Quarterly GDP growth gained strength in the 
course of 2015. Household and business sentiment 
about labour market prospects improved 
substantially and fuelled optimism at the beginning 
of 2015, possibly on account of consumption 
growth and favourable real disposable incomes 
supported by lower oil prices (Graph I.1.3). 
It remains to be seen whether the current 
responsiveness of unemployment to growth will 
continue also in the future, also in view of the 
heightened uncertainty notably linked to the result 
of the UK leave vote (see also European 
Commission, 2016f). Delayed investment and 
consumption decisions may take a toll on the 
recovery.  Looking forward, therefore, further 
progress on the front of EU employment will 
crucially depend on growth prospects and on 
support to investment and consumption.  
Graph I.1.3: Unemployment expectations for the coming 
12 months 
 
Source: European Commission, Business and Consumer 
Surveys; Eurostat. 
1.2.2. Recent labour market developments in 
major world regions 
In 2015, unemployment continued to decline in the 
main industrial countries despite moderate 
economic growth and weak demand stemming 
from emerging economies.  
The recovery in the US continued driven by 
households' spending, but growth has not been 
rapid by the standards of past recoveries. (
4
) By 
early 2016 unemployment was back to its pre-
crisis level. However, the decline in 
unemployment rate has been accompanied by a 
decline in labour force participation rate. Since the 
onset of the recovery in 2010, the activity rate – 
the percentage of the working-age population that 
is employed or looking for work- has fallen by 3 
percentage points to 62.6% in May 2016, along a 
declining trend that started around 2000. (
5
)  
                                                          
(4) GDP per capita and per employed had been declining since 
before the 2008-2009 crisis. Various causes have been 
adduced for the weak recovery, including financial crises 
making recoveries more difficult, the so-called ‘secular 
stagnation’ hypothesis (i.e. factors making demand 
inherently insufficient to maintain full employment), and a 
reduced pace of innovation. 
(5) However, the participation rate has started to increase from 
September 2015. Although early to interpret as a change in 
a trend, this increase has been driven mainly by low-skilled 
males, suggesting a cyclical pattern due to discourage 
worker effect. 
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box I.1.2: The effect of unemployment expectations on job finding and separation 
rates
After spiking upward in 2008 and 2011, job separation rates in the EU and euro area returned to levels 
slightly above the pre-crisis average by the end of 2013. In contrast, job finding rates improved only 
gradually following the development of employers' and consumers' expectations and the recovery of 
domestic demand.  How much do shifts in consumers' unemployment expectations influence the response of 
job finding and separation rates? The underlying idea is that an increase in economic uncertainty raises the 
separation rates and worsens job prospects, increases unemployment and leads employed households to 
accumulate precautionary savings. The ensuing lower demand of goods depresses vacancies and the job 
finding rate; the consequent increase in unemployment duration leads to further increases of precautionary 
savings amplifying the effect of the initial shock. Similarly, a reduction in job separations would entail a 
reduction in the job loss risk, reduce precautionary saving, increase demand and improve job finding rates 
(see Ravn and Sterk, 2016).  
To provide an answer, a VAR model is estimated to analyse the interactions between consumers' 
unemployment expectations, domestic demand and the job finding and separation rates. The sample covers 
the period 2005Q1-2015Q4. Shocks are identified by means of Cholesky decomposition with the following 
ordering of variables: unemployment expectations, domestic demand, job separation rate, unemployment 
rate and job finding rate. This is consistent with the view that economic confidence is a forward-looking 
variable that can jump in response to news; all other variables respond contemporaneously with no 
contemporaneous feedbacks to confidence. Moreover, the job separation rate and the unemployment rate are 
allowed to respond contemporaneously to domestic demand shocks. The job finding rate is the least 
exogenous variable and is supposed to influence all the other variables only with a lag.  
Graph 1. Responses to positive shock to confidence and to a negative shock to job separation rate 
 
Notes: On the horizontal axis quarters following the shock. Variables are presented as percentage deviations from steady state. 
Charts show the response of each variable to a 1 standard-deviation shock in consumers’ unemployment expectations (row 1), 
domestic demand (row 2), and the separation rate (row 3). 
Source: DG EMPL based on Eurostat data. 
Graph 1 depicts the impulse responses to respectively a positive confidence and domestic demand shocks, 
and to a negative shock in the job separation rate. They show that the job separation rate drops sharply in 
response to a confidence shock and quickly reverts toward the pre-crisis levels (first row, third chart). The 
decline in job destruction rate leads to a gradual reduction of the unemployment rate which reaches a 
maximum after about one year (first row, fourth chart). In contrast, the job finding rate is initially unreactive 
to a change in unemployment expectations and improves only gradually over time; yet, the response is small 
and statistically not different from zero (first row, last chart). Domestic demand gradually improves and 
reaches a maximum within the year (first row, second chart). Unemployment expectations improve during 
the recovery as the job finding rates improve (first row, first chart).  
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On top of demographic changes, including the 
ageing of the baby-boom generation and the fading 
of the effect of the entrance of women in the 
labour force, peaking around 2000, the US labour 
force exits reflect discouragement from seeking a 
job and the expiration of extended unemployment 
benefits. (
6
) (
7
) Payroll employment increases in 
                                                          
(6) The probability of an unemployed to leave the labour force 
is higher and more pro-cyclical for those with long 
unemployment spells. Conversely, job finding rates are 
higher and more pro-cyclical for short-term unemployed 
(Krueger, 2015). 
(7) The Emergency Unemployment Compensation is a federal 
program providing additional 13 weeks of benefits to 
individuals who exhausted State benefits. The program, 
created in 2008, expired in January 2014. 
the US have been robust averaging 350 thousand 
per month. Yet, the employment rate 
(employment-to-population ratio) started to 
increase only slowly, only two years after the end 
of the recession; in August 2016 it stood at 59.7% 
about 3.5 percentage points below the pre-crisis 
peak. In addition, although the share of those 
working part-time who would prefer to work full-
time dropped, it remains above its levels prior to 
the 2008-2009 recession. 
Economic growth slowed down in Canada amidst 
resource shifts from capital intensive sectors (i.e. 
falling investments in the energy sector), the 
deterioration of terms of trade - mostly due to the 
Box (continued) 
 
 
 
 
A shock to domestic demand (charts in the second row) has an immediate effect on the rate of job 
destruction, which fades away quite quickly while the job finding rate improves gradually. Consequently, 
the effect on unemployment is initially small and gradually builds up to reach a maximum within the year. 
Finally, a negative shock to the job separation rate leads to an immediate reduction of the unemployment 
rate which accompanies a gradual improvement in consumers' unemployment expectations, domestic 
demand, the job finding rate and the unemployment rate.  Consistently with the findings by Fujita (2007) for 
the US, the hump-shaped pattern in the response of the job finding rate explains the persistency of 
unemployment and long-term unemployment.  
How much of the fluctuations in unemployment, job finding and separation rates can be explained by shocks 
to consumers' unemployment expectations and to domestic demand? The chart below reproduces the 
percentage of the variance of the error made in forecasting a variable due to a specific shock at a specific 
time horizon. They provide a measure of the relevance of each shock for cyclical behaviour of a specific 
variable. For the euro area, unexpected confidence shocks account for 30% of the error in the one quarter 
ahead forecast of the job separation rate. The contribution of confidence shocks reaches a maximum after 
two quarters and declines thereafter, but the proportion of the variance explained by the shock remains 
around 30%. Conversely, shocks to domestic demand account for ¼ of the fluctuations of the separation rate 
in the very short-term (1 quarter after the shock) but have a lower weight in explaining medium term 
fluctuations. In contrast, domestic demand plays a larger role at medium- to long-term horizons. As concerns 
the finding rate, the largest contribution stems within the year from shocks to the unemployment rate, while 
at medium- to long-term horizons the contributions of domestic demand shocks prevail. 
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Source: DG EMPL based on Eurostat data. 
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fall of commodity prices - and high household 
indebtedness; the unemployment rate has slowly 
declined hovering around 7%, about 1 percentage 
point above the pre-crisis average.  
 
Table I.1.2: GDP growth and unemployment in selected 
economies 
 
Source: Eurostat and OECD. 
 
In Japan, unemployment hovered around 3 per cent 
supported by expansionary monetary and fiscal 
policy, in a context of declining potential output 
growth and depressed demand entrenched 
deflationary environment. 
Graph I.1.4: Unemployment rates in the EU the US and the 
‘Group of seven’ advanced economies 
 
Source: OECD. 
In 2015, declining real product wages (i.e. the 
relevant concept for labour demand) prevailed in 
several developed countries, except Canada and 
the US (Graph I.1.5). While in Canada real wages 
lagged behind the slowdown in productivity 
growth, real wage gains in the US showed only a 
modest acceleration in response to a drop of 
unemployment to 5%. Wage moderation during 
the US recovery could be the result of different 
factors. First, the slack in the labour market might 
be more extensive than suggested by the 
unemployment rate. Broader measures of labour 
market slack that include marginally attached 
workers and employed part-time for economic 
reasons trend downwards, but the slack in the 
labour market remains above levels prior to the 
crisis.  
Graph I.1.5: Real wages and productivity growth in the 
euro area and selected advanced 
economies 
 
Note: Real wages are deflated with GDP deflator 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
Secondly, the gradual reduction in the ratio of the 
long- to the short-term unemployed may have 
started only lately to exert upward pressure on 
wages. (
8
) Thirdly, changes in the composition of 
the workforce;  the entry into full-employment 
with wages below the median of workers with 
part-time jobs or not-in the labour force have offset 
the increase of wages of continuously full 
employed workers.  (
9
) 
1.3. EMPLOYMENT, ACTIVITY RATES, HOURS 
WORKED 
In 2015, employment growth picked up both in the 
EU and the euro area (Table I.1.1). Labour market 
participation continued to increase but at a less 
rapid pace than during the recession. Between 
2015 and 2016 (first half of the year), the activity 
rate increased by 0.2 percentage points for the EU 
and 0.1 for the euro area (respectively to 72.7% 
and 72.6%).  
                                                          
(8) Gordon (2013), Krueger et al (2014) and Watson (2014) 
showed that long-term unemployed do not put pressure on 
wages to adjust. Thus, a decline in the ratio of total 
unemployment to short-unemployment translates into 
lower structural unemployment and higher wage inflation.  
(9) Those who change jobs over the year contributed to the 
increase of wages as in past recoveries while the 
contribution of job stayers is lower. Another non-cyclical 
factor pushing down wages is the exits from of higher paid 
retirees (Daly and Hobijn 2016, Daly et al. 2016).  
2000-2007 2014 2015 2000-2007 2014 2015
EA 2.2 1.1 2.0 8.6 11.6 10.9
EU 2.5 1.6 2.2 8.7 10.2 9.4
CAN 2.8 2.5 1.2 7.0 6.9 6.9
JPN 1.5 0.0 0.5 4.7 3.6 3.4
USA 2.7 2.4 2.6 5.0 6.2 5.3
OECD 2.5 1.9 2.2 6.5 7.4 6.8
BRIC: 8.1 5.3 4.2 : : :
BRA 3.6 0.1 -3.8 11.1 4.8 6.8
RUS 7.2 0.6 -3.7 8.1 5.2 5.6
IND 7.2 7.0 7.2 : 7.3 :
CHN 10.5 7.3 6.9 3.9 4.1 4.1
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box I.1.3: Domestic demand and unemployment developments
Since the start of the economic recovery, unemployment has declined quite quickly given the modest 
increase of GDP growth. During the 2008-2009 financial and 2011 sovereign debt crises, domestic demand 
experienced the most sizeable contraction since three decades. Households and firms reduced substantially 
spending and investments in response to heightened uncertainty, difficult access to credit and deleveraging. 
This contraction was particularly large in countries (Ireland Spain, Portugal, Greece) where a sudden stop of 
capital inflows led to a sharp correction of the current account (also called a current account reversal; see 
Graph 1). In contrast during the current recovery, private consumption has been increasing at a rapid pace, 
spurred by gains in real disposable income, lower energy prices and a reduction in household debt 
(European Central Bank, 2015).  
Graph 1. Domestic demand and unemployment 
 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
How much do changes in various components of GDP explain the job intensity of growth? As suggested by 
Anderton et al. (2014), changes in different expenditure components of GDP have different effects on 
unemployment depending on how labour intensive are the products related to each component of 
expenditure. Thus, a pick-up of consumption would lead to a larger drop in unemployment than export as it 
tends to be more labour intensive (but also less productive).  
Table 1 provides an answer to the above question by means of estimating “Okun’s law” type relationships 
linking unemployment changes to different components of final demand (consumption, investment, exports 
and imports). The first column in Table 1 shows results for a simple “Okun’s law” relationship across EU 
countries. An increase of GDP growth by one percent leads to a decline in unemployment by 0.2 percentage 
points. The second column reports results for a similar relationship, explaining unemployment changes by 
the development of different components of domestic demand (rather than by GDP growth). The third 
column replaces these components with their contribution to the growth of GDP. (In practice each category 
of expenditure is weighted with their weight in GDP.) This helps to control for the different share in GDP of 
various expenditure components. For example, consumption accounts for about 2/3 of total GDP.  
Results suggest that the response of unemployment is the highest for private consumption. This is valid both 
when looking at the effect of an increase in each component of GDP (column (2), un-weighted components) 
and when looking at the contribution of each to GDP growth (column (3), weighted components). Thus 
countries with an increase in domestic private consumption of 1.5% (about the median annual increase 
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Graph I.1.6: Employment, unemployment and activity 
rates 
 
Source: Eurostat, LFS.  
Over the same period, the labour force increased 
by about 285 thousand individuals in the EU and 
100 thousand in the euro area, driven mostly by an 
increase in female participation. However, the 
proportion of inactive who wanted to work rose in 
the EU from about 4% in 2007 to 5% in 2015 
(while in the euro area from 4% to 6%),  hinting at 
an underutilisation of the labour force. 
Developments in activity rates should be read in 
conjunction with those of the working age 
population (i.e. the denominator of the activity 
rate). Between 2014 and 2015, despite a growing 
labour force, the working age population declined 
(by about 600 and almost 200 thousand in the EU 
and the euro area respectively). Thus, the rise in 
the activity rate stems also from a drop in the 
working age population.  
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observed during 2013-2015) have benefitted from a decline in unemployment of about 0.2 percentage points 
(unweighted estimation).  
Finally, equations (4) and (5) split the sample in two groups depending on whether the capital intensity is 
above or below trend. If the capital gap is positive (i.e. capital intensity is above trend), the employment 
content of growth of higher domestic demand (both consumption and investment) is higher, while an 
increase in imports do not subtract from the decline in unemployment. Conversely, when the capital gap is 
negative (i.e. capital intensity is below trend), only a change in public consumption reduces unemployment, 
while an increase in imports increases unemployment. Results suggest also that in presence of a negative 
capital gap an increase in imports leads to the export of jobs, but this effect is not statistically significant (i.e. 
its effect is likely to be zero when capital intensity is above trend). 
Table 1. The response of unemployment to domestic and foreign demand, EU28, 1990-2015 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Y-o-y change in unemployment rate 
  
   
Capital 
intensity below 
trend 
Capital 
intensity above 
trend 
Contribution of each component of GDP None Un-weighted Weighted Un-weighted Un-weighted 
Change in unemployment rate, lagged 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.38*** 0.32*** 
 
(0.077) (0.063) (0.073) (0.09) (0.09) 
GDP growth -0.21***     
 
(0.030)     
Change in private consumption  -0.12*** -0.24*** -0.02 -0.17*** 
  (0.028) (0.048) (0.03) (0.04) 
Change in public consumption  -0.048** -0.21** -0.044** -0.07** 
  (0.020) (0.093) (0.02) (0.03) 
Change in investment  -0.018** -0.11** -0.004 -0.03** 
  (0.089) (0.041) (0.009) (0.01) 
Change in exports  -0.017 -0.06* -0.019 -0.02 
  (0.015) (0.036) (0.02) (0.02) 
Change in imports  -0.037 0.0037 -0.07*** -0.03 
  (0.017) (0.037) (0.02) (0.03) 
Constant 0.62*** 0.77*** 0.88*** 0.36*** 0.89*** 
 (0.089) (0.098) (0.12) (0.16) (0.14) 
Observations 556 612 612 284 326 
R-squared 0.51 0.59 0.57 0.50 0.63 
Number of countries 28 28 28 28 28 
Notes: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks mark estimated coefficients that are statistically significant: 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimation method: Least square dummy variables, country and period effects included. 
Capital intensity: ration of the net capital stock per person employed. Trend value estimated from regressions on country 
specific trends (sample: 1990-2015). 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database. 
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The weak dynamics of hours worked could partly 
explain the swift response of employment to the 
recovery. After a major drop during 2008-2009 
and 2011-2012 recessions, average hours worked 
remained flat (Graph I.1.7). Weekly hours worked 
by full-time employees fell by 1 hour over the 
recession period. Part of this decline reflects the 
increase in the share of part-time workers for the 
EU from about 20% of 2007 to about 22% of 
2015. 
Graph I.1.7: Cumulative change in GDP, number of 
employees and average hours worked per 
employee, Euro area 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
The share of those reporting that the main reason 
for working part-time is the lack of a full-time job 
rose by 7 percentage points to 29.2% and 31.4% in 
the EU and the euro area respectively. As a 
consequence, closing the gap in average hours 
worked relative to the long-term trend could 
constrain job creation looking forward. Yet, this 
has to be considered against the long-term 
downward trend in average hours worked, which 
reflects both efficiency gains and a shift of 
employment toward the less hours-intensive 
service sector. In the period 2000-2015, hours 
worked declined from 38 to 36.5 hours; almost 
half of this decline occurred before 2007.  
1.4. WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS 
The response of wages to the labour market 
recovery has been quite moderate. In 2015, wage 
growth in the euro area remained relatively flat, 
hovering around 1% (both compensation per 
employee and hourly wages). Wage growth 
remained sluggish in early 2016 when 
unemployment dropped below 11%. (
10
)  
Graph I.1.8: Phillips curve for the euro area 2000-2014: 
annual growth rate of compensation per 
employee 
 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database and Eurostat, LFS 
A key question is to what extent slow wage growth 
reflects a delayed adjustment of wages with 
respect to what is implied by the Phillips curve 
(the relation linking wage growth to 
unemployment) or whether there is more 
underutilisation of the labour force than suggested 
by the unemployment rate, which exerts downward 
pressure on wages. During the recession, wages 
reacted slowly to the increase in unemployment 
(European Commission, 2015). Similarly, since the 
start of the recovery they have been lagging behind 
the drop of unemployment (Graph I.1.8). Since 
then, the link with unemployment has weakened.  
The relationship between the unemployment rate 
and wage growth can be analysed with a Phillips 
curve estimated on a panel of euro area countries 
over different sub-periods, controlling for past and 
expected consumer prices inflation (Gali 2011). 
Results from such an analysis are shown in Table 
I.1.3. There are three main conclusions to be 
drawn. 
First, over time, inflation expectations have 
stabilised and inflation has become less persistent; 
thus, nominal wage growth depends more on 
inflation expectations than on past inflation (see 
also IMF, 2013; Blanchard et al, 2015). This 
                                                          
(10) Wage growth has lagged unemployment declines also in 
the US. From 1990Q1 to beginning of 2007-09 recession 
labour cost grew by 1.2 per cent yearly; since 2009Q2 they 
have grown on average 0.7 per cent yearly. 
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pattern is visible from the change of the coefficient 
of past inflation for different sub-periods (see also 
Graph I.1.9). (
11
)  
 
Table I.1.3: Wage Phillips curve: wage growth and 
unemployment across euro area countries 
over different time periods. 
 
(1) Panel estimation with country fixed effects. Equations 
estimated imposing the restriction that the effects of past 
and future inflation sum up to one.   
(2) Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistically 
significant estimated coefficients are marked with asterisks 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  
(3) Wages are measured by nominal compensation per 
employee. Inflation expectations are households' 
consumer price expectations for the next 12 months; 
unemployment gap: gap between actual and structural 
unemployment rate (NAWRU).  
Source: European Commission calculations based on data 
from DG ECFIN AMECO database, EU Survey, and Eurostat. 
 
Second, the Phillips curve is fairly stable up to 
2013. An increase in the unemployment gap (the 
difference between the actual and the structural 
unemployment rate (measured by the NAWRU) by 
1 percentage point is accompanied by a decrease in 
wage growth by about 0.6 per cent.  
Third, from 2013, the effect of expected inflation 
becomes weaker, while the Phillips curve becomes 
steeper. The increased sensitivity of wage growth 
to unemployment and the lower sensitivity to 
inflation expectations are visible in the difference 
of the values of the coefficients of unemployment 
gap and expectations in columns (1) to (4) of Table 
I.1.3 – see also Graphs I.1.9 and I.1.10.  
It is too early to draw solid conclusions on the 
relationship between wage developments and 
unemployment after 2013. Yet, if persistent, the 
recent changes in the responsiveness of wages to 
unemployment and inflation could have important 
implications for the aggregate dynamics of wages 
and the deflation risks. The weaker response of 
wages to inflation expectations signals that it may 
                                                          
(11) The Phillips curve is estimated assuming that inflation 
expectations are based on past and expected inflation, both 
effects summing to 1. An increase of the effect of expected 
inflation implies a decline of the effect of past inflation. 
become more difficult to stabilise expectations. In 
contrast, the increase in the cyclical sensitivity of 
wages to unemployment means that labour market 
conditions exert stronger pressures on wages. (
12
) 
Thus, smaller fluctuations of unemployment 
around its structural level are needed to stabilise 
wage inflation. However, the fact that wages 
depend more on past than expected inflation, risks 
decoupling wages from inflation expectations.  
Graph I.1.9: Effects of inflation expectations on wage 
growth 
 
(1) The chart shows the coefficient of inflation expectations 
in a wage Phillips curve linking wage growth to lagged 
wage growth, lagged consumer price inflation, inflation 
expectations over the next 12 months, and the 
unemployment gap. A coefficient close to 1 means that 
wage growth is anchored to long-term inflation 
expectations.  
(2) Each point shows estimates over different periods.  
(3) The dotted lines mark the band 2 standard errors 
around the point estimates. 
Source: European Commission calculations based on data 
from DG ECFIN AMECO database, EU Survey, and Eurostat. 
The stability of inflation expectations means that 
cyclical fluctuations of the unemployment rate 
around its structural level would entail temporary 
changes on wage inflation; even with high 
unemployment rates, wage growth would settle 
around a value consistent with price stability. (
13
) 
Yet, a prolonged period of low wage growth may 
destabilise inflation expectations. Similarly, a 
protracted period of high unemployment may have 
long-lasting effects and lead to higher structural 
unemployment (the so-called “hysteresis” effect).  
                                                          
(12) In the analysis of Blanchard et al (2015) the estimated 
Phillips curve becomes steeper in 5 out of 13 EU countries 
after 2007.  
(13) If expected inflation is replaced with ECB 2% reference 
value, the coefficient of inflation expectations equals 1 for 
the period covering the recovery. This suggests that 
keeping inflation close to the ECB 2% would not de-anchor 
inflation expectations. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lagged wage growth 0.24 ** 0.16 0.12 -0.25 -0.40***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) (0.15)
Inflation expectations 0.50*** 1.1*** 1.04*** 0.82*** 0.22*
(0.15) (0.13) (0.16) (0.11) (0.14)
Unemployment gap -0.69*** -0.60*** -0.55*** -0.85*** -1.1***
(0.08) (0.20) (0.17) (0.20) (0.13)
Constant 0.89 0.07 0.43 1.3*** 2.3***
(0.56) (0.46) (0.42) (0.63) (0.34)
Observations 131 133 189 151 75
R-squared 0.75 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.73
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19
2007-2013 2007-2016 2013-2016
Dependent variable: wage 
growth
2000-2007 2009-2016
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If estimates of the Phillips curve suggest that 
recently wages may have become more sensitive to 
the labour market slack, why have wage gains 
been limited in spite of the drop in unemployment? 
Several explanations can be put forward.  
Graph I.1.10: Effect unemployment gap on wage growth 
 
(1) The chart shows the coefficient of inflation expectations 
in a wage Phillips curve linking wage growth to lagged 
wage growth, lagged consumer price inflation, inflation 
expectations over the next 12 months, the unemployment 
gap. A coefficient close to 1 means that wage growth is 
anchored to long-term inflation expectations. Each point 
shows the estimates over different periods. 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database, EU Survey, Eurostat, 
First, low wage growth of recent years has 
occurred against the slowdown of productivity 
growth. In the 1990s, labour productivity gains 
averaged 1.5 per cent per year. In the 2000s and up 
to 2007, productivity growth averaged about 1 per 
cent per year. Since 2008, productivity growth has 
dropped to 0.3 per cent per year. (
14
) A pick-up of 
investment would boost productivity and wages. 
Second, the fall in energy prices has held down 
consumer price inflation and helped to contain 
wage claims on the back of rising real household 
disposable income. In a low-inflation environment, 
there are fewer incentives in undertaking costly 
negotiations for wage gains that are known to be 
limited. With low inflation, nominal wage 
rigidities prevent upwards and downwards wage 
adjustments. (
15
)  
                                                          
(14) If productivity is based on potential output per person 
employed and structural employment obtained from the 
NAWRU, the current activity rate and working age 
population, productivity growth is 1 per cent for the 1995-
2000 and 2000-2007 and 0.4 per cent after 2008. 
(15) Nominal wage rigidities have been proved to be the main 
reason for the low wage growth during the US recovery 
(Daly and Hobjin, 2015). 
Third, aggregate wages appeared relatively 
unresponsive to the drop of output at the early 
stages of the crisis. Cyclical changes in the 
composition of the workforce (i.e. the dismissal of 
low skilled workers during recessions leading to an 
automatic increase of the average wage) may have 
contributed to the downward wage rigidity 
observed at the onset of the crisis (e.g. Verdugo, 
2016). Similarly, when previously displaced 
workers are rehired, wages would be subdued at 
the early stage of the recovery as most of the hires 
concern previously displaced low-wage workers.  
Fourth, wage growth may remain low because, 
although unemployment is dropping, the current 
slack in the labour market is higher than indicated 
by cyclical unemployment (the difference between 
the unemployment rate and the NAIRU), as 
witnessed inter alia by the high number of part-
time work and lower average hours worked.  
Graph I.1.11: Phillips curve for the euro area: growth rate of 
nominal compensation per employee, 
2000q1-2016q1 
 
(1) The regression line is based on the pre-crisis relationship. 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database and Eurostat, LFS. 
Graph I.1.11 depicts the Phillips curve for the euro 
area using, rather than unemployment, a measure 
of cyclical unemployment. Despite the possibility 
that also the NAWRU may contain a cyclical 
element so that fluctuations in the NAWRU follow 
closely those of overall unemployment, Graph 
I.1.11 shows nonetheless some flattening of the 
Phillips curve after 2013. (
16
)  
                                                          
(16) See European Commission (2013) for a discussion of the 
cyclicality of the NAWRU. Similar pattern is observed 
when the growth rate of negotiated wages is used instead of 
the growth rate of nominal compensations per employee. 
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Since 2013 wage growth has been lower than at 
comparable levels during the previous recovery; in 
2016Q1 wage growth was slightly less than 1 
percentage point below growth implied by its level 
of cyclical unemployment.   
Recent analyses have tested whether the flattening 
of the Phillips curve in the US is linked to the 
growing incidence of the long-term unemployed, 
less easily employable even at lower wages. Graph 
I.1.12 shows the relationship between wage growth 
and respectively the short-term (less than 12 
months) and the long-term unemployment rate 
(more than 12 months) for the period 2000Q2-
2016Q1 (
17
). The rounded and the squared symbols 
represent the long-term and the short 
unemployment respectively. The symbols without 
fill denote the pre-crisis period; those with fill the 
post-crisis period. Several factors stand out as 
particularly important. 
Graph I.1.12: Phillips curve for the euro area: short-term 
and long-term unemployment rates 
 
(1) Short-term and long-term unemployment rates: duration 
shorter and longer than 12 months. 
Source: Commission Services. 
The slope of the Phillips curve for long-term 
unemployment is lower than for short-term 
unemployment. This is an indication that long 
spells of unemployment make unemployed 
workers less employable, so that wages fall less in 
response to unemployment when its duration is 
long than when it is short. Yet the difference 
between the wage response to short- and long-term 
unemployment is small and the composition of 
                                                          
(17) Data are available until 2005 at annual frequencies only for 
the second quarter. 
unemployment by duration does not modify 
significantly the slope of the Phillips curve. (
18
)  
The fact that the change of the long-term 
unemployment rate lags the increase in the short-
term unemployment rate implies that wage growth 
may be relatively flat before long-term 
unemployment changes. Similarly, the change in 
the long-term unemployment lags the fall in 
unemployment because job destruction has fallen 
while the job finding rate remains low. Therefore 
one should see moderate wage pressures (i.e. a 
flatter Phillips curve) when long-term 
unemployment increases (i.e. aggregate 
unemployment is high) but strong wage pressures 
(i.e. a steeper Phillips curve) when long-term 
unemployment falls (i.e. aggregate unemployment 
is low).  
The fact that both short and long-term 
unemployment dropped by about 1% since late 
2013 without generating upward pressures on 
wages, suggests that there is more slack in the 
labour market than the unemployment rate would 
suggest. In 2015 there were almost 22 million 
unemployed in the EU (17 million in the euro 
area). In addition, 12 million of employed declared 
that they were willing to work more hours; among 
the inactive, about 4.5 million have given up 
looking for a job. 
Wage growth dropped from about an annual 
average of 1.6 per cent between 2012Q1 and 
2014Q1 to 1.2 per cent between 2014Q2 and 
2016Q1. This reduction in wage growth predates 
the stronger than expected drop in HICP inflation 
which occurred between the fourth quarter of 2013 
and the first of 2014; it appears to be stronger for 
actual rather than negotiated wages. The moderate 
wage growth in 2014 and 2015, coupled with a 
pick-up in productivity growth, translated into a 
reduction in the dynamics of unit labour costs at 
euro-area level, with growth rates in 2015 falling 
below 1% (Graph I.1.13). 
It is early for a clear assessment of the recent 
steepening Phillips curve. It is however likely that 
                                                          
(18) Over the 2005Q1-2016Q1 period, a 1 percentage point 
increase in the long-term unemployment rate leads to drop 
in wage growth by -0.6%; this decline is comparable to the 
effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the overall 
unemployment rate. See also European Commission 
(2015). 
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the protracted labour market slack plays a role, in 
combination with the usual lags characterising the 
response of wages to labour market conditions (i.e. 
similar to the evolution for the US) and the 
materialisation of the impact of wage setting 
reforms in a few countries.  
Graph I.1.13: Compensation per employee and unit labour 
costs in the euro area, growth rate on same 
quarter of previous year 
 
Source: Commission Services. 
1.5. LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
LABOUR MARKET MATCHING  
The proportion of the labour force that is 
unemployed for one year or more continued to 
decline, reaching at the end of 2015 4.4% in the 
EU (5.4% in the euro area). Compared to the US, 
where it has gone back to pre-crisis averages 
(slightly below 1%), in the EU it remains around 
levels about 2 percentage points above those 
prevailing before the 2008 crisis (Graph I.1.14).  
Graph I.1.14: Long-term unemployed (for 1 year or more) 
in the EU, the euro area and the US (% of total 
labour force) 
 
Source: Eurostat and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Changes in the structure of unemployment 
duration reflect fluctuations in the job-finding and 
separation rates (Graph I.1.15). After the initial 
surge at the onset of the 2008 and 2011 recessions, 
separation rates declined steadily at a fairly 
sustained rate, almost reaching their pre-crisis 
levels by the end of 2013.  
Graph I.1.15: Job-finding and separation rates in the euro 
area 
 
Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat data. 
In contrast, job-finding rates, albeit bottoming out 
in 2013 and slightly recovering afterwards, 
continue to remain at historically low levels. 
Persistently depressed job-finding rates find their 
counterpart in the lengthening of unemployment 
spells. The expected duration of unemployment 
spells reached a peak of almost 19 months at the 
end of 2012, up from about 10 months before the 
crisis. (
19
) 
Graph I.1.16: Job-finding rate by duration of 
unemployment, euro area 
 
Source: Commission Services based on Eurostat data. 
At the end of 2015, it dropped to 16 months, still 
above the pre-crisis average duration of about 14 
months. Job-finding rates are distinguished 
according to length of time spent in unemployment 
                                                          
(19) The expected duration of unemployment equals the 
reciprocal of the job-finding rate.  
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in Graph I.1.16. Since 2013, the job-finding 
probability has been increasing for all durations 
but more sharply for jobseekers with short 
durations; job-finding rates remain depressed, 
especially for the long-term unemployed. 
The evolution of job-finding rate is behind 
movements of the Beveridge curve depicting the 
relationship between the unemployment rate and 
the availability of job vacancies (Graph I.1.17). 
Post-crisis movements in the euro-area Beveridge 
curve were the result of a mix of temporary, 
demand-related and structural factors (European 
Commission 2013). The outward shift of the 
Beveridge curve since 2008 observed at the 
aggregate level was to some extent linked to 
worsened labour market matching, with however 
major differences across countries (e.g., improved 
matching in Germany). 
Graph I.1.17: Beveridge curve for the euro area, 1995q1-
2016q2 
 
Note: Job vacancies are approximated with the survey 
based indicator of labour shortages in industry. 
Source: Commission Services. 
Labour demand also played an important role. At 
the onset of the 2008 crisis, the number of 
vacancies dropped sharply and the unemployment 
grew. Vacancies started to increase visibly during 
the short-lived 2010 recovery, while the response 
of unemployment was relatively muted, a pattern 
that can be attributed to either a typical counter-
clockwise movement of the vacancy-
unemployment relation during the adjustment to 
negative labour demand shocks or to an increase in 
structural unemployment. As the euro area entered 
again in recession, unemployment and vacancies 
moved along the negative relationship, signalling 
weak demand for labour instead of a structural 
deterioration in matching.  
Since 2013 a new phase has started where 
vacancies are growing in parallel with a reduction 
in unemployment. This is an unusual pattern as 
unemployment responds to cyclical developments 
with lags; while vacancies respond to shocks 
immediately. In the second quarter of 2016, 
vacancies increase more than unemployment 
declines. This pattern is consistent with a 
consolidation of expectations in the first half of the 
year; however, as unemployment gets closer to its 
structural level (9.7% for the EU), unemployment 
becomes also less reactive to the cycle. 
1.6. CONCLUSIONS 
The overall labour market performance in the EU 
and the euro area is improving. The unemployment 
rate has dropped to 8.6% in the EU (10% in the 
euro area) amidst a weak recovery and a modest 
uptick in investment. The drop of unemployment 
has been supported by a strengthening of domestic 
demand, moderate real labour cost developments 
and low consumer prices. Although the 
unemployment rate has fallen, it remains at the 
highest levels since 2000.  
The drop of unemployment has not been 
accompanied by a significant increase in wage 
growth. Yet, for the typical euro area country the 
estimated slope of the Phillips curve has increased.  
The increase in the sensitivity of wages to 
unemployment is consistent with the 
materialisation of the effects of structural reforms 
aiming at enhancing nominal wages flexibility and 
at removing the constraints to job creation and 
labour market participation.  
However, during the current recovery observed 
wage growth has been less than expected. Factors 
explaining lacklustre wage growth include low 
commodity prices, the pickup of profit margins 
after a prolonged contraction, the current slack in 
the labour market and a trend decline in labour 
productivity. While the former are likely to fade as 
the recovery gains strength the latter will continue 
to hamper further wage gains. Low productivity 
growth together with prolonged labour market 
slack may validate the current low inflation and 
destabilise inflation expectations. For example, it 
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may be difficult for firms to increase prices if the 
general perception of households is that prices are 
going to be low. With low wage growth, a 
slowdown in inflation makes the absorption of the 
unemployed difficult.  
After the initial surge, separation rates are 
gradually returning towards their pre-crisis levels, 
while the job-finding rates have improved only 
slightly and especially for the short-term 
unemployed. This implies that employment 
prospects remain difficult for those who have lost a 
job during the 2008-2009 economic and financial 
crisis. With high unemployment the pressures to 
increase wages are limited. Lower job-finding 
rates imply that unemployment will stay for longer 
far from the level that corresponds to the pre-crisis 
inflows and outflows rates. 
Looking forward, while the labour market has 
improved considerably, the labour market outlook 
is linked to medium-term growth prospects, which 
remain weak in light of the legacy of the economic 
and financial crisis and underlying long-term 
economic trends. 
2. LABOUR MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN MEMBER STATES 
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In 2015 and early 2016, labour markets continued 
to improve in nearly all EU Member States. 
Unemployment rates fell, while employment and 
activity rates increased, benefiting from a 
relatively job-rich recovery in view of the modest 
economic growth. Most significant improvements 
have been observed in the countries hit the hardest 
by the crisis, notably Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Spain and also Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia 
and the Baltic states. A convergence of wage 
growth across the EU was observed on the back of 
wage stabilisation in countries that adjusted the 
most during the sovereign debt crisis and 
moderate wage developments in countries with 
stronger economic activity. With subdued wage 
and dynamics, unit labour costs continued rising at 
a moderate pace even declined in some EU 
countries. In particular, after falling for several 
years, unit labour costs stabilised in most of the 
euro area countries that had experienced current 
account deficits before the crisis, with the 
exception of the Baltic states, while growing at an 
unchanged pace, or even decelerating, in countries 
with previous current account surpluses. The 
rebalancing process, which had brought about 
sizeable labour cost adjustment and reductions in 
trade deficits in a number of countries, slowed 
down in 2015. The observed shift of resources 
from non-tradable to tradable sectors necessary to 
spur exports and reduce external debt was also 
milder than in earlier years. More dynamic 
domestic demand in countries previously 
characterised by current account surpluses, 
possibly supported by favourable macroeconomic 
policies, would ease the continuation of the 
rebalancing process. 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter takes a closer look at labour market 
and wage developments at the level of the 
individual EU Member States. It does so in an 
integrated way assessing employment, 
unemployment and wage developments. Current 
labour market developments are compared to 
previous recoveries. A focus on cyclical patterns 
and sectoral developments provides some insights 
into the macroeconomic determinants of temporary 
employment. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Sections 2.2 
and 2.3 describe recent developments in 
unemployment rates and in employment and 
activity rates, respectively, while the latter looks at 
which sectors are driving the recent job creation. 
Section 2.4 reviews the fluctuations of 
unemployment in terms of job creation and job 
destruction and the cyclical and sectoral 
determinants of temporary employment. Section 
2.5 describes recent wage and productivity 
developments, and changes in wages at the sectoral 
level. Section 2.6 analyses the evolution of unit 
labour costs and their main components. Section 
2.7 focuses on external competitiveness and how 
labour market outcomes relate to external balances 
and adjustment needs. Section 2.8 concludes. 
2.2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
The fall in unemployment that had started in mid-
2013 continued throughout 2015 and the first half 
of 2016 with unemployment rates dropping in 
almost all EU countries (Graph I.2.1).  
Since the start of the recovery, there has been 
convergence in unemployment rates with large 
falls especially in countries more severely hit 
during the crisis. Spain, Bulgaria and Ireland 
recorded falls in their annual average 
unemployment rates of about 2 percentage points 
in 2015; Greece, Lithuania, Slovakia and Portugal 
had unemployment falling by about 1.5 percentage 
points. These trends continued in the first two 
quarters of 2016, with unemployment declining by 
around 1.5 percentage points in Spain and Slovakia 
and 1 point in the other cases. 
Declines of 1 percentage point over 2015 took 
place in Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, and Poland – 
respectively from very high levels in the former 
two countries and from levels close to the EU 
average in the latter two. The same happened in 
Cyprus, Croatia and Italy, which represented the 
first falls in unemployment rates in several years 
and from levels above EU average. Croatia and 
Cyprus recorded further declines in the first half of 
2016 in excess of 2 percentage points, which were 
the strongest in the EU. 
Unemployment fell also in countries with rates 
below the EU average (e.g. Czech Republic, 
European Commission 
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Germany, Malta, Slovenia, Denmark and Sweden). 
After two years of increase, the unemployment rate 
dropped in 2015 in the Netherlands. 
There were few exceptions to these positive 
developments. In Austria, Luxembourg and 
especially Finland, unemployment rates were on 
the rise in 2015 – reaching the highest rate in more 
than a decade in Finland; in Austria a marginal 
deterioration continued into the first half of 2016. 
Romania, Belgium and France recorded declining 
unemployment rates already in 2016 after 
unchanged readings in 2015. 
Backed by improvements in high unemployment 
countries, the dispersion of unemployment rates 
continued to decline in 2015 and early 2016. 
Improvements in countries with unemployment 
rates just above the EU median also contributed to 
the fall in the dispersion (Graph I.2.2). Compared 
to past recoveries, the current fall in the dispersion 
of unemployment rates appears particularly rapid 
(see Box I.2.1 on labour market patterns in the 
current and past recoveries.).  Nonetheless, cross-
country differences in unemployment rates remain 
important. With the exception of four countries 
(including Germany), the jobless rate remains 
above the lows of 2008. On the other hand, in the 
cases of Spain and Greece, the unemployment rate 
remains close to or well above 20%, respectively, 
more than 10 percentage points above the pre-
crisis rate.  
Graph I.2.2: Distribution of unemployment rates for euro 
area Member States: 2010-2016 
 
(1) The boxes represent the “middle 50%” of the distribution 
of unemployment rates across euro area Member States 
(i.e., the second and third quartile); the horizontal mark 
inside the box represents the median. The two whiskers 
show the upper and lower extreme values of the observed 
unemployment rates that fall within a range of 1.5 of the 
interquartile range (the height of the box) away from the 
top or the bottom of the box, respectively; the dots 
represent the values that fall outside this range.  
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat, Labour 
Force Survey. 
The labour market recovery gained traction 
supported by the consolidation of economic 
growth. Yet the reaction of unemployment to the 
economic recovery has been stronger than 
expected. 
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Graph I.2.1: Unemployment rate, 2013-2015  and first half of 2016 
 
(1) Seasonally-adjusted data for 2016 Q1 and Q2.  
(2) Countries are ranked by ascending order of unemployment rate in 2014. 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey. 
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(Continued on the next page) 
Box I.2.1: Labour market behaviour during the current recovery and past 
recoveries 
The recovery from the 2008-2009 financial and 2011-2012 Eurozone sovereign debt crises is three years old. 
Compared to previous episodes, the recessions triggered by the global financial crisis affected almost all 
Member States, especially in the 2008-2009 crisis, and, excluding the slow 2009-2011 recovery, lasted for 
about 12 quarters for the EU as a whole (Graph 1). (1) The recession hit the quasi totality of Member States 
but resulted in wide differences in GDP growth rates across countries. These divergences in economic 
growth were accompanied by remarkably divergent unemployment rates; this is visible in the spike of the 
measure of dispersion at the peak of the 2011-2012 recession (Graph 2).  
How does the current recovery compare to previous ones? It has been noted that recoveries that follow 
financial crises are weak. For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2014) note that according to the experience of 
past severe banking crises, it took about eight years for the affected countries to reach the pre-crisis level of 
per capita GDP. By the end of 2015, about eight EU countries (2) had GDP more than 5% lower than the 
levels prior to the 2008-2009 crisis. In every previous recovery, the dispersion across countries in 
unemployment rates appeared highly persistent or even increasing, with each recession of the 1970s and the 
1980s being followed by a temporary drop in the standard deviation only after few years. The current 
recovery showed a relatively early fall in dispersion of unemployment rates from historical highs, not seen 
in previous recoveries; yet, by the end of 2015 it remained at its very high historical levels.  
Graph 1: Member States in recession and EU GDP (1970q1= 100) Graph 2: Unemployment rate levels and dispersion  
  
Note: EU 15 before 2002, EU 28 after 2002. 
Source: Eurostat, Ameco and OECD.  
Graph 3 provides a snapshot of the cross-country distribution of the GDP, employment, unemployment and 
wages (in real terms, deflated with the GDP deflator) since the start of the recovery (normalised to 100) and up 
to the following three years. The height of the boxes inside the graphs is informative of the mass of the 
distribution that is within the second and the third quartiles; the white strip is the mean and the dot symbol 
represents extreme values. Weak GDP growth is a salient feature of the current recovery; even the outlier of the 
current recovery stays well within the 50% range of the distribution of previous recoveries. Compared to the 
2008-2009 recession, the distribution shifts upward, which means that the recovery is broad-based, benefitting 
also countries most hardly hit by the twin 2008-2009 and 2011-2012 crises. In the last two recoveries, the 
growth rate was almost half that observed in the previous recovery (median growth: +1.5 % after one year). 
Unlike earlier recoveries, the recovery following the 2008-2009 recession saw unemployment falling in most 
EU countries, in some cases quite markedly. Since 2013, all countries have benefitted from the recovery as 
employment increased and unemployment dropped, with the size of those improvements being comparable to 
those over previous crisis. Yet the level of unemployment remains far from the readings observed before 2008-
2009. The behaviour of real wages was atypical with no real wage growth for more than half of the countries. 
After increasing during the 2011-2012 recovery as reflection of the differences across countries in the jobless 
rate, the dispersion in real wages developments dropped during the current recovery despite the observation of 
some outliers, which is symptomatic of the difficulty of adjusting real wages in a low inflation scenario.  
 
                                                          
(1) Adopting the double dip definition of recession as in Reinhart and Rogoff (2014), the 2011-2012 recovery is part of 
the recessive episode and the recession lasted for five years. 
(2) Ranked by decreasing difference of GDP between 2015q4 and 2008q2; Greece (around -25%), Cyprus (-16%), Italy 
(-11%), FI (-9.5%), HR (-9.5%), SI (-7%), DK (-6.5%), ES (-5%). 
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Box (continued) 
 
 
 
 
However, the current recovery remains weak and, although back to its pre-crisis level, output is in many 
countries well below where it would be based on the pre-crisis long-term trend.  
In a historical perspective, Table 1 confirms that the employment intensity of the current recovery is high in 
light of the weak economic growth and comparable only to the recovery that followed the currency crisis of 
the early 1990s. However, treating the double dip as part of the same cycle, the recession was unusually long 
and unemployment rate has shown only recently some encouraging signs.  
Graph 3: GDP, Employment, unemployment rate, and real wages during past recoveries until year n+3 (trough =100) 
  
  
Notes: EU 15 for the recoveries in 1975, 1983, 1993; EU 28 for 2009, 2013.The bottom and top of the boxes represent the 1st and 3rd 
quartiles of the distribution; the horizontal mark inside the box represents the median. The two whiskers show the upper and lower values 
falling within a range of 1.5 of the interquartile range (the range between the 1st and 3rd quartile); the dots represent observations that do not 
fall within that range. Year n+1 is determined depending on the quarter in which the trough was reached. If this was Q1 or Q2, year n+1 is 
the trough year (for 1975); if in Q3 or Q4, year n+1 is the following year (for 1982 and 1993). For 2009 and 2013, quarterly data available 
for all countries; the dating is from the exact quarter in which the trough was reached.  
Table 1: The recent recovery in historical perspective: cumulated change 3 years after the recovery  
Recession period 1974q4-5q2 1980q2-80q3 1992q2-93q1 2008q2-09q2 2011q4-13q1 
GDP growth       
Mean 10.6 3.3 9.5 2.2 6.8 
Median 10.1 3.6 7.7 4.4 5.9 
Max 18.0 7.7 26.9 9.1 19.8 
Min 1.3 -3.7 5.1 -21.0 -0.2 
Employment growth      
Mean 1.7 -0.9 3.3 -2.1 2.8 
Median 1.2 -0.9 3.6 -0.1 3.1 
Max 6.2 3.2 14.9 7.4 8.5 
Min -3.0 -5.1 -1.9 -18.4 -1.9 
Unemployment rate pp change      
mean 1.5 1.6 -0.2 1.6 -1.7 
median 1.1 1.4 0.5 1.1 -1.6 
max 4.6 4.7 1.7 10.0 0.7 
min -0.5 0.0 -3.9 -2.7 -4.8 
Real wages growth (GDP deflator)      
mean 7.5 1.0 2.8 0.9 2.2 
median 8.3 1.2 3.2 0.4 1.3 
max 22.8 5.0 8.0 16.9 21.6 
min -1.5 -9.0 -1.6 -9.6                 -8.3
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Graph I.2.3 shows the difference between the 
actual change in unemployment rate and the 
change predicted on the basis of historical 
relationship between GDP growth and changes in 
the unemployment rate (negative values imply that 
the fall in unemployment is stronger than 
expected).  
Graph I.2.3: Changes in unemployment rate unexplained 
by GDP growth in 2014 and 2015 (cumulative, 
percentage points) 
 
(1) The graph shows the gap between the actual change 
in the unemployment rate and the change predicted on 
the basis of GDP growth. A negative value means that 
unemployment fell faster (or increased by less) than 
predicted based on economic growth. 
(2) The relationship between the change in unemployment 
and GDP growth is also called “Okun’s law”. The graph is 
based on an estimated relationship for EU Member States 
in which 1 ppt of additional GDP growth reduces 
unemployment by 0.29 ppts. The expected change in 
unemployment at zero economic growth is estimated by 
country-specific constant terms.  
Source: Commission services based on Eurostat 
Stronger-than-expected declines in unemployment 
occurred in almost all countries in 2014 and 2015, 
most notably in Lithuania, Portugal, Estonia and 
Greece. Only in Finland were changes in the 
unemployment rate less beneficial than predicted 
based on GDP growth over the two years. In a few 
other countries, unemployment developed in line 
with GDP growth (Sweden, Belgium and Italy). 
Various factors may have contributed to the strong 
unemployment response. The drop of 
unemployment comes after marked job destruction 
during the crisis beyond what could be expected on 
the basis of past trends. At the same time, as 
shown in Chapter 1, the recovery was fuelled by a 
revival of domestic demand, which usually is more 
conducive to job creation than an export-led 
upturn. In addition, labour market reforms and 
measures taken over these years may be fostering 
job creation. Finally, the recovery was 
accompanied only by a minor increase in average 
hours worked. 
2.3. EMPLOYMENT AND ACTIVITY RATES, 
HOURS WORKED AND JOB MARKET 
FLOWS 
In 2015, employment increased in nearly all EU 
countries. The number of employed persons rose at 
the highest rate in Luxembourg and Spain by about 
5% and 3%, respectively, compared to EU and 
euro area averages of about 1%. Additional 
evidence from the first half of 2016 suggests a 
strengthening of those developments. Employment 
and activity rates have increased in most countries 
in 2015, while the number of discouraged workers 
(i.e. inactive people who stopped looking for a job 
because they feel they would not find one) 
declined, especially where employment expanded 
the most. At the same time, the rising number of 
persons employed in 2015 was accompanied by 
largely unchanged, or at times falling, average 
hours per worker.  
2.3.1. Employment and activity rates  
In 2015, employment and activity rates went up in 
almost every Member State(Table I.2.1). More 
than half of EU countries recorded gains in the 
employment rate of at least 1 percentage point, in 
particular Eastern European countries and those 
most hit by the crisis. The gains surpassed 2 
percentage points in Estonia and Hungary. 
Increases in employment rates were more limited 
in Member States with already above-average 
employment rates and in most large EU countries. 
Employment rates declined only in Luxembourg, 
Finland and Belgium; and in the last two countries 
by low margins.  
The activity rate increased nearly everywhere but 
less than employment rates, which is consistent 
with the observed declines in the unemployment 
rate. Increases in excess of 1 percentage point were 
recorded in countries such as Hungary, Estonia, 
Malta and Latvia. The activity rate declined only 
in Cyprus, and, marginally, in Germany and 
Belgium.  
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As shown in Chapter 1, activity rates have been 
resilient since 2008. In fact, labour force 
participation often increased across the income 
distribution and especially for those living in 
poorest households. In particular, in the countries 
that were hit the hardest by the crisis such as 
Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal, 
participation of those in the lowest quartile of the 
income distribution increased faster than for the 
higher quartiles in the years following the crisis  
(Box I.2.2). 
The share of marginally attached workers (i.e. the 
proportion of the inactive who are available to 
work but not actively search for a job) declined in 
around half of the EU Member States while the 
share of discouraged workers (i.e. those marginally 
attached workers that do not search for a job 
because they believe that no jobs are available) 
declined for more than two thirds of the EU 
countries (Table I.2.1). The most significant 
declines were recorded in Romania, Slovenia, 
Spain, Slovenia, Ireland, and Denmark. Yet the 
stability in the ranking of the stocks of marginally 
attached workers and, within this group, of 
discouraged workers – with highest percentages in 
Italy, Bulgaria and Portugal and the lowest in 
Denmark, UK and Malta – suggests that, beyond 
cyclical developments, factors such as the low 
labour market transitions of specific groups of the 
population influence individuals' decisions to 
search for jobs.  
 
Table I.2.1: Employment and activity rates and shares of marginally attached and discouraged workers: 2013-2015 
 
(1) Marginally attached workers are defined as inactive persons (aged 15-74) who are available to work but are not actively 
searching for a job, expressed as a share of the total inactive population. Discouraged workers are defined as marginally 
attached workers who are not seeking employment because they think no work is available, based on questionnaires about 
the reasons for not looking for work, expressed as a share of the total inactive population. Countries are sorted according to 
the decreasing order of the employment rate in 2015. Employment is based on the resident concept.  Employment and 
activity rates refer to age group 15-64. 
Source: Eurostat, LFS 
 
2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015 2013 2014 2015
SE 74.4 74.9 75.5 81.1 81.5 81.7 9.8 9.3 8.4 3.0 2.8 2.4
NL 73.6 73.1 74.1 79.4 79.0 79.6 14.9 15.1 14.7 6.3 5.9 5.4
DE 73.5 73.8 74.0 77.6 77.7 77.6 8.1 8.2 8.5 1.9 1.6 1.6
DK 72.5 72.8 73.5 78.1 78.1 78.5 12.2 13.5 11.8 0.5 0.5 0.4
UK 70.5 71.9 72.7 76.4 76.7 76.9 14.3 13.9 13.9 0.5 0.5 0.4
EE 68.5 69.6 71.9 75.1 75.2 76.7 15.4 15.5 15.2 3.9 3.6 3.7
AT 71.4 71.1 71.1 75.5 75.4 75.5 20.0 20.3 21.1 0.7 0.8 0.6
CZ 67.7 69.0 70.2 72.9 73.5 74.0 5.0 4.5 4.6 0.6 0.8 0.8
FI 68.9 68.7 68.5 75.2 75.4 75.8 11.4 12.7 13.3 6.1 6.8 6.3
LV 65.0 66.3 68.1 74.0 74.6 75.7 19.9 17.2 17.6 8.5 7.9 6.8
LT 63.7 65.7 67.2 72.4 73.7 74.1 4.6 3.7 4.6 2.5 2.3 2.3
LU 65.7 66.6 66.1 69.9 70.8 70.9 18.2 16.8 21.6 1.2 1.2 1.5
EU28 64.1 64.8 65.6 72.0 72.3 72.5 12.1 12.2 11.9 5.6 5.7 5.2
SI 63.3 63.9 65.2 70.5 70.9 71.8 13.0 14.5 10.3 3.8 5.2 3.8
EA19 63.4 63.8 64.5 72.2 72.3 72.4 11.7 12.1 12.1 6.1 6.3 6.1
HU 58.1 61.8 63.9 64.7 67.0 68.6 11.6 10.4 10.0 6.6 5.3 4.2
MT 60.8 62.4 63.9 65.0 66.3 67.6 14.6 13.3 14.2 1.4 0.8 0.5
PT 60.6 62.6 63.9 73.0 73.2 73.4 14.5 14.7 13.9 12.6 12.1 11.3
FR 64.1 63.8 63.8 71.1 71.1 71.3 5.9 6.7 6.9 2.7 2.9 3.6
IE 60.5 61.7 63.3 69.8 69.8 70.0 10.9 9.3 7.9 4.2 3.4 2.5
BG 59.5 61.0 62.9 68.4 69.0 69.3 12.1 11.3 10.4 14.0 13.5 12.2
PL 60.0 61.7 62.9 67.0 67.9 68.1 15.2 14.9 13.6 6.2 6.3 6.0
CY 61.7 62.1 62.7 73.6 74.3 73.9 13.1 13.6 13.1 6.4 7.5 7.4
SK 59.9 61.0 62.7 69.9 70.3 70.9 5.9 5.9 6.3 0.9 1.4 2.0
BE 61.8 61.9 61.8 67.5 67.7 67.6 7.2 7.0 6.4 4.8 4.4 4.2
RO 60.1 61.0 61.4 64.9 65.7 66.1 12.0 11.2 7.3 9.1 8.6 3.5
ES 54.8 56.0 57.8 74.3 74.2 74.3 13.5 12.7 11.5 7.4 7.1 5.5
IT 55.5 55.7 56.3 63.4 63.9 64.0 19.4 21.0 21.6 12.5 13.9 13.7
HR 52.5 54.6 55.8 63.7 66.1 66.8 13.9 12.1 12.2 7.8 5.3 5.5
EL 48.8 49.4 50.8 67.5 67.4 67.8 4.5 4.5 4.9 1.9 1.6 1.4
Employment rate Activity rate 
Share of marginally attached 
workers
Share of discouraged workers
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Table I.2.2: Drivers of the employment rate, 2013-2015 
(cumulative changes) 
 
(1) Countries are ranked by decreasing order of the 
change in the employment rate over the years 2013-2015. 
Population aged 15-64 is considered for working-age 
population. (2) In the formula, At refers to the number of 
active individuals, Ut refers to the number of unemployed, 
while WAPt refers to the working-age population. See also 
the previous footnote. 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data. 
 
Demographic trends may also impact employment 
and activity rates. Table I.2.2 disentangles recent 
changes in the employment rate due to changes in 
the number of employed and active people and, 
residually, changes in working-age population. (
20
)  
                                                          
(20) The decomposition of the change of employment rate is 
based on the following relationships. First, the employment 
rate in year t is defined as the ratio of employment (Et) to 
working-age population (WAPt). The change in the 
employment rate is then decomposed into the change in 
employment and the change in working-age population in 
the following way: (Et / WAPt) – (Et-1 / WAPt-1) = [(Et – 
Et-1) / WAPt] + [(Et-1 / WAPt) – (Et-1 / WAPt-1)], where 
the first term in square brackets on the right-hand side of 
the equation isolates the effect of the change in the number 
of employed people, while the second term in square 
brackets is the effect of the change in working-age 
population. In a final step, the first term can be further 
decomposed into the effect of active population and 
unemployed population, using the relationship that 
employment (Et) is equal to active population (At) minus 
For the majority of EU Member States the number 
of unemployed people dropped (i.e., where figures 
in column (3) are positive) while the number of 
active people kept rising (i.e., where figures in 
column (2) are positive), both developments 
contributing to an increasing employment rate.  
Demographic trends and international mobility 
also had a sizeable impact. In particular, for two 
thirds of the EU countries, shrinking working-age 
populations contributed to increasing employment 
rates (i.e., in countries for which the figure in 
column (4) is positive). The decline in the labour 
force depends on a number of factors, including, 
inter alia, ageing, low fertility rates, and net 
emigration flows.  
For instance, in the case of Latvia, Portugal and 
Spain, falling unemployment was accompanied by 
significant decreases in active population and 
working-age population. In the decomposition of 
Table  I.2.2, a decrease in active population has a 
negative contribution to the employment rate 
(column 2), while a decrease in working-age 
population has the opposite (‘mechanical’) effect, 
as it affects the employment-to-population ratio 
positively (column 4). In Central European 
countries (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia), decreases in working-age 
population were accompanied by stable, or even 
increased, active population due to comparatively 
high activity rates of young cohorts and increasing 
activity rates among older cohorts related, as in the 
case of Hungary, to restrictions in early retirement, 
among other factors.  
Overall, factors related to demography and 
international mobility were playing a role not only 
in countries with rapid ageing of the population 
(e.g. Bulgaria or Finland) but also in the Baltic and 
Eastern European countries and in countries hit by 
the debt crisis (e.g. Cyprus, Portugal, Greece and 
Spain). The working age population rose in 
Luxembourg, and, to a lesser extent, France and 
Austria.  
                                                                                   
unemployed population (Ut) (Et = At – Ut). Columns (2) to 
(4) of Table I.2.2 correspond to these three components.  
 
Components explained by:
Change in 
active 
population
Change in 
unemployed 
population 
(opposite sign)
(∆At/WAPt) (-∆Ut/WAPt)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HU 7.3 3.3 2.5 1.4
LT 5.2 -0.4 3.3 2.3
LV 5.1 -3.1 4.5 3.8
MT 4.8 4.7 0.3 -0.3
EE 4.7 -0.5 3.1 2.1
IE 4.4 -0.1 3.8 0.8
BG 4.1 -0.6 2.3 2.5
CZ 3.7 0.4 1.4 1.9
PL 3.2 0.1 1.8 1.4
SK 3.0 0.6 1.7 0.7
UK 2.8 1.2 1.9 -0.3
PT 2.5 -2.0 2.8 1.7
HR 2.3 1.7 -0.4 1.1
ES 2.1 -1.7 2.5 1.3
SE 1.8 2.2 0.3 -0.7
RO 1.2 0.1 0.0 1.1
SI 1.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.5
DE 1.0 1.1 0.5 -0.7
DK 0.9 0.5 1.0 -0.6
LU 0.3 7.2 -1.4 -5.4
EL 0.0 -1.3 0.0 1.2
BE -0.1 1.0 -0.7 -0.3
FR -0.2 2.2 -0.9 -1.5
NL -0.3 0.3 -0.9 0.3
AT -0.3 1.7 -0.7 -1.3
IT -0.3 0.4 -0.9 0.1
FI -0.8 -0.5 -1.3 1.0
CY -2.0 -2.4 -2.0 2.5
Change in 
employment 
rate (pps)
Change in 
working age 
population 
(opposite sign)
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2.3.1. The adjustment of hours worked 
Increasing headcount employment has been 
accompanied by a very muted increase in hours 
worked since the start of the recovery. In 2015, 
hours worked changed little and even declined 
further in nearly half of the EU countries; these 
have been followed by only slightly higher 
readings in the first and second quarters of 2016 
(Graph I.2.4). Even for countries where job 
creation has been solid and the labour market 
became tighter recently, hours have seldom picked 
up in a meaningful way.  
Average hours worked per employee stand at 
levels higher than before the crisis only in a 
minority of EU countries. In the aftermath of the 
crisis, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, and Malta 
recorded the sharpest cumulated falls. The UK, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Finland posted the 
 
 
 
 
 
Box I.2.2: Temporary employment in upswings and downturns
How much do changes in the share of temporary employment reflect cyclical fluctuations? It can be 
expected that in periods of economic slack when the economy is below its potential, the beginning of the 
economic recovery may trigger first an increase in the relative importance of temporary employment as 
employers are risk averse and may fear that the economic recovery is too fragile, uncertain or even possibly 
short-lived to hire on a permanent basis. Only when economic growth has proven to be stable, are open-
ended contracts more likely to be offered instead of temporary positions. As a result, one may expect a 
different relation between the share of temporary employment and economic growth depending on whether 
the economy is below or above its potential: the relation between changes in the output gap and the share of 
temporary employment being positive in the former and negative in the latter. Table 1 shows the impact of 
the cycle on the share of temporary employment. Cyclical developments are proxied by the output gap (the 
gap between actual GDP and its potential level). To analyse whether the impact of economic growth is 
different in economic upswings than in downturns, a distinction is made between positive and negative 
output gaps.   
The effect of the cycle on the share of temporary employment is found to be only significant when the 
economy is below its potential. In these periods, a 1 percentage point increase in the output gap is expected 
to lead an increase of about 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points in the share of temporary employment in the various 
specifications. There is no significant effect of economic growth on the share of temporary employment in 
periods when the economy is above potential. These findings are robust to alternative specifications of the 
estimated model. An alternative model specification which includes the output gap and its squared term as 
explanatory variables confirms the hypothesis that the share of temporary employment responds differently 
according to which phase of the business cycle the economy is. In case the output gap is negative or slightly 
positive, there is a positive correlation between the output gap and the share of temporary employment. 
However, in case the output gap increases further, the correlation becomes negative. 
Table 1: Drivers of changes in the share of temporary employment 
  Model A Model B Model C 
Output gap (when positive)  -0.0103 -0.0429 -0.256 
  (0.0759) (0.0967) (0.187) 
Output gap (when negative)   0.234*** 0.220*** 0.311** 
  (0.0702) (0.0832) (0.149) 
Constant 19.02*** 18.28*** 18.44*** 
  (0.612) (0.826) (1.383) 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE No Yes Yes 
Observations 5316 5316 2323 
R-squared 0.496 0.497 0.471 
Note: The output gap is the difference, in percentage points, between actual and potential GDP. The share of 
temporary employment is the percentage of temporary employees in the total number of employees employed in a 
specific sector. The sample period is 2000-2015; the sample includes all 28 EU member states; Depending on the 
data availability in the individual country, model A and B include the sectors NACE Rev.2 A-U (except O – 
public administration); Model C is based on a subsample and only includes the sectors with a higher-than-average 
share of temporary employment. The sectors included are NACE Rev. 2 A, B, F, H, N, P, Q, R, S and T.  
 *** 1% significant, ** 5% significant, * 10% significant; Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors' analysis based on EU-LFS data and AMECO. 
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largest gains. Although these patterns can hint to 
the existence of some labour market slack, they 
should also be seen against the long-term trend of 
falling average hours per worker. The latter 
predates the crisis and can reflect changes in the 
structure of employment with increased 
importance of services, where the overall amount 
of hours are lower and the work schedule more 
flexible than the more standardised production 
activities in construction or manufacturing. In 
2015, the diffusion of part-time does not seem to 
have played a role in bringing down average hours 
as in previous years, as the share of part-time over 
total employment remained largely constant at 
about 20%, after some marked increases during the 
crisis years. 
2.3.2. Employment developments at sectoral 
level 
Employment in market services recorded the 
strongest growth in the majority of countries 
(Table I.2.3). Consistent with the dynamism of 
domestic demand, areas like accommodation, food 
service activities and information and 
communication recorded the strongest gains; 
employment in public administration, health and 
education often grew at similar rates.  
 
Table I.2.3: Employment growth in different sectors over 
the years 2013-2015 (cumulative % change) 
 
Countries are ranked by decreasing order of total 
employment growth over the years 2013-2015. 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts. 
 
 
Industry Construction
Market 
services
Public admin, health, 
education
MT -2.3 9.9 11.0 10.3
HU 1.6 4.8 5.5 4.8
LU -1.2 2.7 5.8 5.4
IE 6.1 20.1 4.1 5.3
UK 2.3 7.9 5.0 4.9
EE 1.4 10.2 8.9 5.9
LT -0.3 17.3 2.3 2.8
SE -3.5 5.6 4.5 5.6
PL 5.9 -4.9 3.7 2.8
SK 2.2 -5.7 2.4 1.1
DE 1.0 1.0 1.8 2.2
LV -5.2 12.7 4.6 3.2
CZ 4.1 -6.9 1.4 1.3
DK -0.3 4.2 2.6 2.7
AT 0.2 -0.1 2.1 2.3
EU28 0.1 -3.2 2.2 2.2
HR -3.2 0.5 3.6 3.1
FR -2.4 -3.7 0.4 0.2
EA19 -1.2 -5.7 1.0 1.3
BE -5.5 -3.8 -1.3 -1.3
ES -0.9 -11.7 2.2 2.9
SI -0.5 -7.4 0.3 0.1
BG -0.7 -1.9 1.2 0.3
PT 3.6 -11.1 1.5 0.9
NL -1.7 -10.2 0.3 1.0
RO -0.4 -4.2 9.3 8.5
IT -4.6 -13.2 -1.0 -0.9
FI -7.3 -1.7 -1.5 -2.2
EL -3.0 -25.1 2.4 3.8
CY -13.2 -32.6 -3.5 -3.3
Graph I.2.4: Change in number of employees and of total hours worked (cumulative % change since 2009q1) 
 
Note:  Countries are ordered by increasing order of % change in the number of employees between 2009q1 and 2016q1. 
Full data are not available for Croatia, and Romania; values for number of employees for Luxembourg and Malta are out of 
scale (+17.1% and +24% respectively between 2009q1 and 2016q1). There is a break in the data series for hours worked in 
Hungary in 2010q1. 
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts. 
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(Continued on the next page) 
 
Box I.2.3: Structure of employment per sectors and temporary work
How does the sectorial structure of employment affect the change of temporary employment? A shift-share 
analysis is applied here to decompose changes in the share of temporary employment in total employment 
into three components: a within-sector temporary employment component, an across-sector total employment 
component, and an interaction component. The first component, the within-sector temporary employment 
component identifies changes in the weight of temporary employment at the sectorial level for an unchanged 
sectorial employment structure. The second component, the across-sector total employment component 
measures the shift in the structure of employment across the economy, for a given sectorial structure of 
temporary employment. Finally, the third component, the interaction component measures the change in 
temporary employment due to changes in the sectorial structure of both of temporary employment and total 
employment. In symbols:  
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 − 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡−1 = 𝑒𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ ∆
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ ∆𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∆𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐼
𝑖=1
∆𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡  = Share of temporary employment in total employment in period t; 𝑇𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡  = Share of temporary 
employment in sector i in total employment in sector i in period t; 𝑒𝑖𝑡   = Share of employment in total 
employment in sector i in period t; i = {A, ….  , U} NACE sector classification, 
Graph 1: Decomposition of growth of share of temporary employment, 2008-2012 and 2013-2015 
 
Note: No data on temporary employment by sector available for Lithuania. 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat, Labour Force Survey. 
The shift-share analysis reveals that changes in the share of temporary employment within the different 
sectors account for a large proportion of the changes in the total share of temporary employment – both up or 
down (Graph 1). Thus, for countries where the overall share of temporary employment varied the most, the 
changes of temporary employment in different sectors have been more important than the shifts in the 
structure of the economy towards or away from sectors that use relatively more temporary employment. This 
holds both the years of the crisis and for the period of the recovery (i.e. years 2008-2012 and the period 2013-
2015 respectively), e.g. Greece and Spain in 2008-12 and Bulgaria, Ireland and Latvia in 2013-15).  
On the other hand, changes in the structure of employment across the economy prevailed over changes in 
sectorial temporary employment in the cases of Cyprus (in 2008-2012) and Hungary (in 2013-2015): in these 
countries, the structure of employment tilted towards sectors where temporary contracts were relatively more 
common and thereby contributed to a change in share of temporary employment for the whole economy with 
the relevance of temporary employment within the different sectors changing little. In some countries, the 
within-sector temporary employment and across-sector total employment component offset each other to a 
certain extent, thereby limiting the growth of temporary employment. This is for example the case of 
Denmark, Latvia and Slovenia in 2008-12, Cyprus, Finland and the Netherlands in 2013-15.  
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The services sector as a whole (public and private), 
rather than export-driven activities, accounted for 
an ever-growing share of employment. 
Employment in services declined only in Cyprus, 
Finland, Belgium and Italy between 2013 and 
2015. Over the years 2013-2015, employment in 
construction exhibited marked variations across 
countries, reflecting different financing and 
demand conditions as well as different stages in 
the adjustment after the booms in construction 
recorded in a number of countries in the 2000s. Job 
creation in this sector has been quite robust in 
Ireland and the Baltics, while it declined in 
Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. 
2.3.3. Employment developments by contract 
type 
The labour market recovery has been characterised 
by a strong expansion of temporary employment –
growing by 3% in 2015 following the strong 
growth of 2014.  
Graph I.2.5: Employment growth by type of contract, EU 
28 
 
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, age group: 15-64. 
The number of permanent positions also expanded, 
especially more recently, yet it lagged temporary 
job creation, such that the share of the latter in 
total employment edged up in 2014 and again in 
2015. The number of self-employed slightly 
dropped along the trend of the last years (Graph 
I.2.5).  
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Across the EU, the increase in temporary employment over the years 2013-15 was particularly prevalent in 
sectors such as arts, entertainment and recreation; transportation and storage; wholesales; and construction. In 
contrast, it was less important in information and communication, manufacturing; education; and 
professional, scientific and technical activities (Table 1). 
Table 1: Percentage point change in the share of temporary employment, 2013-2015 
 
Note: No data on temporary employment by sector available for Lithuania. 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat, Labour Force Survey. 
Total Accomm
odation 
& food 
service 
Administ
rative & 
support 
service 
Agricultu
re, 
forestry 
& fishing
Arts, 
entertain
ment & 
recreatio
n
Construc
tion
Educatio
n
Financial 
& 
insuranc
e 
Human 
health & 
social 
work
Informati
on & 
communi
cation
Manufact
uring
Professi
onal, 
scientific 
& 
technical 
Public 
administ
ration
Transpor
tation & 
storage
Wholesa
le & 
retail 
trade
HR 5.1 8.7 8.7 4.6 10.0 6.8 0.9 6.9 2.3 9.2 4.9 3.9 2.0 1.6 5.1
SK 3.1 7.7 -9.2 0.6 -1.1 3.3 2.7 3.5 1.6 12.2 1.8 5.0
LU 2.0 3.5 5.3 5.1 2.5 2.0 2.5 1.0 2.7 4.2
ES 1.8 1.2 1.5 4.0 0.8 5.2 1.7 0.5 1.1 -1.1 3.4 0.2 2.8 0.1 2.2
SI 1.4 4.2 2.6 2.4 -0.9 1.6 -0.3 -0.8 0.5 -2.8 0.9 0.9 1.1 2.1 1.5
EL 1.3 3.1 1.8 1.3 3.7 2.0 0.5 0.3 3.2 -0.4 0.9 0.7 1.1
CY 1.3 4.8 3.7 -2.5 -2.4 4.8 -4.2 7.5 3.4 0.7 3.7 3.2 -3.5 1.9 2.9
PL 1.0 5.6 -0.6 0.3 2.4 1.3 0.4 3.3 1.3 -2.4 2.6 0.3 3.0 1.9
PT 1.0 1.8 4.4 3.9 -2.5 0.7 -2.8 0.7 -1.3 -0.1 1.6 1.2 -0.6 2.6 2.4
CZ 0.8 -0.1 -1.1 -0.6 -3.3 -0.4 0.3 1.9 1.2 1.9 1.1 -0.4 1.2 0.8
IT 0.7 2.3 0.3 1.3 4.2 0.1 -0.3 -1.0 0.5 -0.3 1.6 -0.3 -0.5 2.4 -0.1
BE 0.7 0.0 4.8 1.2 0.2 0.6 -0.2 0.6 -1.1 1.4 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.9
FR 0.7 0.1 -1.0 -0.2 4.0 -0.7 3.7 0.4 0.3 -1.0 1.7 0.1 2.1 -0.4 -0.2
HU 0.4 -1.7 1.0 2.7 1.6 -1.5 0.1 -0.4 -0.9 -1.3 -0.1 6.3 -0.5 -1.4
SE 0.3 -2.3 4.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 -0.4 0.6 0.5 -0.7 0.2 -0.4 -0.8 0.2 0.6
MT 0.0 -7.0 -1.7 2.1 1.4 0.1 -1.0 4.5 -1.8 1.4
UK 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.6 -0.9 -0.6 0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.3 -0.2 0.5
RO 0.0 0.2 0.5 -0.2
AT -0.1 -2.0 -1.0 1.2 -1.2 1.9 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.3
DK -0.1 1.1 -2.1 -2.0 1.0 -0.7 -0.8 -0.2 0.4 -1.5 1.3 0.4
DE -0.1 0.8 -0.3 1.7 -0.6 -0.6 -0.9 -0.1 -0.4 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1
EE -0.2 -1.0 -2.2 0.5 -0.4 -0.5
NL -0.3 -1.4 -1.3 -1.2 -0.3 -0.2 1.2 -1.5 -1.5 -2.4 1.1 -1.5 1.1 -1.2 -0.3
FI -0.3 -1.0 0.7 -0.4 -2.0 1.4 -0.6 -0.8 -0.1 -2.4 -3.0 0.9
LV -0.6 -1.6 -1.3 0.8 0.0 -0.7 -1.6 0.0
BG -1.0 0.2 -14.2 1.8 -1.4 -0.3 -1.2 -2.2 -1.1
IE -1.0 -1.3 -1.3 1.3 -0.4 -3.8 -0.9 -1.5 -2.4 -0.6 -1.7 0.7 -0.6 -0.2
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As shown in Box I.2.2, the increase in temporary 
contracts is typical of the early stages of economic 
recoveries – i.e. when GDP growth becomes 
positive but GDP level is below potential (negative 
output gap). As the economic recovery proceeds, 
employment grows stronger on the basis of open-
end positions and the temporary employment share 
is expected to recede. Similarly, during downturns 
the share of temporary employment falls as the 
share of expired but not renewed contracts 
increase.  
In 2015, the number of temporary employees 
increased by double-digit rates in some countries 
(e.g., Slovakia and Croatia) and declined sharply in 
others (e.g., Lithuania and Bulgaria). Whereas very 
often strong growth in temporary contracts 
occurred in countries that had recorded dynamic 
job creation, also countries with below-average 
improvements like France and Italy recorded a 
visible expansion of temporary employment. On 
the other hand, fast increases in temporary work or 
self-employment are not necessary conditions for 
rising employment figures as the cases of Ireland 
and UK show as all the net job creation was on 
permanent contracts (Graph I.2.6). The 
developments in some countries may also reflect 
recent reforms affecting the possibilities of using 
fixed-term contracts (e.g. Croatia where changes 
went in the direction of broadening those 
possibilities and where the share of temporary 
employment increased visibly). The path of 
Graph I.2.6: Dynamics of open-ended and temporary contracts (year-on-year % change, 2009q1-2016q1) 
 
(1) Age group: 15-64. 
Source: European Commission calculations based on Eurostat, Labour Force Survey. 
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temporary contracts is also linked to the structure 
of the economy, with temporary contracts more 
likely to be found in the service sector, which has 
been growing the most during the current recovery. 
Box I.2.3 provides insight on the impact of 
changes in the structure of the economy on the 
relative importance of temporary contracts. 
Differences across Member States with respect to 
contractual relationships can be significant. In 
some countries, a low share of open-ended 
employment goes hand in hand with a 
comparatively high incidence of self-employment, 
while in others it is linked to the prevalence of 
fixed-term employment (Table I.2.4). This depends 
on institutional and legal features, structure of 
employment and labour demand. 
 
Table I.2.4: Distribution of contract type among the 
employed (%) 
 
(1) Countries are ranked decreasing share of open-end 
contracts in 2015. Change refers to the change in the ratio 
compared with the previous year (in percentage points). 
Source: European Commission. 
 
2.3.4. Job market flows 
Changes in unemployment are the result of two 
countervailing labour market flows: job 
separations (inflows into unemployment from 
employment) and job findings (outflows from 
unemployment into employment). The drop of 
unemployment from its peak, especially in 
countries that had been most affected by the 
financial crisis, was driven initially by a decline in 
the job separation rate (or, somewhat more loosely, 
the rate of job destruction, i.e., the number of 
layoffs). In contrast, job finding rates have edged 
up only recently. This reflects the consolidation of 
the economic recovery and/or possibly a reduction 
of the number of those unemployed with a low 
probability of finding a job. (
21
)  
Falls in job separation rates in 2015 were 
particularly visible in countries where they had 
increased the most during the crisis, notably 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and the Baltics 
(Graphs I.2.7 and I.2.8). But also a number of 
countries less affected by the crisis have recorded 
lower probabilities of losing a job, e.g., Denmark, 
Poland, UK and Germany. Even if from low 
levels, in 2015 separation rates have still been 
growing in Cyprus and Austria and have started to 
decline only more recently. (
22
) 
Job finding rates have kept mildly improving in 
most of EU countries from the low points 
witnessed during the recession. Some of the 
strongest improvements in job finding rates have 
taken place in the countries most hit by the debt 
crisis, especially in the Baltics and to a lesser 
extent Ireland, Portugal and Italy. Job finding rates 
have trended up also in Greece and Spain, albeit 
only gradually. Yet, with the exception of few 
countries, the pace of hiring remains below the one 
observed in pre-crisis years, in some cases by a 
large margin.  
Job finding probabilities are at their lowest levels 
since a decade in Austria, and Finland, while 
improving only gradually in Cyprus, Greece and 
Spain. These developments may in part explain the 
persistence in long-term unemployment in the 
latter countries. 
                                                          
(21) Darby, Haltiwanger and Plant (1985) claim that the average 
job finding rate can be expected to be countercyclical – in 
the sense of being lower over recessions and higher over 
expansions – and the average spell in unemployment 
procyclical. That happens if the composition of job-losers 
changes systematically over the business cycle, and groups 
that experience longer durations of unemployment, i.e. 
lower job-finding rates, enter unemployment in 
proportionally greater numbers during a recession. That 
result happens even if the spells of individual 
unemployment are acyclical and individuals search 
optimally independently of the cycle. 
(22) The methodology for computing job separation and finding 
rates follows the one as in Elsby (2009). 
2015 change 2015 change 2015 change
LU 88.1 -1.2 5.8 1.2 6.1 -0.1
EE 87.6 -0.3 3.0 0.2 9.4 0.1
LT 85.9 0.4 1.8 -0.6 12.3 0.2
DK 85.8 0.1 7.6 0.1 6.6 -0.3
LV 84.1 -1.2 3.2 0.3 12.7 0.9
UK 82.7 0.6 5.0 -0.2 12.3 -0.5
MT 82.4 0.5 6.0 -0.3 11.7 -0.2
HU 80.7 -0.5 9.7 0.5 9.6 0.0
SE 80.7 0.3 14.6 -0.2 4.7 -0.2
AT 79.4 0.4 7.6 0.0 13.0 -0.4
DE 79.2 0.2 10.8 0.0 10.0 -0.2
CZ 77.3 0.3 7.9 0.3 14.7 -0.6
SK 76.2 -1.2 9.5 1.6 14.3 -0.4
IE 75.8 0.6 7.0 -0.5 17.2 -0.2
BE 75.8 -0.3 7.5 0.2 16.7 0.1
FR 75.8 0.2 13.5 0.0 10.8 -0.2
FI 75.2 0.1 12.5 -0.3 12.3 0.2
EU28 73.6 0.1 11.3 0.2 15.1 -0.3
EA19 72.9 -0.1 12.3 0.3 14.7 -0.2
CY 72.1 0.0 15.6 -0.1 12.3 0.1
RO 71.1 2.7 1.0 0.0 27.9 -2.6
BG 70.1 1.0 3.3 -0.6 26.6 -0.5
NL 67.5 0.9 15.3 -0.9 17.1 0.0
HR 67.1 -2.7 16.9 2.8 16.0 -0.1
ES 66.5 -0.7 20.0 1.0 13.4 -0.3
PT 66.4 -0.3 17.6 0.7 16.0 -0.3
SI 65.7 -1.3 14.4 1.2 19.9 0.1
IT 64.9 -0.1 9.7 0.4 25.4 -0.2
EL 60.2 0.6 6.9 0.3 32.9 -0.8
PL 56.7 0.3 22.0 -0.2 21.3 -0.1
Open-ended Temporary  Self   
contracts contracts employed
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Graph I.2.7: Job finding and job separation rates 2008q1-2016q1 
 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data. 
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39 
Graph I.2.8: Job finding and job separation rates 2008q1-2016q1 cont. 
 
Source:  European Commission based on Eurostat data. 
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A lengthening of unemployment spells is the 
mirror image of depressed job finding rates. In 
most EU countries, the average duration of 
unemployment measured in late 2015 was the 
highest level in the past decade (Graph I.2.10).  
 
Graph I.2.10: Unemployment duration in months 
 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data. 
In fact, only in few countries is the unemployment 
duration lower now than in the past ten years; and 
in all cases only by small margins. 
2.4. TRENDS IN WAGES AND LABOUR COSTS 
2.4.1. Wage developments in nominal terms 
Differences in wage developments across EU and 
euro-area countries were significant but declining 
in 2015. (
23
) In nearly half of the EU countries, 
                                                          
(23) Compensation per employee is obtained from national 
accounts as compensation of employees divided by total 
number of employees. Compensation of employees has two 
compensation per employee grew at an unchanged 
pace, or even decelerated, most notably in those 
that had shown faster wage growth in 2014. (
24
) At 
the same time, wages continued to fall – although 
at much lower rates – in countries that had marked 
wage cuts in earlier years (Graph I.2.9).  
In general, countries with lower-than-average pay 
levels, for instance Eastern European countries, 
recorded stronger wage growth. At the same time, 
pay increases in euro area countries tended to be 
lower than the ones in non-euro area economies. 
Pay increases were at the fastest pace in the 
Baltics, in particular Latvia. Sweden and Hungary 
also recorded a relatively high growth of 
compensation per employee. On the opposite side, 
Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Croatia displayed 
further falls in nominal terms. However, these 
wage cuts were more limited than in previous 
years, reflecting also receding labour market slack. 
The largest euro area countries saw varying rates 
of wage growth. Compensation per employee grew 
by 2.7% in Germany, by 1.2% in France (about the 
euro area average), and 0.5% in Spain and Italy – 
but linked with falling average hours in Spain and 
increasing hours in Italy. Wage growth changed 
little in these countries since 2014; the largest 
                                                                                   
components: 1) Wages and salaries payable in cash or in 
kind; 2) Social contributions payable by employers. When 
not relevant the terms compensation, wages and pay are 
used inter-changeably. 
(24) The acceleration noticed for the EU as a whole was largely 
driven by a 10% appreciation of the UK's Pound (GBP). 
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Graph I.2.9: Nominal compensation per employee, annual % change 
 
(1) Countries are displayed in ascending order of the unemployment rate in 2014. 
Source: AMECO database on the basis of Eurostat. 
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change was recorded in Spain, where wage growth 
marginally turned from negative to positive, 
followed by Italy; pay dynamics in Germany and 
France were largely unchanged.  
Hourly labour costs developed largely in a similar 
way as compensation per employee (Graph I.2.11). 
In 2015, hourly labour costs increased at the 
highest rate in Latvia and Bulgaria, by around 7%, 
and by more than 5% in Estonia and Lithuania. 
Italy and, especially, Cyprus were the only EU 
countries where hourly labour costs declined by a 
small margin. Overall, most non-euro area 
countries saw their hourly labour costs rise more 
than euro area ones. Among the larger Member 
States, Germany clearly stood out for the sharpest 
increase, at 2.7% – the same progression as for pay 
per worker (Graph I.2.11). Differences between 
pay per hour and per worker were the largest in 
Bulgaria and Poland and negative in Sweden and 
Italy (and Belgium and Finland by a minor extent) 
on account of changes in the number of hours 
worked per worker. 
Cross-country differences in wage dynamics 
reflect to some extent the differences in 
unemployment rates of the previous year. 
Graph I.2.11: Hourly Labour Cost Index, y-o-y % change 
 
Note: Industry, construction and services (except activities of households as employers and extra-territorial organisations and 
bodies). Countries grouped according to the magnitude of variations in the HLCI. Data for Denmark, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Romania are lacking and thereby not displayed. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Graph I.2.12: Philips curve for EU countries: compensation growth and unemployment rate 2000-2007 and 2008-2015 
 
Source: European Commission. 
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Graph I.2.13: Philips curve for EU countries: compensation growth and unemployment rate 2000-2007 and 2008-2015 cont. 
 
Source: European Commission. 
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Still robust growth in compensation per employee 
was recorded in countries with above-average 
unemployment rates (e.g. Latvia, Lithuania or 
Slovakia), while wage restraint was observed also 
in countries with below-average unemployment 
rates (e.g. the Benelux countries). 
The Phillips curve displays the relation between 
wage growth and the level of the unemployment 
rate and informs on how the strength of that 
relation has changed over time (Graphs I.2.12 and 
I.2.13). For some countries (e.g. Belgium, Finland, 
Portugal) the Phillips curve during the recovery is 
steeper than during the previous period of 
recession or weak growth, indicating that wage 
growth is lower than expected based on the level 
of unemployment. The steepening of the Phillips 
curve may reflect “pent-up wage deflation”: 
downward wage rigidities during the recession 
period kept wages above the level consistent with 
higher unemployment; as the recovery proceeds, 
and unemployment falls, wages do not adjust 
upward for those workers that have not 
experienced wage cuts during the recession 
(Yellen, 2014).  
2.4.2. Wage developments in real terms 
In 2015, real consumption wages (i.e. wages 
measured in terms of the goods and services that 
can be purchased with a given wage) increased in 
several countries at faster rates than in earlier years 
(Graph I.2.14). Thus, the support to purchasing 
power stemming from low price inflation, amidst 
moderate growth of nominal wages, helped to 
sustain aggregate demand. Real consumption 
wages expanded at the fastest rates in the Baltics 
and Poland. They receded only in Portugal, Croatia 
and Belgium. As expected, the real consumption 
wage growth was more contained in high 
unemployment countries. 
As in earlier years, wages expressed in terms of 
production prices (real production wages), which 
is a labour cost indicator relevant for labour 
demand decisions, barely grew in 2015. However, 
there were some marked differences across 
countries. The Baltics and Poland recorded the 
highest increases, together with Slovakia. On the 
other hand, the sharpest declines were recorded in 
Ireland (by over 4%), Portugal and Croatia.  
Overall, production wages grew less than 
consumption wages, thereby leading to an increase 
in the profit margins. The differences were the 
largest in Ireland (by over 4%), Romania, Poland 
and Hungary. Only in Slovakia did production 
wages increase more, but by only a very small 
margin, than consumption wages. 
2.4.3. Real compensation per employee, 
productivity and unemployment 
Over the years 2013 to 2015, real wage growth 
lagged behind productivity growth in a large 
number of EU countries. This is most visible in the 
case of Ireland, Croatia, Greece, Portugal, Czech 
Republic and Romania (Graph I.2.15). In contrast, 
wages have risen well above productivity in the 
Baltic states and Bulgaria. Real wage growth 
above productivity was also recorded in Austria, 
Denmark, Germany, Slovakia and Poland, which is 
consistent with low unemployment and tight 
labour markets in these countries.  
Graph I.2.14: Real product and consumption wages, HICP and GDP deflator, annual % change, 2015 
 
Countries are ranked in ascending order of the unemployment rate in 2014. 
Source: AMECO database of the European Commission.  
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Graph I.2.15: Real compensation per employee and 
productivity, average growth rates 2013-2015 
 
(1) Real compensation is the change in nominal 
compensation per employee deflated with GDP deflator. 
(2) Along the diagonal, real product wages growth equal 
productivity growth; points above the diagonal imply that 
real wages grow less than productivity; the opposite for 
points below the diagonal. 
Source: European Commission.  
After a strongly negative correlation between the 
unemployment rate and the growth of real unit 
labour costs during the recession, this relationship 
weakened in 2015 (Graph I.2.16). Real unit labour 
costs appeared less responsive to unemployment, 
particularly in high unemployment countries (e.g. 
Greece, Spain, Cyprus and Croatia). However, 
declines in real unit labour cost were also observed 
in countries hit by the crisis such as Ireland and 
Portugal, owing respectively to strong productivity 
growth and sizable nominal wages cuts. Unit 
labour costs increased most in the Baltic states, 
even though unemployment rates were close to the 
EU average. 
Several explanations can be put forward for this 
weak response of real unit labour costs to the 
unemployment rate in the last two years: the 
substantial adjustment that had already taken place 
in labour costs in previous years, low productivity 
growth, composition effects with job creation 
occurring more in low-pay sectors, the presence of 
downward real wage rigidities in a low inflation 
environment, and the relevance of higher structural 
unemployment that may make labour markets 
tighter than suggested by the headline 
unemployment rates. Wage setting reforms over 
recent years may also have contributed to increase 
the sensitivity of wage growth to recent conditions 
in some countries.  
Graph I.2.16: Unemployment rate in 2014 and the change 
in real unit labour costs (RULC) in 2015 
 
Source: European Commission.  
2.4.1. Compensation per employee at 
sectoral level 
Both the private and public sectors contributed to 
the recent wage dynamics in many countries. 
Overall, the developments of public wages became 
less heterogeneous across the EU and more similar 
to that of the private sector.  
Compared to earlier years, the dynamics of 
aggregate wages in 2015 were less dampened by 
developments in the public sector. Before 2015, 
public wages were cut in countries marked by 
strong fiscal adjustments (Croatia, Cyprus, 
Slovenia, Greece, Portugal, and Spain). This was 
much less the case in 2015, with several countries 
recording increases in public wages (Graph I.2.17).  
On the other hand, public wages slowed down in 
some countries where they had been increasing the 
most before (Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and 
Lithuania). However, an acceleration of 
government wages was observed in Estonia and 
Latvia. For the remaining Member States, changes 
in public sector pay in 2015 were either muted or 
slightly lower than before. 
Pay changes in the public and the private sectors 
have become more aligned than before; in 2015 
public wages rose faster than in the private sector 
in more EU countries than before. Still, among the 
countries recording the largest increases in 
compensation per employee in 2015, the growth 
rate was higher in the public sector only in Latvia. 
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In the private sector, wage developments were 
strongest in trade, transport and accommodation 
and industry, both in the EU and the euro area 
countries (Graph I.2.18). For Member States with 
the strongest aggregate wage growth, pay in 
finance and business services also evolved in line 
with, and sometimes even faster than, the other 
broad sectors (Estonia being the only exception). 
However, the patterns in that sector were more 
heterogeneous for the rest of the countries, 
sometimes trailing behind the other sectors within 
the same country (e.g., Portugal, Croatia, Ireland, 
UK or Bulgaria). To a lesser extent, dispersion was 
observed also for construction, where wages 
declined in Greece, Croatia and the UK but 
increased strongly in Bulgaria. 
2.5. PRICES, UNIT LABOUR COSTS AND THE 
TAX WEDGE 
2.5.1. Nominal unit labour costs  
The growth of nominal unit labour costs remained 
low in 2015 and even declined in various countries 
on the back of a modest increase in productivity and 
sluggish wages (Table I.2.5). As in previous years, 
the increase in unit labour costs was the highest in the 
Baltic countries, followed by Hungary. The sharp 
expansion of compensation per employee and the 
decelerating productivity – in Estonia, the 
productivity level even dropped –, contributed to the 
increases of unit labour costs in these countries. 
 
Graph I.2.17: Compensation per employee in public and private sectors, % change, 2015 and in earlier years 
 
Note: Public sector proxied by public administration and defence, education, health and social work, personal service 
activities. Countries ranked by increasing order of growth of compensation per employee in the public sector in the period 
2014-2014. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Graph I.2.18: Compensation per employee by sector, annual % change, 2015 
 
(1) France and Poland not included because of missing data. Countries are ranked by ascending order of changes in 
average compensation per employee (total economy) in 2015. 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table I.2.5: Decomposition of unit labour costs, annual % 
change, 2015 
 
Note: Countries are ranked by decreasing order of change 
in nominal unit labour costs in 2015. 
Source: Commission services 
 
At the same time, almost half of the EU Member 
States saw their unit labour costs declining in 
2015, albeit at different pace and driven by 
different factors. In Ireland, the strong decline in 
unit labour costs was spurred by fast productivity 
gains, and moderate wage developments. The 
strong increase in productivity in Romania, 
partially offset by wage rises, led the decline in 
nominal unit labour costs. In contrast, pay cuts 
and, in some countries modest productivity gains, 
helped to preserve competitiveness in Cyprus, 
Portugal, Spain or Greece. Among the larger 
Member States, in 2015 unit labour cost continued 
to expand somewhat faster in Germany (slightly 
below 2%), with Italy, France and Spain all close 
to a 0.5% growth rate. Compared with 2014, 
labour costs accelerated in Spain, stabilised in Italy 
and decelerated in France. 
In 2015, the dynamics of unit labour costs in real 
terms often reflected that of nominal unit labour 
costs but with somewhat larger cross-country 
variation given different paths for GDP deflators. 
Once again the Baltics recorded the strongest 
increases in real unit labour costs.  
On the opposite side, the largest falls in real unit 
labour costs often coincided with the ones on the 
nominal unit labour costs and in some cases helped 
by brisk GDP deflators. 
2.5.2. Contribution to the final demand 
deflator  
In 2015, moderate unit labour cost developments 
contributed to keeping inflation in check (Table 
I.2.6). In fact, in around half of the EU countries, 
unit labour cost developments had a negative 
contribution to the domestic demand deflator. 
Estonia and Latvia were the countries where unit 
labour costs added the most to inflation, yet falling 
gross operating surplus (profits) led to low 
inflation pressures in these countries. 
 
Table I.2.6: Contributions to the final demand deflator, 
annual % change, 2015 
 
Source: Commission services 
 
The final demand deflator continued to rise at 
moderate rates in all Member States. In addition to 
stagnant nominal unit labour costs, weak 
developments in gross operating surplus and falls 
in import prices led to moderate increases of the 
final demand deflator. The only exceptions are 
Luxembourg and especially Ireland where both 
imported inflation and strongly rising profit 
margins added to inflationary pressures.  
NULC
Compensation 
per employee
Labour 
productivity
GDP deflator RULC
EE 5.8 3.9 -1.8 1.4 4.3
LV 5.6 7.0 1.4 0.6 4.9
LT 3.8 4.1 0.3 0.4 3.4
HU 3.2 3.3 0.1 1.8 1.4
DK 1.9 1.9 0.1 1.0 0.8
DE 1.8 2.7 0.9 2.1 -0.2
AT 1.4 1.6 0.2 1.5 -0.1
SE 1.0 3.6 2.6 1.9 -0.8
PL 0.9 3.1 2.2 0.4 0.4
SK 0.8 2.4 1.6 -0.3 1.0
UK 0.7 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.5
FI 0.7 1.6 0.9 0.4 0.3
IT 0.6 0.5 -0.1 0.8 -0.2
EL 0.4 -1.7 -2.1 -0.6 1.1
FR 0.4 1.2 0.8 1.2 -0.9
ES 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.6 -0.3
BE -0.4 0.1 0.5 0.9 -1.3
HR -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.1 -0.6
CZ -0.5 2.4 3.0 0.7 -1.3
SI -0.6 0.8 1.4 0.4 -1.1
NL -0.6 0.4 1.1 0.4 -1.0
PT -0.6 -0.6 0.1 1.9 -2.5
BG -0.7 1.8 2.6 0.3 -1.1
MT -1.2 1.5 2.7 2.3 -3.5
RO -1.4 3.2 4.7 2.9 -4.2
LU -1.4 0.8 2.3 1.6 -3.0
CY -1.7 -1.0 0.7 -1.4 -0.3
IE -4.2 0.6 5.1 5.3 -9.0
IE 1.4 -1.0 -0.1 3.7 4.1
LU 2.6 -0.3 -0.3 1.2 3.2
MT 0.8 -0.3 0.1 1.2 1.8
DK 0.9 0.7 0.2 -0.2 1.6
SE 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.6
RO -0.6 -0.5 0.6 1.9 1.4
AT -0.1 0.5 0.2 0.3 1.1
DE -0.5 0.7 0.2 0.6 1.0
HU -0.4 0.8 0.3 -0.2 0.5
FR -0.7 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.2
EE -0.8 1.6 0.5 -1.3 0.2
ES -0.3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1
PT -1.2 -0.2 0.7 1.0 0.1
LV -0.4 1.6 0.2 -1.5 0.0
IT -0.6 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0
FI -0.9 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
PL -0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.1 -0.1
CZ -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.3
SI -0.5 -0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.3
HR -0.4 -0.2 0.4 -0.1 -0.3
SK -0.5 0.2 0.1 -0.4 -0.6
BG -1.0 -0.3 1.0 -0.5 -0.8
BE -1.5 -0.1 0.0 0.6 -1.0
CY -0.2 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -1.0
UK -1.4 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -1.2
NL -1.5 -0.2 0.0 0.5 -1.4
EL -2.2 0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -2.6
LT -3.1 1.0 0.4 -1.1 -2.9
Import prices NULC Indirect taxes
Gross oper. 
surplus
Final demand 
deflator
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2.5.3. The tax wedge 
The average tax burden on labour remained 
broadly stable in 2015 in most of the EU countries 
(Table I.2.7). Those declines even if small tended 
to be recorded in countries with the tax wedge 
already at or below the median. The tax wedge at 
the average wage fell by at least 1 percentage point 
in Greece, Spain and Estonia. Taking a more 
medium-term view, Hungary recorded the 
strongest decline since 2008 (by over 5 percentage 
points), followed by the Netherlands, Denmark and 
Greece. On the other hand, Croatia recorded the 
sharpest hike in the tax wedge by 1 percentage 
point driven by employers' contributions in 2015; 
Italy and Portugal came close to such an increase. 
From 2008, Ireland and Portugal increased the 
labour tax wedge the most by over 5 points largely 
on account of higher personal income taxation. 
2.6. COST COMPETITIVENESS AND EXTERNAL 
ADJUSTMENT DEVELOPMENTS 
2.6.1. Real effective exchange rate 
developments 
In 2015, almost all EU countries recorded gains in 
their cost competitiveness. Over recent years, most 
countries have gained cost competitiveness (Graph 
I.2.19). Greece, Ireland, Czech Republic, Cyprus 
and Croatia, were the EU countries that 
experienced the strongest gains in cost 
competitiveness as measured by the falls in the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) based on ULC 
over recent years. (
25
) Yet, in contrast, the Baltics, 
Bulgaria, and the UK visibly worsened their 
competitiveness position. To a lesser extent, that 
happened also to Germany, Austria and Denmark. 
                                                          
(25) The REER measures cost competitiveness of a country 
relative to its main trading partners. It is computed as a 
weighted average of its currency relative to a basket of 
other currencies and adjusted for the effects of price or 
labour cost inflation. Weights are a function of trade vis-à-
vis each country. 
 
Table I.2.7: Decomposition of tax wedge 
 
Note: Single person without children paid at the average wage. Countries are ranked by ascending order of the tax wedge 
in 2015. * 2014 data; differences are for 2013-2014 and 2008-2014 respectively. Data for Cyprus not available; data for 
Croatia not available before 2013. 
Source: European Commission based on OECD Taxing wages models. 
 
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Contributions 
Employee
Social 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Contribution 
Employer
Total Tax 
Wedge
Personal 
Income 
Tax
Social 
Contribution 
Employee
Social 
Contribution 
Employer
MT* 24.5 11.1 6.7 6.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.4 -0.3 -0.3
IE 27.5 14.2 3.6 9.7 -0.5 -0.5 0.0 0.0 5.2 4.4 0.7 0.0
UK 30.8 12.8 8.4 9.7 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -2.0 0.1 0.0
BG* 33.6 7.4 10.9 15.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.5 0.2 0.1 -1.8
PL 34.9 5.2 15.3 14.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 -0.3 1.5
NL 36.2 15.2 12.1 8.9 -0.6 1.2 -1.7 -0.1 -3.0 1.2 -3.7 -0.5
DK 36.4 35.8 0.0 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -2.5 -2.5 0.0 0.0
LU 38.3 16.0 11.4 10.9 0.6 0.2 0.4 0.0 3.6 2.2 0.6 0.9
EE 39.0 12.6 1.2 25.3 -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.1 0.6 -0.4 0.7 0.3
EL 39.3 7.1 12.4 19.7 -1.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.9 -2.2 0.0 -0.1 -2.2
ES 39.6 11.6 4.9 23.0 -1.2 -1.2 0.0 0.0 1.6 1.7 0.0 -0.1
HR* 40.5 8.8 17.1 14.7 1.0 -0.1 -0.3 1.5 : : : :
LT* 40.9 10.4 6.9 23.7 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.7 -5.2 4.6 -0.1
SK 41.3 7.4 10.2 23.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 2.5 -0.1 -0.4 3.0
PT 42.1 14.0 8.9 19.2 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 5.1 5.1 0.0 0.0
RO* 42.1 10.4 9.8 21.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 1.0 -2.5 1.2
SI 42.6 9.7 19.0 13.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 0.3 0.2 -0.8
SE 42.7 13.5 5.3 23.9 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -2.1 -1.6 0.0 -0.6
CZ 42.8 9.2 8.2 25.4 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.7 0.9 -1.1 -0.6
LV* 43.2 15.6 8.5 19.1 -0.7 0.0 -0.4 -0.3 1.6 0.7 1.2 -0.3
FI 43.9 18.4 6.7 18.7 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -1.1 1.7 -0.6
FR 48.7 10.6 10.3 27.8 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 -1.1 0.8 0.7 -2.7
IT 49.0 17.5 7.2 24.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.0
HU 49.0 12.5 14.4 22.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -5.1 -3.4 1.8 -3.5
DE 49.4 16.1 17.2 16.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 -1.9 -1.6 -0.1 -0.1
AT 49.5 13.1 14.0 22.4 0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0
BE 55.3 21.6 10.8 22.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.6 -0.2 0.1 -0.4
Total Tax 
Wedge 
2015
Of which Difference 2014 - 2015 Difference 2008 - 2015
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Various measures of the real effective exchange 
rate (REER) hints to these gains, in particular 
when the REER is based on the unit labour costs. 
Although the REER based on GDP or export 
deflators declined recently, they did so less than 
the ULC-based REER, which implies an increase 
of price mark-up and profit margins.  
Countries benefitted also from the weakening of 
their currencies (including the euro), the fall in 
energy prices and, possibly, the materialisation of 
structural reforms. (
26
) 
2.6.2. Competitiveness and adjustment in the 
euro area 
In the euro area, labour costs and prices of goods 
and services play a dual role of ensuring internal 
and external balance. With the lack of an exchange 
rate instrument, the dynamics of labour costs and 
prices have a bigger role to play in shaping how 
the economy reacts and adjusts to shocks. 
In 2015, the relation between external adjustment 
needs in the euro area and changes in 
competitiveness positions weakened compared 
with earlier years. Indeed, the change of the ULC-
based REER was of the same order for countries 
with different rebalancing needs (Graph 
I.2.20). (
27
)  
                                                          
(26) Among the euro area countries, Ireland and Cyprus 
benefitted the most from the nominal depreciation of the 
euro, which reached some 20% vis-à-vis the US dollar.  
(27) For example, the Netherlands recorded competiveness 
gains comparable to those of Spain despite having a 
That apparent weakening of the relation between 
external adjustment needs and changes in 
competitiveness followed the substantial 
adjustments in current accounts and 
competitiveness of previous years, not only by 
deficit countries. (
28
) Various factors may have 
contributed to those earlier current account 
improvements including the contraction of private 
domestic demand, and in some countries, the pace 
of fiscal consolidation. As the recovery has gained 
momentum and private consumption and imports 
keep growing, the pace of improvement of the 
external balance has slowed down. Nevertheless, 
the dynamism of exports, the competitiveness 
gains of previous years and favourable oil prices 
contributed to preserving the current account 
surpluses. Although few euro area countries 
recorded sizeable current account deficits in 2015, 
the stocks of net external liabilities remain 
elevated in a number of them.  
                                                                                   
position as large external creditor. This conclusion does not 
change when considering the current account needed to 
stabilise the net international investment position. 
(28) The group of surplus countries include: Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and 
Finland. Deficit countries are all other euro area member 
States. This classification is based on the current account 
situation (both headline and underlying readings of it) 
around the year 2008. 
Graph I.2.19: REERs based on ULC deflator, cumulative % change over the period 2013-2015 
 
Note: countries are ranked in ascending order of the variation in the ULC-based REER in 2013-2015. 
Source: Commission services calculations on the basis of Eurostat data. 
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Graph I.2.21: ULC-based REER (2015, % change) and 
relative output gap (2014, % of GDP) 
 
Note: REER relative to the rest of the euro area. Relative 
output gap is the difference between the output gap of 
the country and the one of the euro area. 
Source: Commission services. 
The cost competitiveness developments in 2015 
appeared consistent with the different business 
cycle positions of most euro area countries. Graph 
I.2.21 suggests that countries with a relative weak 
cyclical position in 2014 – e.g. Cyprus and 
Portugal and, to some extent, Spain and Italy – 
experienced a weaker dynamic of the ULC-based 
REER in 2015 (i.e. gained in competitiveness). 
Similarly, an appreciation of the REER was 
observed in countries with rapidly expanding 
economies – e.g. Estonia, Lithuania, Germany and 
Austria. On the other hand, Greece had no further 
gains in competitiveness despite the weak activity, 
with a gap relative to potential that was perhaps 
too large to be recovered quickly.  
Graph I.2.22: ULC in deficit and surplus countries within the 
euro area (weighted average, annual % 
change) 
 
(1) Surplus countries are Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. 'Deficit' countries are 
all other euro area member states. 
Source: Commission services calculations on the basis of 
Eurostat data 
When looking only at the recent evolution of unit 
labour costs (and leaving other factors aside like 
nominal exchange rate fluctuations), main 
indicators suggest that developments in 2015 have 
continued to be consistent with the external 
rebalancing needs of the different euro area 
countries. Indeed, labour costs have grown faster 
in countries characterised by a current account 
surplus before the crisis (“surplus countries”) than 
in countries with previous current account deficits 
(“deficit countries”) (Graph I.2.22). Yet in 2014 
and 2015 the rebalancing was more moderate 
largely on account of a further lowering in unit 
labour cost growth in surplus countries, which 
confirms the view already suggested by the 
analysis between current account and ULC-based 
REER. 
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Graph I.2.20: Current account balance (% of GDP) and ULC-based REER (% change): earlier and more recent relations 
 
(1) Real effective exchange rate (REER) is calculated relative to main trading partners (37 industrial countries). 
(2) Ireland is omitted in the right-hand graph. 
Source: Commission services on the basis of Eurostat data. 
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Rebalancing external positions requires not only 
changes in unit labour costs relative to main 
trading partners, but also changes in relative prices 
and wages of different sectors within countries. 
Two types of adjustments support the absorption 
of external imbalances: (i) a drop in the price and 
unit labour costs of domestic tradable goods 
relative to foreign tradable goods to stimulate 
exports and induce demand switching from foreign 
to domestic products (the better functioning the 
product markets are, the lower price stickiness 
should be and the stronger the pass-through of 
lower labour costs into lower prices); and (ii) the 
reallocation of production towards the tradable 
sector and the increase of export-oriented 
activities. The latter requires an increase in the 
wages and profit margins in sectors producing 
tradable goods and services relative to non-
tradable ones. Higher profit margins in the tradable 
sector requires less dynamic prices in the non-
tradable relative to tradable or lower unit labour 
cost growth in the tradable sector relative to the 
non-tradable sector or a combination of both. At 
the same time, lower prices for non-tradable goods 
and services support households' purchasing 
power. 
The decomposition of compensation per employee 
between tradable and non-tradable sectors in 
deficit and surplus countries shows that the wage 
moderation in recent years in deficit countries was 
led mainly by a sharp deceleration of wages in the 
non-tradable sectors (Graph I.2.23). Thus, the 
recent pattern of relative wages seems to support a 
reallocation of labour from non-tradable to 
tradable sectors and contribute to external 
rebalancing in deficit countries. (
29
) As the 
recovery proceeds it is unlikely that this effect will 
continue with the same strength to support 
reallocation. 
                                                          
(29) Tradable sectors include: Agriculture, forestry and fishing; 
Industry (except construction); Wholesale and retail trade, 
transport, accommodation and food service activities. Non-
tradable sectors include: Construction; Information and 
communication; Financial and insurance activities; Real 
estate activities; Professional, scientific and technical 
activities; Administrative and support service activities; 
Public administration, defence, education, human health 
and social work activities; Arts, entertainment and 
recreation; Other service activities; Activities of household 
and extra-territorial organizations and bodies. 
Graph I.2.23: Compensation per employee, tradable and 
non-tradable sectors, in 'deficit' and 'surplus' 
countries within the euro area. 
 
Note: Surplus countries are Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria and Finland. Deficit 
countries are all other euro area Member States. 
Source: Commission services on the basis of Eurostat data. 
For the periods 2010-2013 and 2014-2015, Graph 
I.2.24 describes the tradable vs non-tradable 
dynamics of wage and employment within the euro 
area countries. During the first period, some 
countries more affected by the crisis (e.g. Ireland, 
Portugal and Spain) had a faster wage growth in 
the tradable than in the non-tradable sectors. 
Conversely, surplus countries usually had similar 
wage developments across tradable and non-
tradable sectors (e.g. Germany or Netherlands) or 
slightly more wage growth in tradables (e.g. 
Belgium and Austria). As for employment, surplus 
countries were not marked by a single pattern, but 
in no case the employment composition shifted 
towards the tradable sector. Deficit countries 
(Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece) recorded a 
relative re-allocation of employment towards 
tradable activities. 
In 2014 and 2015, stronger wage dynamics in the 
tradable sector were detected for a larger number 
of countries (Graph I.2.24), reflecting inter-alia the 
broadness of the EU economic recovery. Job 
dynamics continued to be tilted most towards 
tradable sectors in Greece, Cyprus, Portugal or 
Estonia. However, employment in non-tradables 
expanded at a higher rate in most EU countries, in 
the wake of the revival of domestic demand. 
Still, the evolution of unit labour costs of recent 
years has been supportive of the adjustment 
towards tradable activities. In countries affected by 
external imbalances, unit labour costs grew less for 
the sectors most exposed to trade than for the 
-1
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sheltered ones – not only Greece, Ireland or Spain, 
but also Estonia and Slovakia (Graph I.2.25). 
 
Graph I.2.25: Developments in nominal ULC and 
employment growth differential between 
tradable and non-tradable sectors, 2013-
2015 (average annual % change) 
 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data. 
Overall, most of the EU countries showed one of 
the following two patterns: in some, contained unit 
labour costs in the tradable sectors relative to non-
tradables coincided with relatively stronger 
employment dynamics in the former sector (upper 
left quadrant of Graph I.2.25); in others, higher 
labour cost growth in the non-tradable sectors 
relative to tradable ones went hand in hand with 
relatively more employment in non-tradables 
(lower right quadrant of Graph I.2.25). Deficit 
countries tended to display the first pattern, surplus 
countries the second. together with the dynamics 
of unit labour costs, the price developments 
determine profit margins. Changes in profit 
margins in tradable versus non-tradable sectors can 
be key to trigger the necessary re-allocation of 
resources. 
Graph I.2.26: Evolution of profit margins in tradable and 
non-tradable sectors: 2013-2015 (average 
annual % change) 
 
Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data. 
In recent years, the increase in the profitability of 
tradable sectors (and often also of non-tradable 
ones) has been a key feature of the adjustment 
process in deficit countries. Over recent years, 
profitability in the tradable sector has dropped in 
few countries only, especially Estonia and 
Lithuania (Graph I.2.26). 
In some cases, the increased profitability in the 
tradable sector went hand in hand with an 
employment shift towards tradables since 2010 
(e.g., Spain, Greece and Portugal). However, most 
of the EU countries were marked by raising weight 
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Source: European Commission based on Eurostat data. 
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of employment in non-tradable activities (Graph 
I.2.27). 
Graph I.2.27: Tradable and non-tradable sectors: 
developments in profitability and 
employment: 2010-2013 (average annual % 
change) 
 
(1) 'Profit margins' is computed as the differences between 
the growth rates of deflator of gross value added and of 
ULC in each respective sector. The chart shows the 
difference between the growth of profit margins for the 
tradable and the non-tradable sectors.  
Source: Commission services on the basis of Eurostat data 
Unlike earlier years, in 2014 and 2015, profit 
margins tended to grow more in non-tradable 
sectors (Graph I.2.28).  
Graph I.2.28: Tradable and non-tradable sectors: 
developments in profitability and 
employment: 2014-2015 (average annual % 
change) 
 
(1) 'Profit margins tradable – non-tradables' is computed as 
the differences between the growth rates of deflator of 
gross value added and of ULC in the tradable and in the 
non-tradable sectors. 'Employment tradable – non-
tradable' is computed as the gap in the average 
difference between annual change in employment in the 
tradable and in the non-tradable sectors. 
Source: Commission services. 
This observation is consistent with an economic 
recovery led by domestic demand, in particular 
consumption. Nonetheless, it has not prevented the 
continuation of a shift of employment towards 
tradable sectors in the countries that have been 
tackling large imbalances (e.g., Greece, Estonia, 
Cyprus or Portugal). 
2.7. CONCLUSIONS 
In 2015 and first half of 2016, the labour market 
continued to improve nearly in all EU countries. 
Unemployment rates fell further while 
employment and activity rates edged up, 
benefitting from the upswing in economic activity 
that started in mid-2013. For several countries, job 
creation responded faster and more strongly than 
expected, in light of the modest pick-up in 
economic activity. Improvements have been the 
strongest in the countries hit hardest by the crisis, 
notably Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain and 
also Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic 
states. However, labour market improvements 
were broad based and concerned also countries, 
such as Germany, which weathered the crisis 
relatively well.  
Aggregate private consumption has been supported 
by confidence effects, spurred inter alia by the 
drop of unemployment after years of job 
destruction, expansionary macroeconomic policies 
and favourable energy prices. The latter also 
contributed to improvements in the purchasing 
power of wages. Yet, with few exceptions, the 
increase in headcount employment has not been 
accompanied by comparable increases in the 
number of the average hours worked. To some 
extent that seems consistent with earlier trends of 
gentle declining average number of hours worked 
per person. On the other hand, that dampens the 
growth of households’ disposable income, which 
has implications for the sustainability of 
consumption growth of low wage workers 
households.  
The fall in job separation rates and, more recently, 
improvements in job finding rates contributed to 
the decline in unemployment rates. Yet the rates at 
which the unemployed find a job often remain 
below pre-crisis levels, which contribute to the 
persistent long-term unemployment in a large 
number of countries.  
The labour market recovery has seen a significant 
increase of job creation in the service sector, which 
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is consistent with the large contribution to GDP 
growth stemming from private consumption. 
Cyclical and sectoral composition effects over the 
upswing of these years have contributed to the 
increase in the share of temporary employment in 
total employment. 
Low wage growth continued despite the receding 
joblessness, in particular in the euro area and with 
the exception of the Baltic states and, to a lesser 
extent, Eastern European countries. Wage 
moderation characterised both countries that need 
to reabsorb high levels of unemployment and 
improve competitiveness and those with low 
unemployment and no major external imbalances. 
Factors that can explain this broad wage 
moderation include the remaining labour market 
slack, weak productivity growth, lagged response 
of negotiated wages to major labour demand 
shocks. Wage setting reforms aiming at increasing 
relative wages flexibility may also have 
contributed to increase the sensitivity of wage 
growth to those recent conditions. In a number of 
EU countries, public wage reductions were less 
frequent than in earlier years. 
Productivity grew faster than real wages, 
especially in countries with high unemployment 
rates. Yet real unit labour costs have been less 
reactive to unemployment rates than in the past. 
With subdued wage dynamics and productivity 
growth little changed, unit labour costs continued 
rising at a slow pace in most EU countries and 
even declined in some. Such developments partly 
explain the lack of significant inflationary 
pressures in a context of very low inflation rates 
and improving profitability.  
Unit labour costs have risen somewhat in the so-
called deficit countries after years of visible falls; 
they were unchanged or even decelerated in 
surplus countries. In all, unit labour costs have 
become less differentiated between these two 
groups of countries. 
Rebalancing within the euro area has been 
consolidated in 2015, but after the substantial 
adjustment last years, the impetus was lower. 
Employment in non-tradable sectors has recently 
grown faster than in tradable sectors in line with a 
recovery led by domestic demand. Yet 
developments of employment and profitability 
have overall been consistent with a reallocation of 
resources towards the tradable sectors in deficit 
countries.  
3. POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
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Reform activity in employment and social policy in 
the EU can be divided into three phases since the 
burst of the financial crisis in 2008. In a first 
phase, the policy response largely consisted of 
stimulus measures aimed at cushioning the short-
term impact of the crisis on employment and 
incomes. Starting from 2010, with the unfolding of 
the imbalances accumulated since the early 2000s, 
the focus shifted towards improving the adjustment 
capacity of labour markets, especially in countries 
with major adjustment needs. As of 2013, a new 
phase has been emerging, whereby attention is 
being increasingly paid to revising labour 
taxation, social policies and overall labour market 
settings in such a way to set the conditions for 
well-functioning labour markets, increased 
protection and a fair redistribution of the benefits 
of growth. This process of intense reform activity, 
which continues to be above pre-crisis levels, is 
being accompanied by a growing awareness about 
the need for collective ownership of reform efforts, 
including reform design issues that affect the 
short-term effects of reforms. Priorities at the EU 
level are in line with these findings.  
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of recent 
developments and reform trends in the field of 
employment and social policies since the start of 
the crisis.  
Section 2 analyses reform activity across the EU 
making use of the LABREF database, an inventory 
of labour market reform measures adopted by the 
EU Member States since 2000. (
30
) Based on a 
count of measures by policy domain and direction, 
the section identifies reform patterns over time, 
reflecting different institutional settings, varying 
economic conditions and challenges, and shifts in 
priorities as the economic situation evolves. The 
section contrasts reform activity in two policy 
domains: Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL) and Labour Taxation. It also provides an 
overview of youth-related measures across the EU.  
                                                          
(30) The LABREF database is maintained by the European 
Commission and is available online under the link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1143&intPageId
=3193&. See Turrini et al. (2015).  
Section 2 further reviews the emerging literature 
on the short-term effects of structural reforms. 
While long-term benefits of some labour market 
reforms (such as EPL) take time to materialise, 
recent studies find that such reforms can have 
negative effects in the short-run, especially if 
adopted during economic downturns. As a 
consequence, design issues as well as 
accompanying measures need to be carefully 
considered to cushion possible short-term negative 
impacts and increase ownership.  
Section 3 surveys reform activity since the start of 
2015. It confirms findings from the previous 
section noting that, between 2015 and 2016, 
reform activity accelerated in the fields of labour 
taxation and social protection, while fewer reforms 
were adopted in domains which had seen intensive 
reform activity over the previous years, such as 
employment protection and wage setting. In some 
Member States, the unprecedented inflow of 
migrants, and, in particular, of asylum seekers, 
also triggered significant policy response to 
facilitate their integration in the labour market and 
in the society at large.  
Section 4 looks at policy priorities for the future, 
with a specific focus on the priorities emerging in 
the framework of the European Semester. Section 
5 concludes. 
3.2. POLICY TRENDS 
Overall patterns in reform activity 
While Member States’ response to the crisis has 
been different depending on the nature and 
severity of the challenges they faced on the labour 
market, three broad phases of labour market 
reform activity can be identified across the EU 
since 2008, as can be clearly depicted from Graph 
I.3.1, which, based on LABREF, shows the 
development of the average number of reform 
measures across the EU in a selected number of 
policy domains. Reform measures are 
differentiated by their ‘direction’. (31)  
                                                          
(31) The “direction” of policy measures is either increasing or 
decreasing, based on their effect on the underlying policy 
settings, with no a priori judgement on their implications 
for labour market functioning. Since the relevant labour 
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In a first phase (2008-2009), the focus was on 
fiscal stimulus to contain the labour market effects 
of the economic slowdown and mitigate its social 
impact, including through labour tax cuts (of both 
of permanent and temporary nature), the extension 
of unemployment and other welfare benefits (in 
some cases also with a temporary nature) and the 
introduction or stepping-up of schemes such as the 
publicly sponsored short-time working 
arrangements. This was in line with what was 
recommended in the European Economic 
Recovery Plan of November 2008 (European 
Commission, 2008).  
In a second phase (2010-2012), several European 
countries, and especially those affected by the 
sovereign debt crisis, resorted to tax increases and 
benefit cuts, although in several cases cuts in 
benefit generosity were rather the result of the 
expiry of the above-mentioned temporary stimulus 
measures or were accompanied by the extension of 
                                                                                   
market institution or policy setting differs across policy 
domains, the definition of reform direction has to be 
defined separately for each domain. “Increasing” direction 
will thus for instance mean increasing stringency of 
regulation in the domains of employment protection 
legislation, wage setting, working time and immigration; 
increasing generosity of unemployment and other benefits; 
increasing tax burden on labour; and increasing 
availability of active labour market policies (ALMPs); vice 
versa for the “decreasing” direction. See European 
Commission, 2015a; Turrini et al., 2015.  
benefit coverage. Countries facing major 
adjustment needs passed significant reforms, in 
particular in the EPL and wage setting domains, to 
increase the adjustment capacity of their labour 
markets. 
Starting from 2013, a third phase of reform activity 
can be identified, in which the focus has turned to 
a better targeting of Active Labour Market Policies 
(ALMPs), to enhancing social safety nets and to 
cutting the tax wedge on labour. During this third 
phase, reform activity in labour market regulation 
(in particular in EPL and wage setting) decreased 
somewhat following the major initiatives put 
forward in previous years, also in view of the time 
lag necessary for their full implementation and for 
producing effects. In terms of the direction of 
reforms, a similar number of measures can be 
observed since 2013 in the direction of either 
increasing or decreasing the stringency of 
regulation, while in the previous phase of reform 
activity, and especially between 2011 and 2012, a 
major part of measures was taken in the direction 
of decreasing stringency and increasing flexibility 
(Graph I.3.1).  
Three phases of crisis response can, to some 
extent, also be identified when looking at the 
number of reform measures adopted through time 
by policy field within the domain of ALMPs 
(Graph I.3.2). The graph shows that there was a 
general increase in reform activity starting around 
Graph I.3.1: Average number of labour market reform measures per country per year by direction of reform measures, 
selected policy domains, EU28 
 
(1) Information for Bulgaria and Romania starts in 2003 while for Croatia in 2012. Reform measures are classified as 
"increasing" ("decreasing") if they lead to an increase (decrease) in the underlying policy setting: the tax burden on labour; 
the generosity of unemployment and other welfare benefits; the stringency of regulations on employment protection, wage 
setting, working time, and immigration and mobility policies. The graph excludes policy domains ALMP and Early withdrawal. 
Source: European Commission, LABREF database.  
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2008, most pronounced in the field of Training and 
Special schemes for youth. (
32
) An increased focus 
on Public Employment Services can be seen 
between 2010 and 2013, followed by a further 
increase in targeted measures like employment 
subsidies (especially in 2012-2013) and special 
schemes for the youth (since 2012).  
Graph I.3.2: Average number of reform measures in 
selected policy fields in the domain of Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMP), 2000-2015, 
EU28 
 
(1)The chart excludes policy fields ‘Special schemes for the 
disabled’ and ‘Direct job creation schemes’. 
Source: European Commission, LABREF database. 
The rest of this section focuses on three policy 
areas: youth-related measures (mostly affecting 
ALMPs), reforms of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) and changes to the tax burden for 
low-income earners. 
Youth-related measures: shared priorities 
Addressing youth unemployment has continued to 
be an important task for Member States during the 
slow recovery from the financial and economic 
crisis. Without policy action, it clearly appeared 
from trends observed since the start of the crisis 
that depressed labour markets can mark the careers 
of the young generations for the long run, 
evidencing that the so-called “scarring effects” of 
unemployment are greater for the young. 
Addressing youth unemployment is also a field in 
which policy action at the European level has been 
                                                          
(32) Special schemes for youth are complex measures 
comprising a number of different ALMPs (e.g. both 
training and employment subsidies). For more detail on 
youth-related measures, see the next subsection.  
stepped up, becoming a powerful lever for national 
reforms. 
Graph I.3.3 provides an overview of youth-related 
measures across the EU. (
33
) While there was a 
clear increase in reform measures targeted at 
young people already in 2008, the peak of reform 
activism in this field was reached in 2012 and 
2013, after which it returned to levels seen 
between 2008 and 2011. This reform momentum 
was partly spurred by the Youth Guarantee 
Recommendation and by the Youth Employment 
Initiative, both launched in 2013. The latter was 
intended to provide financial support (€6.4 billion), 
to the implementation of Youth Guarantee 
schemes through direct financial support to young 
people aged below 25 and living in regions where 
youth unemployment was higher than 25% in 
2012. (
34
)  
Graph I.3.3: Average number of youth-related measures 
by type of measure, 2000-2015, EU28 
 
(1) Reform measures are classified in the policy field of 
‘Special schemes for youth’ (within policy domain ALMP) if 
they are complex measures affecting a number of different 
ALMPs (e.g., both training and employment subsidies), and 
they focus on youth. Many measures related to the ‘Youth 
Guarantee’ fall into this category. 
Source: European Commission, LABREF database.  
Graph I.3.3 shows youth-related reform measures 
in a breakdown of three sub-groups. The category 
“Special schemes for youth” designate complex 
                                                          
(33) Beyond the measures in the policy field ‘Special schemes 
for youth’, youth-related measures were identified by a text 
search on the title and description of individual reform 
measures with key words “youth” and “young”. Measures 
falsely identified by this automatic search as youth-related 
were manually marked and removed from the count.   
(34) For the legal acts, see European Council (2013) and 
Council of the European Union (2013). The Youth 
Employment Initiative, adopted in 2013, was already 
operational and implemented through national measures in 
2012. 
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measures affecting a number of policy fields 
within the ALMPs domain (including for instance 
a combination of training and employment 
subsidies, but also the introduction or the stepping-
up of new contractual arrangements targeted at 
young people, coupled with fiscal incentives or 
specific training). Many of the measures in this 
category are related to the introduction of the 
Youth Guarantee: the graph shows that the 
category of measures “Special schemes for youth” 
was the largest responsible for the jump in reform 
activity around 2012. 
The number of “Other ALMP measures” (ALMP 
measures such as a training or wage subsidies 
targeted at young people that do not belong to the 
above mentioned “Special schemes for youth”) 
also visibly increased after 2008 (especially 
between 2010 and 2013), but “Other measures” 
(i.e. all other measures specifically targeted at 
young people but outside the ALMP domain, such 
as targeted rebates in social security contributions) 
were also present throughout the post-2008 period.  
Reforms of employment protection legislation: 
looking back and looking forward  
Reforming employment protection legislation 
(EPL) has been high on the policy agenda in 
countries with large cumulated imbalances and 
pressing adjustment needs since the start of the 
crisis. In many of these countries, very strict EPL 
for regular workers under open-ended full-time 
contracts and a great discrepancy in the protection 
of open-ended versus temporary workers has been 
blamed for a high and increasing segmentation of 
the labour market, a reluctance of employers to 
hire on a permanent basis, and a lock-in of some 
categories of workers with long job tenure into 
protected jobs - all factors which have been widely 
recognised as hampering labour market adjustment 
in the face of economic shocks, thus contributing 
to slow productivity growth. (
35
)   
Graph I.3.4 shows the change in the strictness of 
EPL for permanent contracts between 2008 and 
2013. The graph reveals that a number of countries 
have passed significant reforms of job protection 
regulation during that period (latest available data 
                                                          
(35) A survey of the empirical literature on the effect of EPL 
reforms on labour reallocation and productivity is given by 
Martin and Scarpetta (2011).  
for most countries); the vast majority of them went 
in the direction of reducing the overall strictness of 
EPL for permanent contracts. These include euro-
area countries like Portugal, Greece and Spain, but 
also countries such as Estonia and Slovakia that 
were not member of the euro area in 2008.  
Graph I.3.4: Strictness of Employment Protection 
Legislation, OECD indicator for regular 
workers 
 
(1) The graph includes all EU Member States for which the 
OECD database has values since at least 2008. For most of 
these countries, 2013 represents the most recent 
information. 
Source: OECD/IAB Employment Protection Database, 2013 
update. 
Despite an overall reduction in the reform activity 
in this field in the subsequent period, the 
momentum for EPL reforms continued in 2013 and 
beyond, including in Belgium (the single status 
law, 2013), Croatia (Labour Act, 2014), France (El 
Khomri Law, 2016, besides a number of measures 
in 2013 and 2015), Italy (Jobs Act, 2015), the 
Netherlands (Work and Security Act, 2014), 
Slovenia (Employment Relations Act, 2013). (
36
)  
Graph I.3.5 shows a number of general reform 
patterns in the three main EPL fields, i.e. 
permanent contracts, temporary contracts and 
collective dismissals, across the EU. First, it 
clearly emerges from the graph that reform activity 
has significantly increased after 2009 in all three 
EPL domains, reaching a peak around 2012. Since 
then, the number of measures decreased but overall 
reform activity has remained far above pre-crisis 
levels. Second, in the post-crisis period most 
reform measures have affected permanent 
                                                          
(36) See the next section for an overview of most recent policy 
action in the EPL domain. For a summary of the reforms in 
the 2013-2014 period, see European Commission (2015a, 
pp. 77-78). 
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contracts, followed by temporary contracts, and 
fewer measures have touched upon the regulation 
of collective dismissals. Third, while there have 
been measures in all three fields intended to both 
increase and decrease the strictness of regulation, a 
slight majority of post-crisis measures went in the 
direction of reducing the strictness of regulation in 
the fields of permanent contracts and collective 
dismissals. The majority of measures in the field of 
temporary contracts were on the contrary intended 
to increase the strictness of regulation. This 
indicates that there was a trend towards reducing 
the discrepancy that existed in a number of 
countries between the strictness of regulation for 
permanent and temporary contracts, with a view to 
reduce the incentives for firms to hire on 
temporary contracts.  
Graph I.3.5: Average number of reform measures by 
direction and policy field in the policy 
domain of Employment Protection Legislation, 
2000-2015, EU28 
 
(1) Reform measures are classified as having an 
"increasing" direction if they increase the stringency of 
Employment Protection Legislation (and vice versa for 
decreasing measures).  
Source: European Commission, LABREF database. 
The large increase in policy action since 2008 has 
also prompted a growing interest for the effects of 
structural reforms in more recent years, notably in 
the field of EPL. While previous work focused on 
the long-term effects of structural reforms, and 
showed in particular that EPL reforms increase 
productivity in the long run, (
37
) recent studies 
have turned to the assessment of the short-term 
effects of reforms. This recent work can be divided 
into two groups: country-case studies and cross-
country analyses.  
                                                          
(37) See Bassanini et al. (2009) and Martin and Scarpetta 
(2012). 
Some country-case studies have looked at the 
relationship between policy reforms and 
subsequent macroeconomic developments. A 
preliminary assessment of the Spanish labour 
market reforms found evidence that the reforms 
contributed to a decrease in labour market 
segmentation already in the short run, as hiring 
increased, especially on permanent contracts 
(OECD, 2014; 2016). An analysis of the effects of 
EPL reforms in Estonia and Slovenia shows that 
these reforms have led to increased unemployment 
in the first two years after implementation, but 
such an effect was not found in Spain. Similar 
reforms appear to have also increased hiring on 
permanent contracts in Slovenia, another country 
with high levels of labour market segmentation 
(OECD, 2016).  
Preliminary evidence consistent with these 
findings has also been documented in the 2016 
Country Reports of the European Commission. An 
analysis of the relationship between the different 
labour market flows in Spain suggests that job 
finding rates increased and job destruction rates 
were reduced after the EPL reform, as compared to 
what could be expected based on their pre-reform 
relationship with economic growth (European 
Commission, 2016a, p. 38). Also in Portugal, the 
labour market recovery since 2013 brought about a 
robust rate of hiring on permanent contracts for the 
first time in more than a decade, although the share 
of temporary workers remained stable (European 
Commission, 2016b, p. 29). 
Some studies estimate the short-term effects of 
structural reforms based on experience over a long 
reference period. These studies show that EPL 
reforms can have adverse short-term effects on 
employment and unemployment outcomes, 
especially in recessionary times. (
38
) The 
experience of the various countries gives, however, 
some lessons about how other labour market 
institutions may contribute to mitigate such 
adverse short-term effects (OECD, 2016). First, it 
appears that benefits are higher and short-term 
costs lower in countries with high levels of labour 
market segmentation. Second, it is important that 
firms have at their disposal instruments to adjust in 
recessionary times without resorting to firing 
workers (e.g., by short-time work schemes, 
                                                          
(38) See, e.g., Bouis et al (2012a ; 2012b), IMF (2016), OECD 
(2016).  
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
5
Collective dismissals
increasing decreasing
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
5
Permanent contracts
increasing decreasing
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
5
Temporary contracts
increasing decreasing
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 2016 
 
60 
flexibility in collective bargaining in bad times). 
Third, those who lose their job need to have access 
to employment services early, to reduce the risk of 
long unemployment spells.  
Also the design of reforms matters. For instance, if 
an EPL reform affects only new contracts (the so-
called “grandfathering” clause), as it was the case 
in the recent reform passed in Portugal, then the 
incentives for employers to fire workers in a 
recessionary environment are not increased 
(although the longer-term productivity benefits are 
also expected to appear more gradually). Reform 
sequencing and reform packaging also play a key 
role in shaping reform effects. Typically, reform 
packages may include the provision of fiscal 
incentives associated to major EPL reforms to 
support their implementation (such as social 
security contribution rebates for new hires, as 
those decided in Italy for hiring under the new 
contract introduced by the Jobs Act). In this case, 
it will be also important to be able to disentangle 
the effects of the different strands of the reform 
package (for instance to know if possible first 
round positive effects on hiring are due to the EPL 
reform itself or to the fiscal incentives associated 
to it). 
To conclude, overall there has been a great effort 
to reform the rules of hiring and firing in a number 
of EU Member States since 2008. Most reforms 
are quite recent; thus it may take time for workers 
and firms to adapt their behaviour to new rules, but 
also for courts to establish the case-law based on 
the new legislation and thereby reduce legal 
uncertainties. While challenges in EPL remain, 
these are to a great extent country-specific and 
only imperfectly captured by quantitative 
indicators. Looking forward, more attention should 
thus be paid to specific aspects of EPL legislation, 
such as those related to procedural requirements 
and dispute resolution mechanisms that, in 
interplay with other labour market institutions, 
may increase economic uncertainty related to 
hiring permanent workers and thereby reduce the 
incentives for job creation.   
Tax wedge on low earnings: trade-off between tax 
revenue and employment incentives 
While there have been significant reform efforts to 
revise EPL, a high tax burden on low earners 
remains a challenge in a number of countries, 
implying risks to the employability of low-skilled 
workers and the (long-term) unemployed, but also 
in terms of financial incentives to work. Graph 
I.3.6, showing the tax wedge for a single worker 
without children earning 67% of the average wage, 
indicates that between 2008 and 2015 the tax 
wedge on low earnings changed relatively little in 
most Member States, and in about half of them it 
increased even, in most cases due to fiscal needs. 
Meanwhile, the EU average remained about 
constant between 2008 and 2015. (
39
)   
Graph I.3.6: Tax wedge of low earners in 2008 and 2015 
 
(1) The tax wedge indicator is the sum of all labour taxes, 
employee and employer contributions as a share of total 
wage cost. (2) The graph shows the tax wedge of single 
workers with no children earning 67% of the average wage. 
(3) Countries are ordered according to the tax wedge in 
2008. 
* Latest data reflects 2014 for Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta and Romania.  
Source: European Commission and OECD: Tax and Benefits 
Database. 
Trends in reform activity in labour taxation across 
time and tax instruments are presented in Graph 
I.3.7. The graph shows that most tax measures 
affect income taxes, followed by employers’ social 
security contributions, employees’ social security 
contributions and, finally, the contributions of the 
self-employed. The time pattern of tax measures is 
similar across instruments: stimulus around 2008-
2009, followed by adjustment around 2011-2012 
and by tax reductions in most recent years.  
                                                          
(39) See the next section for an overview of most recent policy 
action in the labour taxation domain. 
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Graph I.3.7: Average number of measures per year by 
direction and policy field within the policy 
domain of Labour taxation, 2000-2015, EU28 
 
(1) Reform measures are classified as having an 
"increasing" direction if they increase the tax burden on 
labour (and vice versa for decreasing measures). 
Source: European Commission, LABREF database. 
A closer look at Graph I.3.6 reveals that different 
reform paths can be observed across countries.  
 A majority of countries having introduced 
reforms to reduce the tax wedge were among 
the countries with a high-tax wedge on low-
income earners at the outset (the reduction was 
of 2.9 percentage points (ppts) in France, 1.8 
ppts in Sweden, 1.3 ppts in Germany and Italy, 
0.8 ppts in Belgium), while in few others the 
tax wedge on low earners was already 
comparatively low (notably Netherlands and 
the UK were able to reduce it by more than 2 
ppts).  
 Some of the Member States most affected by 
the financial and sovereign debt crisis, 
including Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, 
had a tax wedge on labour below the EU 
average at the beginning of the reference 
period, and most of them increased it. Of these 
countries, Ireland had the lowest tax wedge on 
low incomes in 2008, and increased it most in 
the ensuing years (by 6.5 ppts to 21.6%) due to 
pressures of fiscal consolidation. The tax 
wedge on low earnings also increased in 
Portugal (by 4 ptts) and Spain (by about 2 
ppts), while it decreased Greece. In 2015, all 
three countries have a tax wedge for low 
earners close to 35%.  
 Another group of countries in which there has 
been a perceptible increase in the tax wedge for 
low-income earners are the Central and Eastern 
European Member States. In Hungary, Latvia, 
and Slovakia the tax wedge for low earners 
increased by more than 2 ppts between 2008 
and 2015. In Hungary, this development is 
connected to the introduction of the flat income 
tax between 2011 and 2013, which cut taxes 
substantially for high-income earners, 
especially with children, while it eliminated the 
employee tax credit for low-income earners. To 
mitigate the increase of the tax wedge for low 
earners, contribution rebates were introduced 
for selected groups, including young people, 
older workers, those in low-skilled 
occupations, and those returning from 
maternity leave or long-term unemployment. 
This example highlights that policy makers 
generally face a trade-off between three 
possible policy targets: the introduction of a 
simple single rate tax regime, adequate public 
revenues, and employment incentives at the 
bottom end of the wage distribution. 
3.3. POLICY ACTION SINCE 2015 
In 2015, reform activity followed patterns similar 
to those seen since 2013. Increasing fiscal space 
allowed reductions in the tax burden on labour, 
and Member States adopted some reforms 
extending unemployment and other benefits. At 
the same time, the pace of reform activity affecting 
labour market regulation (employment protection, 
working time, wage setting institutions) was more 
moderate than at its peak around 2012 but still 
more elevated than during the pre-crisis period. 
Reforms affecting immigration and labour 
mobility received increased attention in the wake 
of the refugee crisis (see Graph I.3.1).  
Active labour market policies 
The provision of individualised job-search support 
and early activation has received increasing 
attention in recent years. In this respect, special 
action plans and strategies continued to be 
promoted in 2015, especially targeted to the long-
term unemployed (e.g. Bulgaria, France, Ireland, 
Latvia, Spain, Slovakia).   
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In order to better support the unemployed, the 
institutional capacity has been improved by a 
reorganisation of the public employment services 
(e.g. Czech Republic), the introduction of 
benchmarking and bench-learning (e.g. Lithuania), 
the obligation to register vacancies (e.g. Latvia) 
and the setting-up of a one-stop shop for youth 
(e.g. Finland) Further measures include tighter 
conditionality of benefits with respect to accepting 
a job offer, public works or training (e.g. Italy, 
Slovakia, UK).  
Employment subsidies continue to be used 
extensively to boost labour demand. Typically, 
new schemes are targeted to specific 
disadvantaged jobseekers, such as long-term 
unemployed (e.g. Cyprus, Malta, Slovakia), 
disabled (e.g. Germany, Luxemburg), young (e.g. 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain) and 
women (e.g. Portugal, Slovakia). Measures to 
support the unemployed to start working as self-
employed emerged in several countries (e.g. 
Cyprus, Greece).  
Direct job creation measures have been 
reintroduced in Romania after being abolished in 
2010. In Hungary, the rules of the Public Works 
Scheme have been made somewhat more flexible 
and a financial incentive has been introduced to 
encourage participants to find a job on the primary 
labour market. In both 2015 and 2016, Greece 
adopted a new series of public work schemes. 
In line with action pursued in the previous years, 
almost all Member States have further 
implemented measures under the Youth Guarantee 
to tackle youth unemployment. New training or 
support programmes have been introduced in 
several Member States targeted at the young (e.g. 
Malta, Sweden, UK), older workers (e.g. Bulgaria, 
Greece) and the long-term unemployed (e.g. 
Portugal).  
Benefits 
Since 2015, major reforms affecting 
unemployment benefit systems have been adopted 
in Italy. As foreseen by the Jobs Act, Italy linked 
unemployment benefits closer to contributions and 
increased the coverage by providing a means-
tested income support targeted at workers who are 
no longer entitled to regular unemployment 
benefits, have children, or are close to retirement 
age. Further, it increased the link between access 
to unemployment benefits and participation in 
ALMPs. Other Member States implemented 
smaller reforms, such as increased flexibility and 
generosity of unemployment benefits for those 
willing to work by encouraging unemployed to 
take up any type of work including short-term 
assignments (Denmark), changes to the assessment 
base for older workers (Finland), changes in 
eligibility criteria (Latvia), the introduction of the 
possibility to cumulate unemployment benefits and 
income from self-employment for selected groups 
(Spain) and an increase in benefit generosity 
(Sweden). 
Several Member States have broadened the 
coverage and increased the level of social 
assistance, in particularly for the poorest. Estonia 
increased the level of the Guaranteed Minimum 
Income, Greece started in 2015 subsidies for the 
basic needs of those families living in extreme 
poverty and in 2016 the roll out a guaranteed 
minimum income scheme, Slovenia introduced 
income support for elderly and non-employable 
individuals and Spain introduced several measures 
to tackle homelessness. Child allowances increased 
in Estonia and Slovenia. Rental price subsidies for 
disadvantaged groups have been implemented in 
Luxemburg and Spain. On the other hand, a 
number of Member States restricted access to 
social benefits for specific societal groups. 
Denmark and UK introduced requirements 
regarding the permanent residence in order to 
receive family and child benefits (Denmark) or in-
work benefits (UK).  
Participation-friendly schemes 
The use of financial incentives to work, such as in-
work benefits, was expanded in a number of 
countries. In France and Malta the right to in-work 
benefits was extended to particular groups, such as 
the young, low-wage workers (France) and low-
income single-earner families with children under 
23 years of age (Malta). Furthermore, employment 
of older workers has been further encouraged by 
reforms of early retirement schemes, in countries 
such as Finland and France. The latter country 
introduced early retirement schemes that include 
bonuses and/or penalties as incentives for later 
retirement. Austria introduced the option of partial 
retirement, which allows employees to work part-
time while receiving a more than proportional 
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compensation compared to the hours worked. In 
order to activate the disabled, several Member 
States have introduced specific ALMPs (e.g. 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta). 
Several measures have been adopted to facilitate 
the reconciliation between work and family life. 
The availability and affordability of child care has 
been enhanced by measures such as increases in 
the child care subsidies in Netherlands and 
Slovakia, or by a loosening of the legal restrictions 
to set up child-care facilities in Czech Republic. 
More flexible leave arrangements for parents, 
including through provisions to reduce gender 
inequalities, have been introduced in Austria, Italy, 
Sweden, Poland and Portugal. Germany made care 
arrangements more attractive by giving care 
providers the right to unemployment insurance 
benefits financed by care insurance funds. Finally, 
the Social Welfare Act was revised in Estonia with 
a view to ensure a better provision of quality social 
services.  
Working hours 
In several member states there was a trend towards 
increasing the flexibility of work organisation. 
New flexible work arrangements have been notably 
introduced in Bulgaria, Lithuania, France and the 
Netherlands. In France, the amendments to the 
Labour Code in the ‘El Khomri’ law have 
introduced the possibility to derogate from the 
legal provisions on working time through a 
company agreement, while in 2015 the 'Loi 
Macron' had already eased the provisions on 
Sunday work and night work.  
Labour taxation 
In 2015, Member States continued to reduce labour 
taxes in order to increase the incentives to work 
and reduce the relatively high cost of labour – in 
particular for low-wage earners. Box I.3.1 presents 
in more detail selected reform packages in Austria, 
Belgium, Greece, Latvia and the Netherlands. 
With resuming economic growth and resulting 
larger fiscal space, several measures were also 
adopted in a number of countries aimed at cutting 
income taxes, in line with reform trends already 
witnessed in most recent years. 
Less focus was on the contrary put on reducing 
employers' social security contributions than in the 
previous two years (see Graph I.3.7). Yet, 
significant reductions in employers’ social 
contributions were implemented in Belgium to 
support labour demand and gain cost 
competitiveness (see Box I.3.1), while other 
Member States reduced social security 
contributions for specific groups, such as low-
wage earners (Netherlands), the self-employed 
(Spain), older workers (Austria and Slovenia), 
when hiring under open-ended contracts (Spain) or 
for first time hiring by SMEs or self-employed 
(Belgium). In Slovakia, employers hiring long-
term unemployed in the least developed regions 
received temporary exemptions from social 
security contributions. In contrast, Greece 
introduced in 2016 a temporary increase in the 
social security contributions of 1 percentage point 
up to 2018 (and 0.5% up to 2021) to partially 
finance the pension reform. 
Several Member States, including Austria, 
Belgium, Estonia, Lithuania, Netherlands and 
Slovenia, adopted reforms to reduce the personal 
income tax to increase work incentives in 
particular for low-wage earners. In some Member 
States, such as Latvia and the Netherlands, these 
measures are being partially financed by tax 
increases for high-wage earners or taxation of non-
labour income (see Box I.3.1). In Belgium, the 
“Tax Shift Law” did some rebalancing of the tax 
burden away from labour to other areas (including 
excises and income from interest and dividends).  
Few countries increased labour taxation in 2015. In 
Finland and Germany, contributions were adjusted 
to finance the social security systems. In Malta, 
employers’ social security contributions increased 
by 0.5% to finance the Maternity Leave Trust 
Fund. Other Member States, such as Latvia and 
Romania, introduced a minimum threshold for 
social contributions for all employees (Latvia) or 
for employees deriving income from agricultural 
activities, rental income or income from other 
sources (Romania).  
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Box I.3.1: Labour tax reforms in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Latvia, and the 
Netherlands
While a number of countries passed reform measures to reduce the tax burden on labour in 2015, the 
significant reform packages of Austria, Belgium, Greece (2016), the Netherlands and Latvia are presented in 
somewhat more detail in this box. In all of these cases, incentives for individuals to work, and for firms to 
hire, have been increased, especially affecting low wage earners.  
Reforms in Austria focused on the take-home pay of low earners by reducing the entry personal income tax 
rate from 36.5% to 25%, and made its tax schedule more gradual, increasing the number of tax brackets 
from three to six. A top income tax bracket of 55% was introduced for incomes above EUR 1 million for the 
years 2016-2020, while earlier the top tax bracket was 50%. The tax-exemption threshold of EUR 11 
thousand was unchanged, but refunds have been introduced or extended for employees and old-age 
pensioners who earn less than that amount. Working families also benefited from the doubling of the annual 
tax allowance for children to EUR 440 per children. As a result of changes, the tax wedge for a single 
average wage earner was reduced from 49.3% to 46.7%, from the second highest in the EU to seventh 
highest. 
Belgium considerably reduced both labour taxes and social security contributions to reduce labour cost and 
leave more disposable income for low and middle-income earners. The tax-free allowance was increased and 
the tax brackets are being gradually adjusted to reduce the tax burden. Waivers for low-wage earning 
workers from a part of their social security contributions (“social employment bonus”) and from personal 
income taxes (“fiscal employment bonus”) have been increased from August 2015, with further reductions 
programmed in 2016 and 2019. Regarding employers’ contributions, Belgium reduced the highest nominal 
contribution rate from 32.4% to 25%. In addition, it established or extended exemptions for first 
recruitments by SMEs and the self-employed and reduced social security contributions of the self-employed 
in general, from 22% in 2015 to 20.5% in 2018, in addition to increasing the tax deductions for professional 
expenses. Overall, the labour tax cuts are expected to reduce the implicit tax burden on labour by around 3 
percentage points by 2020 (from 43.5% in 2014). 
In Greece, the new income tax reform adopted in June 2016 introduced fundamental changes to the personal 
tax system. The reform (i) reduces the opportunities for tax avoidance by pooling business and employment 
income and taxing it on a single tax schedule; (ii) attenuates the preferential tax regime for farmers by taxing 
farm income, including direct subsidies, on the same tax scale as other forms of income while providing a 
standard tax credit, and by tightening the definition of professional farmer able to claim the tax credit; (iii) 
integrates the Solidarity Surcharge fully into the Income tax system changing from average to marginal tax 
rates and partly harmonising the brackets with those for personal income tax; (iv) adjusts marginal tax rates, 
in particular tackling the problem of high marginal tax rates for tax payers on middle incomes; (v) broadens 
the tax base and gives additional incentives for labour participation and work by reducing tax credit 
thresholds, which now take account of family composition; (vi) increases the tax rates on rental income 
above EUR 12 thousand.  
In the Netherlands, recent reforms increased work incentives, especially for low earners and second earners 
by increasing the work-related tax credit and the tax credit for working parents, while decreasing the general 
tax credit. The tax rate applicable to the second and third income tax brackets was also reduced from 42% to 
40.15%, while the income threshold for the highest tax bracket was increased by 15%. Employers’ 
incentives to hire low-skilled workers at above but close to the minimum wage were increased, through an 
allowance of up to EUR 2 thousand. 
Latvia introduced an income-dependent tax exemption, aimed at reducing the tax burden on low-income 
earners.  At the same time it introduced a solidarity tax for high-wage earners. This measure was aimed to 
reverse the regressive impact of the recent introduction of ceilings on employee social security contributions 
(the flat income tax rate is set at 23%). In addition, Latvia introduced a lower threshold for social security 
contributions (binding at the minimum wage), expanded the exemption for dependent children and abolished 
the exemption for dependent adults of working age in the personal income tax scheme.  
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Wage setting and collective bargaining 
Recent policy action in the domain of wage setting 
mechanisms includes the introduction of a 
statutory minimum wage in Germany and the 
establishment of a Low Pay Commission to advise 
the government on minimum wage changes in 
Ireland. In Latvia, the legal framework for 
minimum wage setting was adjusted in 2016 and 
includes now the obligation to take into account 
more extensive analytical information, with the 
involvement in the minimum wage setting process 
of other institutions (e.g. the Ministry of Health). 
The UK and the Netherlands have implemented 
measures to fight breaches of the minimum wage 
legislation, the former by obliging cashless 
payment of at least the minimum wage.  In Poland, 
the government adopted in 2016 an amendment to 
the Law on Minimum Wage which extends the 
coverage of the statutory minimum wage to civil 
law contractors.  
In order to ensure a better alignment of wages and 
productivity, Belgium has temporarily frozen wage 
indexation by introducing an “index jump” and 
capped the maximum margin for wage 
developments in 2015 and 2016 at respectively 0% 
and 0.5%.  After several years of cost saving 
measures, some Member States, including 
Lithuania, Slovenia and Spain decided to increase 
public wages or to reintroduce bonuses that were 
supressed during the crisis. Croatia, on the other 
hand, extended the suspension of certain pay 
components for government employees, such as a 
salary increase based on experience, Christmas 
bonus and annual leave bonus.  
The organisation of social dialogue at the firm 
level was revised in France, Lithuania and 
Luxemburg. At a higher level, France extended 
social dialogue to SMEs’ employees by the 
introduction of bipartite committees that will 
provide legal information and advice to both 
employers and employees. In Poland, a new 
framework for social dialogue was set up by the 
establishment of the Council of Social Dialogue 
which includes representatives of employees, 
employers and the Government. It replaces the 
previous Tripartite Commission for Social and 
Economic Affairs, which stopped functioning 
when the employee representatives left the 
Tripartite Commission in 2013.  
There were also changes concerning collective 
bargaining. In Ireland, the sectoral wage setting 
framework that was in place until 2013 was re-
established and a more precise definition of 
collective bargaining introduced, to address legal 
deficiencies. Germany adopted the law on multi-
union bargaining, which aims to prevent more than 
one collective agreement from being applied to an 
identical group of employees. France introduced 
representativeness criteria for employers’ 
organisations at the sectoral level in 2014, which 
will come into effect in 2017.  
Employment protection legislation 
A number of countries have introduced changes to 
the regulation of individual and collective 
dismissals since 2015. Significant measures were 
adopted in France in 2015 (as part of the “Macron 
Law” and “Rebsamen Law”) and 2016 (“El 
Khomri law”). The 2015 legislation amended 
employment tribunal procedures to make the 
procedure quicker and more effective, and 
introduced alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The 2016 legislation broadens the 
conditions for collective dismissal and reduces the 
cost of individual unjustified dismissals.  
In Lithuania, an in-depth revision of the Labour 
Code was passed in 2016. The aim of this reform 
is to make labour market regulations more flexible. 
The new legislative framework facilitates 
individual dismissals by shortening the notification 
period and providing additional grounds for 
dismissal. The new regulation also allows a wider 
use of short-time working schemes. 
Major reforms in other Member States provided 
for more stringent rules on reasonable causes for 
dismissal (the Netherlands), increased protection 
against unfair dismissal for specific types of 
workers (Austria), reduced scope for reinstatement 
(Italy), reduced costs of dismissals and uncertainty 
related to justified dismissals (Italy, Ireland, the 
Netherlands), reduced protection for working 
pensioners (the Netherlands) and the obligation for 
certain employers to prepare a social plan in case 
of collective redundancy (Czech Republic).  
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With regard to the regulation of temporary 
contracts, reforms were aimed at either limiting 
their abuse or injecting more flexibility on the 
labour market. The use of temporary contracts has 
been discouraged by limiting the number of 
renewals and the maximum duration in Poland and 
Slovakia, by reducing the number of temporary 
contract types in Poland and UK, and with the 
introduction of chain liabilities in case of posted 
workers in the Netherlands. In Cyprus, a new law 
was adopted in 2016 that regulates the use of 
fixed-term and open-ended contracts in the public 
sector. On the other hand, flexibility of temporary 
contracts has been increased by extending the 
number of possible renewals (France), broadening 
the scope and number of temporary contract types 
(Bulgaria, Romania) and further liberalising fixed-
term contracts (Lithuania).  
Integration of immigrants 
Measures to facilitate the integration of immigrants 
have been adopted in a number of Member States 
in 2015, including increased funding for the PES 
(Sweden) and faster access to language classes and 
apprenticeships for asylum seekers whose 
application is likely to be approved (Germany). In 
the Netherlands, a ‘participation declaration’, 
which informs immigrants about their rights and 
duties, as well as about the Dutch norms and 
values in society, has been introduced as a part of 
the integration plan for migrants who are granted 
asylum. In Belgium, the ‘Individualised Project for 
Social Integration’ has been reformed and 
extended to more societal groups. Box I.3.2 
provides more detail on the challenges and policy 
responses related to the integration of asylum 
seekers, with a focus on some of the main recipient 
countries (Germany, Sweden, Austria and Italy).  
3.4. POLICY PRIORITIES AND PLANS LOOKING 
FORWARD 
With the economy continuing to experience a 
moderate recovery, accompanied by gradual 
improvements in the labour market and social 
situation, but also by persistently large disparities 
among countries, attention is being increasingly 
put on revising labour market regulations, labour 
taxation and social policies at large, in such a way 
as to set the broad conditions for well-functioning 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box I.3.2: Integration policy facing new challenges
The year 2015 and the first six months of 2016 saw the arrival of about 1.8 million asylum seekers in the 
EU. Considering the high asylum recognition rate for the main countries of origin, more than half of asylum 
seekers can be expected to receive international protection and stay in the EU at least in the short to medium 
run. This has necessitated not only the provision of reception services for asylum seekers, but also an 
overhaul of integration policies, as refugees constitute one of the most vulnerable groups of migrants 
(European Commission and OECD, 2016). 
Most asylum seekers aimed for countries with already a significant non-EU born, and in particular refugee 
population. In 2014, before the inflows peaked, the number of working-age adults who were beneficiaries of 
international protection was 733 thousand in Germany, 247 thousand in Sweden, and 110 thousand in 
Austria (Labour Force Survey data). Between January 2015 and June 2016, Germany granted international 
protection to 453 thousand working-age migrants, Sweden to 72 thousand, Austria to 34 thousand. These 
first-instance decisions were lagging the inflows of asylum seekers considerably as asylum systems became 
overburdened. As a comparison, the number of asylum applicants by migrants aged 18-64 was 580 thousand 
in Germany, 100 thousand in Sweden, and 70 thousand in Austria. In Italy, 122 thousand asylum requests 
were registered in the same age group, and international protection was granted in 76 thousand cases.  
In the major recipient countries, the size of the challenge led to considerable policy efforts aimed at better 
and swifter integration already in the asylum procedure phase, on the labour market as well as through 
training and education. This was justified as the average decision time at the beginning of 2016 was about 6-
7 months in Germany and Austria, 6-12 months in Italy and 9 months in Sweden. In 2015, Italy allowed 
asylum seekers to access the labour market after two months from their asylum request, down from six 
months. In Germany, since August 2016, the previously required labour market test has been suspended for 
three years in the vast majority of regions. Austria is providing language trainings from early on and 
Germany also opened up language courses for asylum seekers from countries with a high asylum 
recognition rate.   
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labour markets, increased protection and a fair 
redistribution of the benefits of growth within the 
society.  
President Juncker (2015) in his State of the 
European Union address of September 2015 
included among the top priorities of his mandate 
“to recreate a process of convergence, both 
between Member States and within societies, with 
productivity, job creation and social fairness at its 
core.”  
The broad public consultation on a European 
Pillar of Social Rights, launched in March 2016, 
reflects this political priority. The Communication 
launching the public consultation (European 
Commission 2016c) clarifies that the Pillar should 
be seen as a reference framework expressing a 
number of essential principles common to 
participating Member States for the conduct of 
their employment and social policy. The Pillar 
should serve as a compass for renewed socio-
economic convergence and drive the process of 
reforms at national level in the light of 21
st
 century 
realities. The challenges that the Pillar is called to 
address are related to how to best combine 
flexibility and security in a changing world of 
work and society, and on how to support an 
effective process of upward convergence towards 
equally resilient institutions and economic 
structures in both the euro area and the EU at 
large. 
A call for a renewed process of upward socio-
economic convergence was also made in the 
Annual Growth Survey for 2016 (European 
Commission, 2015b), with a view to tackle 
economic and social disparities between Member 
States and within societies. In this context, and in a 
spirit of continuity with the approach endorsed in 
2015, the 2016 Annual Growth Survey proposes to 
focus policy efforts on three key priorities: (i) re-
launching both public and private investments in 
physical infrastructure as well as human capital; 
(ii) pursuing structural reforms to modernise the 
economy and to ensure a sound regulatory and 
institutional environment; and (iii) conducting 
responsible fiscal policies. This implies labour 
market policies fit to balance flexibility and 
security considerations and product and service 
markets that are able to stimulate innovation and 
job creation. In the labour market, in particular, the 
2016 Annual Growth Survey emphasised the 
importance of supporting job creation, while 
calling for increased efforts to tackle most pressing 
challenges, notably as concerns long-term 
unemployment, but also labour market 
segmentation and the effectiveness of social 
protection systems.  
 Fighting youth unemployment and long-term 
unemployment was also reaffirmed as a key 
priority for the EU with the adoption of the 
Youth Employment Initiative (YEI; European 
Council, 2013) and the Youth Guarantee 
(Council of the European Union, 2013) in 2013 
and, more recently, with the Long-Term 
Unemployment Recommendation of February 
2016 (Council of the European Union, 2016). 
The proposal for a Skills Guarantee, put 
forward by the Commission in June 2016 in the 
framework of the Skills Agenda (European 
Commission, 2016e), goes in the same 
direction as it proposes specific elements of 
policy design to tackle the skills challenges for 
those with low qualification attainments. The 
three initiatives follow a similar approach and 
can be seen as complementary, proposing an 
intervention model based on an individual, 
coordinated offer to, respectively, young 
people not in employment, education or 
training (NEETs), the long-term unemployed, 
or the low-skilled.  
 While it is too early to assess the effects of the 
Recommendation on Long-term 
Unemployment in terms of follow-up at 
national level, it is already possible to see that 
the combination of well-targeted policy 
recommendations via the Youth Guarantee 
coupled with the provision of financial support 
to combat youth unemployment through the 
EU budget (via the YEI) has spurred positive 
results in terms of reform momentum in several 
countries (see also Section 3.2).  
 The Commission Communication of 4 October 
2016 (European Commission 2016g), taking 
stock of the main achievements of the Youth 
Guarantee and YEI since their launch in 2013, 
shows that the Youth Guarantee has been a 
catalyst for policy change, leading to structural 
reforms and policy innovation across Member 
States and that the Youth Employment 
Initiative has been central to the swift set-up of 
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national Youth Guarantee schemes and has 
provided direct support to over 1.4 million 
young NEETs living in those regions most in 
need. 
This attention to capacity building and to the 
effectiveness of service provision is also clearly 
reflected in the priorities set in the Country-
Specific Recommendations addressed to the EU 
Member States in the framework of the European 
Semester. 
Generally speaking, the streamlining of the 
European Semester process introduced by the new 
Commission in 2015 continued in 2016, but the 
weight of employment and social issues remained 
broadly stable among the Country-Specific 
Recommendations (CSRs) addressed to the 
Member States (Graph I.3.8). (
40
) Similarly to 
2015, there has also been a clear differentiation 
across Member States. Two Member States 
(Denmark and Sweden) with relatively well-
functioning labour markets have received no CSRs 
related to employment or social policies, while 
some other Member States (e.g. Bulgaria, France, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Romania and 
Slovakia) have received a broad range of 
employment-related recommendations.  
For most areas, the relative evolution of CSRs by 
policy field over the total number of CSRs per year 
has remained fairly stable as compared to previous 
years (Graph I.3.9). However, for some policy 
                                                          
(40) The classification of CSRs is done in this exercise by 
policy instrument (e.g. active labour market policies), 
rather than by expected outcomes (e.g. increasing 
employability). This is not always an easy task, as the 
recommendations can concern both objectives/expected 
outcomes and required policy actions. 
fields (notably early retirement and disability 
schemes) their relative importance has been 
decreasing considerably over time.  
Graph I.3.9: Country-Specific Recommendations: 
distribution of CSRs by policy area 
 
Source: Council Recommendations 2012-2016. 
A closer look at labour market and social policy-
related CSRs over the period 2012-2016 gives a 
good overview of national policy priorities from an 
EU perspective: 
 In order to ensure that wages evolve in line 
with productivity, seven Member States 
received a CSR on wage-setting (compared to 
11 in 2014 and 2015). For Belgium, Finland 
and France, the main concern is the effect of 
overall wage evolutions on cost-
competitiveness, emphasising in particular in 
Finland the importance of the local wage-
bargaining framework. In Croatia, the CSR 
concerns the need for harmonisation of the 
wage-setting frameworks across the public 
administration and public services. Similarly to 
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2015, five Member States have received a CSR 
on the minimum wage in 2016. A major 
concern of minimum wage evolutions in these 
Member States is that they may hamper job 
creation and competiveness. In Bulgaria and 
Romania, this relates to the absence of 
established guidelines and clear criteria for 
changes in the minimum wage, which may also 
hamper their predictability. In France, Portugal 
and Slovenia, the high share of workers 
covered by the minimum wage may result in a 
further compression of the wage structure, 
putting upward pressure on wages overall. The 
CSRs acknowledge the role of social partners 
in wage setting. 
 Since the start of the European Semester, 
various countries have implemented far-
reaching reforms of their EPL to address labour 
market segmentation (e.g. Greece, Italy and 
Spain). As a result, there has been a 
progressive decline in the number of CSRs 
concerning EPL (7 in 2012, 9 in 2014 and 4 in 
2016). In 2016, CSRs have been addressed to 
Portugal and France (in the latter a major 
reform of the dismissal law was adopted in the 
summer of 2016); to the Netherlands as 
concerns the rapid growth of temporary 
employment and self-employment; to Poland as 
concerns the abuse of civil law contracts.  
 In light of substantial policy action aimed at 
addressing the high tax wedge on labour in 
particularly for low wage earners, the number 
of countries that received a CSR on labour 
taxation decreased from 9 in 2015 to 5 in 2016 
(13 in 2014 and 11 in 2013). The 2016 CSRs to 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania and Hungary 
mainly address labour taxation of low-wage 
earners, while the CSR addressed to the 
Netherlands concerns the tax distortions 
favouring self-employment.  
 Tackling the negative consequences of the 
economic crisis on the social fabric has become 
a top priority in most recent years, in particular 
in those Member States with poor social 
protection systems or high pressure on public 
spending. In 2016, 11 Member States received 
a CSR related to poverty or social exclusion 
(compared to 7 in 2012, 15 in 2014 and 9 in 
2015). Addressing shortcomings in the 
coverage and adequacy of social assistance 
remains high on the policy agenda especially in 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and 
Spain. Also ensuring the provision of efficient 
social services is gaining in importance 
(Bulgaria, Estonia). With a view to increase the 
effectiveness of social protection systems, Italy 
received a CSR on to reviewing and 
rationalising social spending. Finally, some 
CSRs address the poverty and social exclusion 
of specific groups. The CSR addressed to 
Ireland urges measures related to child poverty 
in general, while five Member States (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia) 
received a CSR asking for a better access of 
disadvantaged groups, including Roma 
children, to mainstream education and 
childcare.   
 In line with the drop in the number of CSRs 
concerning ALMPs in 2015, the number of 
Member States that received a CSR concerning 
ALMPs remained stable (15) in 2016, also in 
relative terms. Most of the CSRs in this field 
focus on enhancing the efficiency of the public 
employment services and the provision of more 
individualised support services, targeting in 
particular disadvantaged groups. These include 
the long-term unemployed (Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Croatia, Portugal, Slovakia), the low-skilled 
(Croatia, Slovenia), young people (Bulgaria, 
Romania) and workers with a migrant 
background (Finland). More specific CSRs 
relate to improving the effectiveness of public 
employment services by reinforcing the 
coordination with social services (Spain, 
Portugal, Romania); reducing regional and 
skills mismatches (Finland, UK); facilitating 
the transition from school to work by 
strengthening the provision of quality 
apprenticeships (UK) and increasing the 
employability of older workers by means of 
targeted life-long learning (Slovenia).  
 In 2016 three countries received CSRs 
addressing the integration challenges of people 
with a migrant background (AT, BE, FI) with 
reference to education and labour market 
policies. The increased policy focus on 
integration is also reflected in the June 2016 
Commission Communication “Action Plan on 
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the integration of third country nationals” 
(European Commission, 2016d). 
 Finally, eleven Member States received a CSR 
with a view to enhance labour market 
participation, often targeted at under-
represented groups (women, older works, low-
skilled). In order to increase female activity 
rates, a number of countries (Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Austria, Slovakia, 
UK) received CSRs demanding an increase in 
in the offer of childcare and long-term care 
provisions, measures to address the gender pay 
gap and a reduction of the financial 
disincentives to work for second earners. 
Germany was asked to encourage the activity 
rate and employability of older workers by 
means of financial incentives for later 
retirement, while Poland was recommended to 
reform existing preferential pension 
arrangements for specific categories of 
workers. 
3.5. CONCLUSIONS 
The broad policy trends emerging in most recent 
years continued in 2015-2016. Following the 
attention paid to structural reforms aimed at 
enhancing the adjustment capacity of labour 
markets, especially in countries most heavily hit by 
the crisis, the focus is now being primarily put on 
revising the tax and benefit systems, along with 
improving the capacity and quality of ALMPs, of 
the employment services and of social services in 
general. Reforms are also being pursued in those 
countries that had weathered the crisis relatively 
well. Making a better link between service 
provision and financial support through the 
development of effective welfare states is at the 
heart of policy action in many Member States.  
Most recent reform trends reveal an increased 
awareness of the need to pursue broad structural 
reforms aimed at balancing the different elements 
of the employment and welfare fabric. Reforms are 
no longer driven by short-term considerations 
linked to macro-economic pressures as in the 
aftermath of the crisis, but they are guided by the 
willingness to sustainably equip national systems 
with a greater capacity to adapt to changing 
economic conditions, in exchange for greater 
support for and protection of workers.  
With the significant acceleration of reform activity 
witnessed since the start of the crisis, the conduct 
of systematic analyses of the effects of reforms 
adopted or envisaged is also gaining in importance. 
This notably relates to the need to disentangle the 
short-term from the long-term effects of policy 
measures, taking into account their possible 
distributional implications and the effect on the 
ownership of the reforms themselves. A better 
awareness of the distributional implications of 
reforms may lead to reform designs that minimise 
their short-term costs. This, together with proper 
communication and transparency about both the 
expected costs and the intended benefits of policy 
measures, could be instrumental to increasing 
overall reform acceptance and ownership. The 
quality of institutions and underlying governance 
arrangements is also being increasingly recognised 
as a key factor to ensure the success of reform 
efforts and their effective implementation, 
including with regard to the capacity to minimise 
unintended side-effects. 
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This chapter assesses the macroeconomic 
implications of the minimum wage and how its 
institutional design influences these 
outcomes.  First, the chapter looks at the 
institutional dimensions of statutory minimum 
wage setting; on the basis of this information, an 
indicator of institutional stringency is built to 
characterise the degree of predictability of 
minimum wage setting. The institutional design 
influences both the growth of the minimum wage 
and its response to underlying macroeconomic 
variables. Second, it explores the impact of 
minimum wage changes on total employment and 
employment of youth and low skilled. The effects 
on overall employment are on average small 
although they can be larger for low wage earners. 
Also the pass-through of minimum wage changes 
on prices is limited, implying that minimum wage 
is effective in protecting low-wage earners' 
purchasing powers. Indeed, econometric evidence 
confirms that minimum wage increases support 
more consumption of low than of high income 
earners. Third, the chapter looks at dynamics that 
follow minimum wage discretionary changes. The 
analysis suggests that discretionary changes in the 
minimum wage have temporary negative small 
effects on total employment which subsides 
quickly. Movements in response to minimum wage 
shocks are mainly driven by countries where the 
institutional design makes these changes less 
predictable and more discretionary. 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a high and increasing interest in the 
minimum wage as a policy tool to reward work, 
improve the income distribution and provide 
families relief from poverty. In the Political 
Guidelines for the Commission, President Juncker 
(2014) said “(…) I believe it is necessary for all 
EU Member States to put in place a minimum 
wage”. Wages (including the minimum wage) is 
one of the 20 policy domains included in the 
European Pillar of Social Rights. In the context of 
the European Semester, several countries have 
received a Council Recommendation to improve 
the transparency of their minimum wage setting, or 
to ensure that their levels are supportive of job 
creation and competitiveness. 
The minimum wage sets a floor to earned labour 
income and in that way can reduce the risks of in-
work poverty associated with low pay. It may also 
reduce wage inequality, especially at the bottom of 
the wage distribution. As the labour market gets 
concentrated and certain types of labour 
fragmented, the relative bargaining power shifts in 
favour of the employer.  In this case, the minimum 
wage would re-establish a balance in the 
bargaining position between the employer and 
workers. By contributing to levelling the playing 
field, a minimum wage, if not too high, could lead 
to higher wages and higher employment. (
41
) It 
may also provide incentives to search for a job 
more intensively, thereby overcoming the costs of 
job-search. On the other hand, if too low, the 
minimum wage might be an ineffective wage floor. 
Yet, it interacts with various aspects of the 
economic and social situation. If too high, the 
positive effects on labour incomes of an increase in 
the minimum wage are offset by the negative 
effect on employment of those with productivity 
below the minimum wage, as predicted by the 
perfectly competitive labour market model (e.g. 
Cahuc et al. 2014, Manning, 2016).    
The minimum wage may affect the broader wage 
distribution, putting upward pressure in particular 
on wages slightly above the minimum wage. By 
compressing the wage distribution, it may create 
distortions, for instance, reducing the incentives 
for upskilling or pushing low-wage activities into 
the informal economy. At the same time, its level 
and rate of change may also serve as a reference 
for further wage settlements, thus providing 
guidance for a significant part of the wage 
distribution, especially when wage-setting 
institutions are weak.  
Minimum wages affect the broader economic 
context through their impact on consumer prices 
and aggregate consumption. In competitive labour 
and product markets, minimum wage updates 
increase the cost of labour and consumer prices. 
                                                          
(41) In the monopsony model (Stigler, 1946), the wage paid to 
the additional hired worker is below its productivity and 
wages and employment outcomes are below those of a 
perfectly competitive labour market. Similarly, the 
presence of information asymmetries leads workers to 
refuse a job if the wage is too low.  
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This effect is potentially stronger in sectors with a 
high share of minimum wage earners. Thus, the 
impact on consumption is ambiguous and depends 
on the impact of minimum wage increases on 
consumer prices, wages, employment and the 
interaction with the tax-benefit system. The 
negative effects on employment through higher 
labour costs can however be mitigated by demand 
effects: increased purchasing power of low-wage 
earners may increase the demand for labour of 
other low-wage earners. Overall, the employment 
effect of the minimum wage is theoretically 
ambiguous, and it is left for empirical studies to 
estimate its effect.  
The empirical evidence, mainly on the US, 
concludes that the effects on employment from 
minimum wage rises are of a small magnitude. 
Indeed, potential negative effects on the demand 
for labour are mitigated by a number of possible 
ways in which labour markets may depart from the 
hypothetical model of perfect competition, 
including, for instance, the bargaining of 
employers in their relationship with employees. 
Finally, minimum wages also have an impact on 
how the economy adjusts to shocks and 
fluctuations and can contribute to the emergence or 
narrowing of macroeconomic imbalances. This 
underlines the importance of the minimum wage as 
a policy tool, especially considering that 
governments play a key role in the design of the 
minimum wage setting and in statutory minimum 
wage decisions, while they can only indirectly 
influence, if at all, other private sector wages. In 
more detail, for example, minimum wages may 
cushion fluctuations in aggregate demand and help 
avoiding the risk of wage undershooting, i.e., 
wages falling below levels warranted by 
fundamentals, or the risk of deflation. On the other 
hand, it may also hamper addressing an 
overshooting of wages, and have a bearing on the 
adjustment of the economy towards tradable 
sectors when that is necessary to absorb high 
unemployment.  
This chapter studies various dimensions of the 
minimum wage. It provides an overview of the 
institutional framework for minimum-wage setting 
in the different EU Member States. Then, it studies 
the impact of minimum wages on employment, 
wages, prices, consumption and poverty as well as 
the interactions between minimum wage policies 
and these variables over time. The last section 
concludes.  
1.2. INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF MINIMUM 
WAGE POLICY 
This section provides an overview of the different 
institutional frameworks for minimum wage 
setting in place in EU Member States. As a start, it 
reviews the institutions in place for setting wage 
floors, distinguishing between countries with and 
without a statutory minimum wage. Thereafter, it 
studies the different approaches in statutory 
minimum wage setting systems in more detail by 
discussing three important dimensions: (1) the 
actors involved and the level of government 
discretion in the decision-making process; (2) the 
timing of updates, including frequency and 
predictability; and (3) the criteria that should be 
taken into account in case of an update. Finally, for 
countries with a statutory minimum wage, an 
indicator of institutional flexibility is developed, 
based on characteristics of the minimum wage 
setting process.  
1.2.1. Institutional framework for wage floors: 
Current situation in the EU 
1.2.1.1. Countries with statutory minimum 
wage  
In the EU, 22 Member States have a national 
statutory minimum wage in 2016: this is a legal or 
regulatory instrument making that wage floor 
legally binding for all workers in dependent 
employment. Some EU countries have introduced 
it in the recent past: the UK (1999), Ireland (2000), 
and Germany (2015). 
The level of the minimum wage varies widely 
across countries; this is the case even when 
controlling for differences in price levels (i.e. by 
making minimum wage figures comparable across 
countries in terms of their purchasing power) 
(Graph II.1.1).   
There is a substantial variation in the ratio of 
minimum wage to average, the so-called Kaitz 
ratio. For instance, while in Spain the proportion of 
the minimum wage over the mean wage is the 
lowest in the EU at only 33%, it is around 50% in 
France, Luxembourg and Slovenia (Graph II.1.2. 
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Graph II.1.1: Minimum wage levels: July 2016 (PPS) 
 
(1) Minimum wage data for Portugal for January 2016. 
Price levels expressed in purchasing power standard (PPS).  
Source: Commission services, Eurostat 
Some countries allow a differentiation of statutory 
minimum wage for certain categories of workers; 
sub-minimum rates or exemptions from minimum 
wage provisions can be set for certain groups, for 
instance youth, apprentices, labour market 
entrants, disabled workers, or long-term 
unemployed. Sub-minima tend to be defined as a 
share of the standard statutory minimum wage and 
thereby changes to the latter lead also to 
adjustment of the sub-minima.  
Graph II.1.2: Kaitz index: minimum wage as a proportion 
of the mean wage in 2015 (%) 
 
(1) 2016 data for Germany, Malta and Slovenia; 2014 for 
Belgium, Estonia, France, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, 
Netherlands and Romania.  
Source: European Commission, Eurostat 
This possibility of hiring at rates below the 
standard minimum wage can be justified to prevent 
the loss of employment of those groups whose 
productive capacity is below that of the average 
minimum wage earner. 
Most minimum wage exceptions concern sub- 
minima for youth or apprentices. At least nine 
Member States provide for these exceptions. In 
other countries, the statutory minimum wage is 
differentiated on the basis of the difficulty of the 
occupation (e.g., Czech Republic or Slovakia), 
skills or qualifications (Hungary or Luxembourg), 
employment tenure (Greece), or on their status of 
(re-)entrants into the labour market (Ireland, 
Poland or Germany with sub-minima in the first 
two cases and exemptions in the third one). For the 
same worker, these exceptions have a limited 
duration, either explicitly ‒ e.g. in Germany long-
term unemployed are exempted from minimum 
wage provisions for six months ‒ or implicitly, 
with the youth sub-minima not being applicable 
once a certain age is reached.  
In other cases, inability-to-pay clauses are foreseen 
to take into account the employer's financial 
situation. For instance, in Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Malta and the Netherlands, employers in 
difficulties may temporarily undercut the 
minimum wage if authorised to do so by a public 
authority (government or court depending on the 
country) (ILO, 2014). Collective agreements can 
undercut the statutory minimum wage by 5% in 
Croatia. 
1.2.1.2. Countries without a statutory minimum 
wage  
Six Member states do not have a nation-wide 
statutory minimum wage. Instead, wage floors are 
only set in collective agreements often at sector 
level, which altogether tend to cover a high share 
of the labour force. This is the case of Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy and Sweden. In Cyprus, 
the government sets statutory minimum wages 
only for certain occupations where workers are 
considered to be in a week bargaining position.  
The scope of collectively-bargained wage floor 
regimes depends on the robustness and coverage of 
collective bargaining. Countries with such 
bargained wage floor regimes generally have a 
comprehensive collective bargaining system, with 
high densities of both unions and employers 
associations (higher or even much higher than in 
most other EU Member States). As a result, a large 
proportion of workers are directly covered by a 
collective agreement.  
Statutory minimum wages and collectively agreed 
wage floors are not directly comparable. The 
statutory minimum wage is a single floor for the 
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whole nation, which is under the direct control or 
influence by national authorities.  It is a minimum 
guaranteed pay for those employees who are not 
covered by the (higher) wage floors laid down in 
collective agreements. Collectively-bargained 
wage floors are the outcome of bi-partite 
negotiations, which can be related to hundreds or 
even thousands of different agreements that in turn 
can, and often do, foresee quite complex and 
differentiated pay schedules, both at sectoral, firm 
or territorial level.  
Statutory minimum wages and collectively-agreed 
wage floors can co-exist in the same country: the 
existence of minimum wage does not prevent sub-
national wage bargaining. Instruments like the 
extension of collective agreements to non-
signatory parties can broaden the coverage of 
collective agreements and wage floors set by those 
agreements, even in countries with statutory 
minimum wage and low social partners' density.  
The relationships between collective bargaining 
and statutory minimum wage may be multiple. For 
instance, a high minimum wage may leave less 
room for bargaining and lead to lower social 
partners' density. However, high collective 
bargaining coverage and high density of social 
partners can help to make a better informed 
minimum wage policy. 
Recent studies show that collectively bargained 
wage floors tend to be set higher as a percentage of 
the average wage than statutory minimum wages. 
(
42
) High wage floors under collective bargaining 
may come at the expense of non-coverage. 
Garnero, Kampelmann and Ryckx (2013) find 
evidence of a trade-off between high wage floors 
and more people being paid below those minima 
under collectively bargained minimum wages 
regimes.  
                                                          
(42) See studies by Boeri (2012); Kampelmann, Garnero and 
Ryckx (2013); and Schulten et al (2015). Boeri (2012) 
states that, especially in countries with high 
unemployment, governments setting a statutory minimum 
wage are more likely to internalise macro-economic 
constraints and fiscal implications of an increase as 
compared to parties engaged in fragmented collective 
bargaining. To the extent that membership is more 
encompassing and collective bargaining is more strongly 
coordinated, negotiating parties are more likely to take 
such constraints into account when setting wage floors. 
This may result from low-paying sectors, firms and 
individuals not covered by collective bargaining. 
Thus, if a large and increasing share of the 
workforce is not covered by collectively agreed 
minima, the case for introducing a statutory 
minimum wage becomes stronger. In this 
perspective, discussions on the introduction of a 
statutory minimum wage took place recently in 
Cyprus and Germany just introduced it. 
1.2.2. The institutional features of statutory 
minimum wage setting systems  
The mechanism used to fix the minimum wage in 
EU countries can be characterised along three 
dimensions: (1) government discretion and actors 
involved in the decision-making process; (2) 
timing of updates, including frequency and 
predictability of updates; and (3) criteria to be 
taken into account in case of an update. This 
section looks at these dimensions more in detail 
before providing a numerical characterisation of 
Member Sates' minimum wage setting regime.   
1.2.2.1. Role of government and other actors 
in the decision process 
There is a considerable cross-country variation in 
the role of the government, social partners and 
other actors in the decision-making process. 
Decisions on minimum wage levels can come from 
bilateral negotiations between social partners or 
tripartite agreements or just unilateral government 
decisions. In some countries, indexation to prices 
or wages or both are a dominant element of 
minimum wage setting. 
Based on an extensive study of the national 
frameworks, three stylized models for minimum 
wage setting are identified on the basis of the role 
of government and other actors in the decision 
making process: 
 Institutionalised decisions,  
 Indexation to prices or wages, and  
 Non-institutionalised processes. 
Table II.1.1 summarises the different country 
cases.  
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Institutionalised decisions 
The key feature here is that the decision making 
process is well-established with relatively specific 
roles for the main actors. Still, it can include 
markedly different variants and combine 
bargaining, negotiation and consultations to 
different extents.  
For example, the process can be led by a 
specialised body or emphasis can be put on 
consultation in a tri-partite format, with the final 
decision taken by the public authorities. Moreover, 
in some countries, negotiations between social 
partners or tri-partite deals have priority over 
government intervention (e.g. Slovakia in the 
former case, Poland in the latter), while in others 
negotiations are an option but a unilateral decision 
by the government is possible. 
Admittedly, the distinction between different 
models is not so neat, especially once the actual 
behaviour of the players is taken into account. For 
example, in some cases requirements on 
consultation may be formal with consulted actors 
risking not having real influence on the minimum 
wage adjustment; the opposite may happen where 
the eventual decision is carefully prepared, despite 
a loosely-defined process. 
In the UK, an independent specialised body – the 
Low Pay Commission (LPC) – plays a leading role 
in making recommendations to the government on 
the annual minimum wage adjustment. (
43
) The 
LPC makes only recommendations, with the final 
decision staying with the government; yet, if the 
latter deviates from the recommendations it has to 
lay a report before the Parliament on the reasons 
                                                          
(43) The LPC consists of 9 members appointed by the 
government having a composition balanced between 3 
profiles: trade unions, employers and independent experts, 
but all serving in their personal capacity. 
for such a decision. So far, the UK government has 
always followed the LPC proposals.  (
44
) 
Ireland adopted in 2015 an approach similar to the 
UK's with a LPC which plays the same role as the 
LPC in the UK. The LPC advises the Minister, 
who can deviate from the LPC recommendation 
but has to justify his/her decision before the 
Parliament.  
In Greece, newly adopted legislation (to enter into 
force as of 2017) foresees that the minimum wage 
will be set by the government after consultations 
with and advice from social partners and experts. 
As in the UK and Ireland, experts would play a 
specific role in making non-binding proposals after 
consultation with social partners and research 
institutions. In addition, consultations with and 
advice from social partners are foreseen as one of 
the steps of the procedure. Germany represents 
another case where a specialised body plays an 
important role. A committee appointed by social 
partners will propose updates to the level of the 
minimum wage. (
45
) The government can adopt or 
reject the commission's proposal, but it cannot 
change it. (
46
) The development of average wages 
laid down in collective agreements is a decisive 
benchmark to be taken into account. Overall, the 
minimum wage setting mechanism has a strong 
bargaining component owing to the bilateral nature 
of the social partners' committee as well as of the 
                                                          
(44) In April 2017, the UK is introducing a National Living 
Wage as the pay floor for those aged 25 and over. When 
announcing it last autumn, the government set as objective 
to have it at 60% of median earnings by 2020 (GBP 9 per 
hour) subject to sustained growth. The path to get to such a 
target will still be proposed by the LPC like the wage floors 
for those younger than 25. 
(45) The committee is composed of 7 social partners' 
representatives and 2 no-voting advisors with academic 
backgrounds and proposed by social partners. 
(46) This process will take place with the first minimum wage 
update in January 2017; the initial minimum wage level 
that came into force in 2015 was set by the government. 
 
Table II.1.1: Role of the government and other actors in the decision-making process 
 
Source:  Relevant national legislation; ILO Working Conditions Laws Database / Minimum wage fixing database 
 
Independent experts-
led process
Bilateral / social 
partners experts led 
process
Gov't following tripartite 
consultations process
Gov't after consulting 
social partners
Bipartite/tripartite 
negotiations possible, 
else government 
decides
EL DE HU ES EE BE BG AT
IE LT HR PL FR CZ CY
UK LV RO SK LU DK
PT MT FI
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SI SE
Statutory minimum wage
Non-statutory 
minimum wage
Institutionalised decisions
Indexation
Non-institutionalised 
decisions
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explicit call to take into account developments in 
recent collective agreements.  
Tri-partite approaches with the final decision being 
with the government characterise the system in 
Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia and Portugal – in the 
latter, an institutionalised tripartite body has to be 
consulted before the government takes a final 
decision.  
Spain, Croatia and Romania share characteristics 
with the previous group of countries. Yet, the 
consultations with social partners do not have to 
take place in an institutionalised setting; instead 
the requirement is only to consult social partners, 
with the approach to consultations being left to 
government will; only in the case of Spain does the 
law go further and require the government to 
consult the most representative social partners.  
In all, broad public consultations and disclosure of 
information on minimum wage policies add 
transparency, predictability and should allow for 
better consideration of the possible implications of 
minimum wage policies. Social partners' 
representatives and other stakeholders are also 
well-suited to voice the concerns of those more 
directly affected. Independent experts may be 
well-placed to make broader economic and social 
considerations, including on the necessary links 
between minimum wage choices and other relevant 
policy areas and their implication for working age 
groups.  
Rule-based indexation 
In 6 Member States, minimum wage updates are 
largely driven by indexation to prices, wages or 
both. That is the case at present of Belgium, 
France, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and 
Slovenia. Often, it is also possible to make 
discretionary changes on top of what is due to 
indexation.  
In Belgium, indexation to consumer prices is the 
key driver of minimum wage updates and widely 
used also for other wages, even if the exact 
modalities vary across sub-national collective 
agreements. More specifically, the minimum wage 
is agreed within the framework of a bi-partite 
national collective agreement every other year 
(which is automatically extended to the whole 
economy). A specific consumer price index – the 
health index - is used (excluding items like 
tobacco, alcohol, petrol, diesel and the impact of 
taxes on energy products).  
Luxembourg indexes wages to headline consumer 
price inflation, which is triggered when inflation 
reaches 2.5%. By law, all wages in the private and 
public sectors are subject to indexation. Every two 
years, the government reports on changes to the 
overall economic conditions and incomes, and on 
that basis it may propose increasing the minimum 
wage; the law does not set a role for social partners 
in these decisions.  
In Slovenia, the minimum wage is adjusted every 
year by at least the increase in consumer prices in 
the previous year. The exact amount of the 
minimum wage is determined by the labour 
minister after prior consultation with the social 
partners.  
Malta has a particular system of wage indexation: 
each year the government issues a national 
standard order increasing all salaries, including the 
minimum wage, by an absolute amount. This fixed 
pay increase known as the cost-of-living 
adjustment (COLA) reflects the change in the 
retail price index applied to a reference base wage, 
which is somewhat higher than the minimum wage 
The exact minimum wage level is set by the 
government after recommendations by the 
Employment Relations Board (which includes 
government's representatives as well as social 
partners and independent experts). 
In the Netherlands, the indexation is relative to the 
average wage increases in recently-signed 
collective agreements and takes place twice a year 
(on 1 January and 1 July). However, there is the 
possibility of not updating the minimum wage rate 
if either the minimum wage revision implied by 
the average wage rise in collective agreements is 
considered too high with the risk of leading to 
higher unemployment or if the increase would lead 
to higher expenditure on social benefits (indexed 
to the minimum wage) with the risks of rising 
taxes or contribution to ensure financing of higher 
benefits.  
In France, the minimum wage is linked to both 
price and wage developments: it should at least be 
indexed to the evolution of the consumer price 
index (for a consumption basket representative of 
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those at the bottom 20% of the income 
distribution) plus 50% of the increase in the 
purchasing power of the wages for workers and 
employees. There is also the possibility of topping 
up – so-called coupe de pouce – those increases by 
government decision after (sequential) opinions by 
groups of independent experts on the minimum 
wage and by the tripartite collective bargaining 
commission where unions and employers 
representatives seat (La Commission Nationale de 
la Négociation Collective – CNNC); the 
government may also submit its own report to the 
CNNC.  
Indexation can be seen from different perspectives. 
It protects real wages against increases in the cost 
of living and may reduce uncertainty and conflict, 
providing a focal point for (minimum) minimum 
wage updates negotiations. Yet it makes real 
wages more rigid with negative implications for 
low wage employment. Real wage rigidity delays 
labour market adjustment in the case of temporary 
aggregate or permanent sector-specific 
productivity shocks that require, respectively, 
changes in aggregate or relative wages. This is an 
issue in particular when the minimum wage level 
is high and the possibility of inability to pay 
clauses limited or no-existent in practice. Finally, 
indexation can lead to wage-price spirals and make 
nominal shocks (e.g., a change in commodities 
prices in world markets) more persistent (see also 
European Commission, 2011).  
A rigid indexation can be problematic especially 
when inflation is far away from the desired rate 
(from below or above) – risking consolidating 
deflationary or inflationary expectations 
respectively – and in times of low productivity and 
rising unemployment. In addition, indexing 
minimum wages to average wages may also be 
problematic, inter alia, when minimum wage 
earners have productivity developments different 
from the average.  
Non-institutionalised processes 
The minimum wage setting is non-institutionalised 
when governments can determine the adjustment 
of the statutory minimum wage, without any 
formal obligation of negotiations or consultation. 
In Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, the 
government determines the adjustment of the 
minimum wage without specific rules and any 
form of negotiations or institutionalised 
consultation with the social partners or with 
experts.  
This does not mean that in other countries, notably 
those with more loosely defined processes, it 
cannot de facto boil down to unilateral government 
decision when bilateral negotiations did not bear 
fruit. At the same time, the lack of tri-partite 
agreements may also reflect a strategic behaviour 
whereby some players count more on a fall-back 
government decision than on consensual solutions.  
The lack of transparent principles and guidelines 
can lead to unpredictability of outcomes. This can 
introduce too much volatility in minimum wages, 
making their setting more dependent on the 
electoral cycle or any other factor that steers 
minimum wage rates in an unchecked way instead 
of linked to underlying economic fundamentals. 
While on the one hand, in a wider discretionary 
framework, policy makers could be able to design 
the optimal policy response to unforeseen 
circumstances, on the other hand too much 
discretion may raise the risk of opportunistic 
decisions and no internalisation of economic 
constraints, with no checks and balances to foster 
sound decisions.  
Thus, a rules-based framework forces the different 
players (including of course, politicians and social 
partners) to adhere to a consistent course of action 
across circumstances. Indeed, if the minimum 
wage setting regime is insulated from short-term 
electoral or other motivations, then the outcomes 
of minimum wage policies can be time consistent, 
meaning that the policy setting makes consistent 
short-term (e.g. income support and poverty 
alleviation) and broader long-term outcomes (i.e. 
sustainable job creation and economic dynamism). 
1.2.2.2. Frequency of adjustment 
The frequency and predictability of minimum 
wage adjustments affect how sensitive the 
minimum wage is to a changing context, while 
keeping its objectives intact across times and 
changing circumstances. EU countries differ 
considerably in their frequency of revising the 
minimum wage (see Table II.1.3). In most cases, 
the minimum wage is adjusted once a year, 
sometimes with precisely set calendars; in other 
cases, only the annual frequency is prescribed and 
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within this group some member states, prescribe 
the date of entry into force of the update (often 
January as for instance in France, Malta or 
Slovenia). 
 
 
Table II.1.3: Frequency of the minimum wage 
adjustments 
 
(1) 1: twice  a year (Jan-July) if inflations exceeds 5%; 2: 
(additional) automatic indexation whenever inflation 
exceeds 2% from the previous MW update; 3:  on the top 
of indexation to consumer prices;  
4: from time to time  
Source: Relevant national legislation; ILO Working 
Conditions Laws Database / Minimum wage fixing 
database  
 
In the Netherlands, the possible update takes place 
every six months (January and July). Germany sets 
minimum wage to be revised every two years as of 
2017 the same frequency as in Belgium and 
Luxembourg – on top of the regular indexation. In 
the UK, the legal provisions require irregular 
minimum wage updates ("from time to time"), but 
in practice the minimum wage is revised every 
October. Finally, a few countries have not set any 
adjustment frequency (Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Romania).  
1.2.2.3. Criteria to be taken into account 
The criteria or parameters taken into account for 
minimum wage updates guide the fixing of the 
actual minimum pay rates. In that way, they can 
foster stability of the minimum wage setting 
process and a balanced and widely-accepted choice 
of criteria can help in confirming the broad 
objectives of the minimum wage policy.  
Labour market and economic conditions, overall 
wages and prices developments are the most 
common criteria in the national legislations (Table 
II.1.2). In some cases, workers' purchasing power 
and indexation to past inflation (in the cases of 
rule-based indexation) or productivity are also 
considered. On the other hand, social benefits or 
labour taxation are usually not taken into account. 
The same holds for minimum wage coverage. 
Overall, the requirements are not exhaustive. 
Minimum wage legislations make only broad 
reference to them without stating how these 
parameters have to be used in practice. For 
instance, there is a general reference to the need of 
taking into account wage developments, but only 
for two Member States the legislation makes a link 
with the outcome of collective bargaining.  
With set 
calendar and 
procedures
Only date of 
kick start or 
of entry into 
force is set
Without 
calendar or 
key dates set
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Not 
specified
NL (Jan & 
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Infra-annual
Annual
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years
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Table II.1.2: Criteria taken into account in the minimum wage setting process 
 
Source: Relevant national legislation. 
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Labour 
market
Employment/  unemployment/ Job 
creation
* * * * * * * *
Economic developments and situation * * * * * * *
Productivity * * * * *
Trade, exchange rate, competitiveness, 
developments in trading partners
* * * *
Social benefits / Taxes and contributions / 
Fiscal impacts
* * *
Other wages * * * * * * *
Retrospective collective-agreements wage 
developments
* *
Purchasing power / incomes & needs of 
MW earners or workers / income & prices 
policies
* * * * * *
Consumer prices (other than rule-based 
indexation)
* * * * * * *
Indexation and /or COLA * * * * *
Consumer prices (next year's) * *
Broad 
economic 
situation
Wages and 
incomes
Prices
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1.2.3. An indicator of institutional stringency of 
minimum wage setting framework 
Table II.1.4 puts together the three dimensions 
reviewed above (discretion, frequency of revisions, 
and criteria). Based on this qualitative information, 
an indicator of institutional stringency has been 
developed. This indicator provides a measure of 
the restrictiveness of the decision making process. 
Lower values point to more flexibility, higher ones 
to more stringency (i.e. less room for discretion 
and more predictability). The methodology to 
develop the indicator is explained in Box II.1.1.  
Graph II.1.3 presents the value of the indicator for 
the EU Member States with a statutory minimum 
wage. On the basis of this indicator, the minimum 
wage setting process is more tightly regulated in 
Greece, Slovenia, Ireland, France and Poland. In 
contrast, it is the most flexible (i.e. less 
predictable) in Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Bulgaria. 
Graph II.1.3: Indicator for the stringency of the minimum 
wage decision-making framework 
 
Source: Commission services, based on relevant national 
legislation 
Intermediate values of the indicator may reflect a 
trade-off between the different dimensions of the 
indicator with stringency or flexibility in one or 
two dimensions being offset by stringency or 
flexibility in other dimensions.  
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Table II.1.4: Summary of the three institutional dimensions of the minimum wage setting framework 
 
Source:  Relevant national legislation. 
 
Gov't after 
consulting social 
partners
Gov't following 
tripartite 
consultations 
process
Bipartite/Tripartit
e negotiations 
possible, else 
government 
decides
Bilateral / social 
partners experts 
led process
Independent 
experts-led 
process
NL AT
LV PL EL CY
SK IE DK
CZ HR FR FI
MT IT 
SI SE
ES HU
PT
DE BE
LU
UK
BG RO LT EE
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 or more
Colour legend / number of criteria
Institutionalised decisions p.m.: Non-
statutory 
minimum 
wage
Statutory minimum wage
Taxonomy
Non-
institutionalised 
decisions
Indexation
Fr
eq
u
en
cy
 o
f 
re
vi
si
o
n
Infra-annual
A
n
n
u
al
With set 
calendar and 
procedures
Only date of 
kick start or of 
entry into force 
is set
Without 
calendar or key 
dates set
Every 2 years
Other 
Not specified
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Graph II.1.4: Correlation between the stringency indicator 
and the level of the minimum wage 
 
Source: Commission services, based on Eurostat and 
relevant national legislation 
Cross-country illustration of the main features of 
the minimum wage setting is provided in Graph 
II.1.4. At a first glance, countries with higher ratios 
between minimum and average wage (i.e., with 
higher Kaitz indexes) have more rigid minimum 
wage setting systems ‒ i.e. relatively more 
predictable and less discretionary‒ (Graph II.1.4). 
(
47
) 
                                                          
(47) The correlation coefficient between the Kaitz index and the 
indicator of institutional stringency of the minimum wage 
setting system is 0.5. Moreover, about ¼ of the difference 
across countries in the Kaitz index is explained by the 
indicator of institutional stringency. These are simple 
correlations, which do not provide any information on the 
causality.  
Table II.1.6 shows the correlation between the 
Kaitz index and various sub-components of the 
minimum wage stringency index. Only the 
correlation with government discretion (0.7) is 
statistically significant, while the other categories 
have small but statistically insignificant values. A 
positive correlation implies that the minimum 
wage is higher (relative to the median) when there 
is limited discretion by the government (i.e. or the 
minimum wage setting is mainly rule based). 
 
Table II.1.6: Correlation among sub-indices of indicator of 
minimum wage setting stringency and with 
Kaitz index 
 
(1) High values of the Kaitz index imply a high minimum 
wage as percentage of the median wage. For sub-indices 
of minimum wage stringency  a low value means high 
discretion , low frequency and predictability, limited criteria 
to be considered when updating the minimum wage. 
Source: Commission services and Eurostat. 
 
The high correlation between the Kaitz index and 
the overall index of institutional stringency of the 
minimum wage setting is driven by the high 
correlation with the sub-complement government 
discretion in minimum wage setting. The relation 
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%
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Stringency indicator
Flexibility of Minimum wage setting regime - sub-indexes
Government 
discretion
Frequency 
of Update
Predictability
Criteria called 
for a decision
Government 
discretion
1
Frequency of 
Update
0.4 1
Predictability 0.2 0.4 1
Criteria called 
for a decision
0.3 0.5 0.6 1
Kaitz index 0.7 0.3 0.04 0.2
 
Table II.1.5: Determinants of minimum wage changes 
 
(1) Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample includes Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Spain, France, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and the UK. Wage growth is measure by the rate of change of nominal compensation per employee. 
Source: DG ECFIN AMECO database and Eurostat LFS. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
higher than 
median
lower than 
median
higher than 
median
lower than 
median
higher than 
median
lower than 
median
higher than 
median
lower than 
median
Average wage growth 0.39 *** 0.48 *** 0.013 0.49 *** 0.012 0.55*** 0.019 0.48 *** -0.20 0.58***
(0.13) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.15) (0.17) (0.13) (0.16)
0.89*** -0.09
(0.16) (0.32)
Consumer price Inflation 0.39*** 0.28 1.03*** 0.29 * 1.02*** 0.16 1.03*** 0.28* 1.3 *** 0.12 
(0.13) (0.23) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
0.013 0.13 -1.14 *** 0.21 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.21) (0.81)
Lagged employment growth 0.33*** 0.015 0.22** 0.35 * 0.22** 0.33* 0.44*** 0.15 0.30 *** 0.14
(0.12) (0.27) (0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.23) (0.12) (0.23)
-0.48*** 0.60*** -0.32*** 0.52
(0.17) (0.35) (0.16) (0.35)
Constant 0.021 *** 0.028 *** 0.015 *** 0.028 *** 0.015*** 1.3*** 0.013 *** 0.028 *** 0.015 *** 0.029 ***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.63) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 383 103 192 163 192 163 192 163 192 163
R-squared 0.80 0.85 0.72 0.82 0.71 0.83 0.72 0.82 0.77 0.83
Number of countries 18.0 18.0 9.0 8.0 9.0 8.0 9.0 8.0 8.0 8.0
Dependent variable: Minimum 
wage growth Basic 
specification 
Years following 
legislative 
elections
Countries with Institutional stringency index
average wage growth in the year 
following elections
Consumer price inflation in the 
year following elections
Lagged employment growth in 
the year before the elections
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between low government discretion and high 
levels of the minimum wage is influenced by the 
fact that the Kaitz index is high in countries where 
updates of the minimum wage occur mainly via 
indexation (e.g., Slovenia, Luxembourg and 
Malta). In addition, with intermediate degrees of 
institutionalisation, having more players and less 
discretion might lead to more moderate minimum 
wage changes as the interest of wide groups of 
workers are taken into account. Thus, in cross-
country comparisons more rule-based minimum 
wage updating systems lead to a higher Kaitz 
index. (
48
) 
Table II.1.5 explores how the increase of minimum 
wage responds to changes in underlying 
macroeconomic variables (column 1) controlling 
for the political cycle (column 2) and for the 
characteristics of the minimum wage setting 
                                                          
(48) Yet the correlation between the relevant institutional 
indicator and the Kaitz index is not statistically significant. 
Less compelling is the evidence for the other 
characteristics.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box II.1.1: How flexible or stringent is minimum wage setting?
In order to assess the flexibility or the stringency of the minimum wage setting framework, this box 
develops a "stringency index". The index is based on the conversion of qualitative information on three 
components of the legal minimum wage setting framework: government discretion in the decision process, 
timing of the update (frequency and predictability of the updating process) and the criteria used for the 
update. The information is collected in the course of an intensive literature review and relates to the 
institutional framework in place in the 22 EU Member states that have a statutory minimum wage in early 
2016. The qualitative information on each of the dimensions is transformed into numbers on a scale (0-6) as 
indicated in Table 1.  
The ranking is built to reflect the degree of discretion of the government in setting the minimum wage: 
lower ratings are assumed to reflect more flexibility (full flexibility at the extreme) while higher readings 
reflect less room for discretion, in other words, more stringency. Whereas there is of course some 
subjectivity in this choice of indicators and their weighting, the index allows a holistic view and especially a 
systematic way of characterising the flexibility or stringency of the minimum wage setting. The ratings just 
reflect the restrictiveness of the framework and do not have a normative value attached.  
Table 1: Detailed items used to compile the stringency indicator 
1. Government discretion, weight: 33.3 (in %) Ratings 
 
Non-institutionalised decisions 0 
 
Institutionalised decisions Gov't after consulting social partners 1 
  
Gov't following tripartite consultations process 2 
  
Bipartite / tripartite negotiations possible, else government decides 3 
  
Bilateral / social partners experts led process 4 
  
Independent experts-led process 5 
 
Rules-based indexation to past prices or wages inflation or both 6 
    2. Timing of update, weight: 33.3 (in %) consisting of: 
 
 
2a. Frequency of update, weight: 16.6 (in %) 
 
 
Not specified 
 
0 
 
Infra-annual 
 
2 
 
Annual 
 
4 
 
Every 2 years 
 
6 
    
 
2b. Predictability of updating process, weight: 16.6 (in %) 
 
 
Without set calendar 
 
0 
 
Only data of entry into force is set 3 
 
With set calendar (and procedures) 6 
    3. Criteria called for a decision on the update, weight: 33.3 (in %) 
 
 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
 
1.5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
4.5 
 
4 
 
6
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process identified on the basis of the stringency 
indicator (columns 3-10). (
49
) Values of the 
indicator below median represent regimes where 
the discretion in setting minimum wage is 
relatively high and the predictability low. A 
number of facts emerge from these estimates based 
on a panel of EU countries. 
 
Minimum wage changes reflect, with 
approximately the same weight, changes in wage 
growth, consumer price inflation, and in the 
employment conditions (column 1). Controlling 
for the political cycle, as captured by the year of 
the elections, modifies the relative importance of 
the underlying macroeconomic conditions for 
minimum wages updates. 
This is visible from the larger effect of wage 
growth and the lower impact of consumer price 
inflation (which also statistically insignificant, i.e. 
imprecisely estimated) (column 2). Thus, in 
electoral years governments take more into 
account redistribution (i.e. the wage distribution 
becomes more compressed when the minimum 
wage increases);  
Columns 3 to 10 look more in detail at various 
specifications splitting the sample on the basis of 
value of their indicator of stringency of their 
minimum wage setting regime. The framework 
used to revise the minimum wage influences the 
size of its average change – visible from the size of 
the constant - and the relative weight of the 
variables usually taken into account for its update. 
Rules-based systems have an underlying growth of 
the minimum wage which is half as much as the 
average growth in more discretionary minimum 
wage setting frameworks.   
Relative high government discretion in minimum 
wage setting raises the effect of average wage 
increase and of employment growth on minimum 
wage updates. Thus, distributional concerns and 
the overall growth of employment take a 
prominent role in the decision of changing the 
minimum wages, when governments have more 
direct control of their setting; with these effects 
                                                          
(49) The political cycle is identified as a binary variable that 
equals 1 in the year of election and 0 otherwise. It is 
obtained from the Database of Political Institutions 2015 
update Cruz et al. (2016). The effect in the year that 
follows elections is obtained lagging the dummy variable 
by one year. 
becoming more important in electoral years 
(columns 3-10).    
1.3. A LOOK AT THE MACRO-EVIDENCE  
1.3.1. Employment 
1.3.1.1. Introduction  
Its employment effect is one of the most debated 
issues related to the minimum wage. While there is 
no consensus in the literature, most studies find 
negative effects of the minimum wage on 
employment of low-wage groups (see, e.g., 
Neumark, 2014). These studies often focus on 
young workers or specific low-wage sectors in a 
particular country (often the US). Standard 
estimates of the employment elasticity of the 
minimum wage for young workers is between –0.1 
and –0.2, which means that a 10% increase in the 
minimum wage is estimated to reduce the youth 
employment by about 1 or 2% (see, e.g., the 
overview of Neumark, 2014). Nevertheless, a 
number of studies find results that are close to zero 
or statistically not significant, and some have even 
found a positive employment effect of minimum 
wage increases in some sectors. The uncertainty 
about the employment effects of the minimum 
wage can well be explained by economic theory by 
invoking various labour market frictions as well as 
demand effects stemming from the increased 
consumption of minimum wage workers (see, e.g., 
Manning, 2016).  
While there is a large literature on the employment 
effects of the minimum wage based on specific 
countries (see, e.g., the surveys of Brown, 1999; 
Neumark and Wascher, 2006; Belman and 
Wolfson, 2014, esp. Chapters 2 and 4; and 
Neumark, 2014), there are relatively few cross-
country analyses. Virtually all existing work 
focuses on a sample of OECD countries. Early 
cross-country analyses include Dolado et al. 
(1996) and OECD (1998). In a seminal study, 
Neumark and Wascher (2004) found negative 
employment elasticities between –0.1 and –0.2 in 
most specifications for the age group 15-24. 
Dolton and Rosazza-Bondibene (2012) find an 
elasticity of about –0.2 for youth (ages 15-24) and 
of about –0.05 of adults (ages 25-54) in their 
baseline estimations. They also find that the 
negative employment effect of the minimum wage 
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is exacerbated in recessionary times for youth, but 
not for adults. Addison and Ozturk (2012) study 
the effect of the minimum wage on the 
employment of prime-aged women and find an 
elasticity of about –0.079 in a baseline 
specification, among a broad range of elasticities 
between –0.04 and –0.35 in various alternative 
specifications. Finally, Christl et al. (2015) find 
that the effect of the minimum wage on youth 
employment is non-linear: it turns negative only at 
a certain level, estimated to be at around 40% of 
the average wage. All contributions emphasise that 
the findings are sensitive to specification decisions 
(see discussion below on the specification). 
The aim of this section is to provide estimates of 
the employment effects of the statutory minimum 
wage for a panel of EU Member States. The focus 
on EU countries allows the extension of the 
analysis to a number of members not in the OECD 
or recent members that were not included in earlier 
analyses. It also allows a comparison across a set 
of countries which are arguably more 
homogeneous, and whose economic data are more 
harmonised, than it is the case across the OECD at 
large.  
The findings of this analysis are broadly consistent 
with the previous literature. First, it is documented 
that results are sensitive to the specification, in 
particular to how secular country-specific time 
trends in the employment rate of the relevant 
groups are controlled for. (
50
) Second, the effect of 
the minimum wage on the overall employment rate 
(age group 15-64) is negative but small and 
estimated with a degree of uncertainty that makes 
it statistically not significant in the most reliable 
specifications. Third, negative employment 
elasticities consistent with standard results in the 
literature are estimated for young workers, in 
particular for the age group 20-24, while results 
are not stable for the age group 15-24. Finally, 
statistically weakly significant negative effects, of 
a magnitude that is comparable to that for young 
age groups, are found for low-skilled workers, a 
group that has not been studied before in the 
literature.  
                                                          
(50) This means that the disemployment effects of minimum 
wage are spurious and reflect pre-existing negative trends 
(e.g. skill-biased technological change) that pre-date the 
policy change (see also Dube et al., 2010). 
1.3.1.2. Analytical approach 
The analysis follows previous cross-country 
studies. As in most studies of the minimum wage, 
the employment rate (employment-to-population 
ratio) is chosen, as dependent variable. 
Regressions are run separately for various groups: 
the overall working-age population (age group 15-
64); youth (age groups 15-24 and 20-24); and the 
low-skilled (ISCED level 0-2, i.e., those without 
an upper secondary education; age group 15-64). 
The main explanatory variable is the ratio of the 
minimum wage to the median wage (the Kaitz 
index). However, the minimum wage is not the 
only determinant of employment and to avoid 
biased estimates it is usual control for others as 
well. These control variables include:  
 Variables reflecting the economic environment 
at large: the output gap (in specifications 
explaining the overall employment rate) or the 
unemployment rate of prime-age males (in 
specifications for particular groups);  
 demographic variables and variables relevant 
for the specific group studied: the share of the 
specific age or skill group in the overall 
working-age population; the share of the 
relevant youth age group in formal or informal 
education or training;  
 labour market institutions: spending on Active 
Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) as a 
percentage of GDP; the indicator for the 
strictness of Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) of regular workers; the 
replacement rate of unemployment benefits; tax 
wedge; union density.  
Country and year fixed effects are added to each 
specification to control respectively for time-
invariant differences between countries and for 
common trends across EU countries, as is standard 
in similar studies. Finally, each empirical 
relationship is studied both with and without the 
inclusion of a country-specific time trend. 
Including country-specific time trends helps 
account for country-specific factors that drive 
employment rates (e.g., industrial or cultural 
changes), beyond those explicitly captured by the 
other control variables included in the regressions. 
If country-specific employment trends are relevant 
but ignored, the resulting statistical findings can be 
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spurious. For this reason it seems prudent to place 
more trust in the specifications with country-
specific trends. (
51
)  
As discussed in the previous section, minimum 
wage updates are influenced by economic 
variables and by the institutional setting. This 
raises the question whether simple regressions 
estimating the relationship between the minimum 
wage and economic outcomes might be biased due 
to the possible endogeneity of minimum wages. 
This issue is addressed here, as in most of the 
literature, by lagging these variables by one 
year. (
52
) 
1.3.1.3. Variables and data 
Information on the Kaitz index (the statutory 
minimum wage as a percentage of the median 
wage) is taken from the OECD earnings database 
(2015). The database has information on 18 EU 
countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and 
the UK. Germany introduced a statutory minimum 
wage only in 2015 and is thus not included in the 
analysis as data are insufficient for a macro panel 
analysis. The database has no information on 
Bulgaria, Croatia, and Malta.  
                                                          
(51) The literature is not unequivocal on this specification issue: 
while most previous contributions have included country-
specific time trends, some (e.g., Dolton and Rosazza-
Bondibene, 2012) did not. 
(52) Only few contributions, e.g., Dolton and Rosazza-
Bondibene (2012) attempted to solve this potential problem 
by an instrumental variable approach. 
Employment rates and population shares are from 
Eurostat; output gap is from the AMECO database 
of the European Commission. Labour market 
institutions (ALMP spending, EPL, replacement 
rate of unemployment benefits, tax wedge, union 
density) are from the OECD. ALMP spending was 
complemented from the Eurostat labour market 
policy database. Union density is from the 
ICTWSS database (Visser, 2015). In the case of 
the other OECD variables, long historical (but 
discontinued) series have been complemented by 
up-to-date (but shorter) series also collected by the 
OECD.  
Taking institutional characteristics of the labour 
market into account among the explanatory 
variables reduces the size of the sample. First, 
recent observations are lost because some 
institutional variables are not available for latest 
years. Second, the EPL indicator for the time 
period considered is not available for Latvia, 
Lithuania and Romania. In view of these data 
limitations, the robustness of the results is assessed 
running regressions with and without institutional 
variables, both on a restricted sample (15 countries 
and those years for which institutional variables 
are available) and on an unrestricted sample (18 
countries and all available years).  
1.3.1.4. Results 
Results are presented for four socio-economic 
groups: the overall employment rate (age group 
15-64), youth (age groups 15-24 and 20-24), and 
the low-skilled. Table II.1.7 provides a summary 
 
Table II.1.7: The employment effect of the minimum wage: Summary of estimated elasticities 
 
(1) The table lists elasticities, calculated by scaling the relevant estimated regression coefficients. (2) All regressions 
estimated by Fixed-Effects panel estimation with robust standard errors. (3) The minimum wage indicator used in all 
regressions is the minimum wage to median wage ratio. (4) “Controls” refer to five variables controlling for labour market 
institutions: ALMP spending as a percentage of GDP; the strictness of Employment Protection Legislation; the replacement 
rate of unemployment benefits; the tax wedge; and union density. (5) Asterisks mark estimated coefficients which are 
statistically significant at the 10% (*), 5% (**) or the 1% level (***). 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable
All 
controls
Stat. sign. 
controls
No 
controls
All 
controls
Stat. sign. 
controls
No 
controls
Employment rate, overall working-age population (15-64) -0.182* -0.168** -0.254* -0.102 -0.047 -0.046 -0.055 -0.106
Employment rate, youth (15-24) -0.268* -0.199 -0.465 -0.308* -0.137 -0.115 -0.104 -0.135
Employment rate, youth (20-24) -0.130 -0.103 -0.246* -0.228** -0.151 -0.194** -0.178** -0.137**
Employment rate, low-skilled (ISCED 0-2; age group 15-64) -0.217** -0.201* -0.212 -0.157 -0.173* -0.162* -0.162* -0.193*
No country-specific time trend Country-specific time trend
Restricted sample Unrestr'd 
sample, 
no 
controls
Restricted sample Unrestr'd 
sample, 
no 
controls
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of the estimated elasticities. (
53
) The first four 
columns in the table show results from 
specifications excluding country-specific time 
trends, while the last four columns show 
specifications including trends. All five 
institutional control variables are included in 
columns (1) and (5). Only significant control 
variables are kept in columns (2) and (6). All 
institutional controls are excluded in columns (3) 
and (7). Finally, columns (4) and (8) repeat the 
regressions shown in columns (3) and (7), but for 
an unrestricted sample (i.e., a sample that is not 
restricted to the 15 countries, and to the years for 
which institutional controls are available). 
Overall employment rate. The first row of Table 
1 summarises the results for the age group 15-64. 
A number of conclusions can be drawn. First, in all 
specifications, the effect of the minimum wage on 
employment is estimated to be negative, but in the 
majority of the specifications it is not statistically 
significant.  
Second, the results are sensitive to whether 
country-specific time trends are controlled for. The 
estimated elasticity is sizeable (between –0.18 and 
–0.26) and statistically significant at least at the 
10% level in the restricted sample when country-
specific time trends are not included, regardless of 
the inclusion of institutional controls. In contrast, 
the elasticity falls to around –0.05 and is never 
statistically significant when country-specific time 
trends are included. (
54
)  
Finally, since the results are more stable when 
country-specific trends are controlled for, and in 
view of the theoretical arguments presented 
discussing the analytical approach, the 
specifications that control for these trends are more 
reliable. Thus, in the most reliable estimates, the 
effect of the minimum wage on the overall 
employment rate appears to be small, and is not 
estimated precisely enough to be statistically 
significant. The point estimate is consistent with a 
fall in employment of about 0.5% to 1% after a 
10% increase in the minimum wage.  
                                                          
(53) Estimated coefficients are transformed into elasticities to 
ease comparability with previous findings of the literature. 
(54) Allegretto et al. (2015) found for the US that including 
state-specific trends produces small and insignificant 
elasticities for teens. 
Youth. The second and third row of Table 1 
summarise the results for the age group 15-24 and 
20-24, respectively. All the regressions on youth 
employment control for the size of the youth 
cohort relative to the working age population, and 
the enrolment rate of the youth cohort in training 
or education, besides the lagged prime-age male 
unemployment rate, which reflects the common 
economic cycle. Two observations can be made. 
First, the estimated elasticities are in all cases 
negative, but they are only robust for the age group 
20-24, while the results for the 15-24 age group are 
uncertain. The elasticities range from –0.1 to –0.5 
for the age group 15-24, but in most cases they are 
not statistically significant. Elasticities fall in a 
narrower range of –0.1 to –0.25 and are in most 
cases statistically significant for the age group 20-
24. The fact that results are more robust for this 
age group suggests that there are other 
determinants of teenage employment (ages 15-19), 
that are relevant beyond those that are already 
controlled for. This might introduce noise into the 
estimation for the cohort including teenagers.  
Second, point estimates of the elasticity for the age 
group 20-24 are in the range of –0.13 and –0.2 
when country-specific time trends are controlled 
for, and are in most cases statistically significant at 
the 5% level. Results for this age group are 
relatively robust to the exclusion of country-
specific time trends, but the increased stability of 
results when these trends are controlled for lends 
further support to the view that their inclusion is 
necessary to isolate the effect of minimum wages 
from those of other factors affecting employment. 
(
55
) 
Low-skilled workers. The last row of Table 1 
summarises the results for the low-skilled. Control 
variables include, beyond the unemployment rate 
of prime-aged males as a cyclical variable, the 
share of low- and high-skilled in the working age 
population.  
The point estimates for the employment elasticity 
of the minimum wage are within a range of –0.15 
and –0.22, and the estimations are fairly robust to 
alternative specifications. In the specifications with 
country-specific time trends, the range of 
                                                          
(55) Statistical tests strongly reject the hypothesis that country-
specific time trends can be excluded. 
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estimated elasticities is between –0.16 and –0.2. 
The estimated effect is in most cases statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This provides some 
evidence for the hypothesis that high minimum 
wages have a negative employment effect on the 
low-skilled. 
1.3.1.5. Conclusions 
This section presented some estimations of the 
employment effect of the statutory minimum wage 
for various groups in 18 EU countries (15 in the 
restricted sample). The most reliable specifications 
found elasticities between –0.13 and –0.2 for 
young adults (age group 20-24) and elasticities 
between –0.16 and –0.2 for low-skilled workers. 
Results were not robust for the broader youth 
group (15-24) which included teenagers, while for 
the overall working age population, the estimated 
elasticities were small and negative (around –0.05) 
and estimated with a degree of uncertainty which 
made them statistically not significant. Overall, 
these findings support the view that, at 
conventional levels, minimum wages do not have a 
large negative employment effect, but may have 
some negative effects on the employment of low-
wage groups. The method applied in this analysis 
did not allow identifying non-linearities in the 
relationship between employment and minimum 
wage. Thus, it is likely that policy-makers in most 
cases have to weigh the social benefits of a higher 
minimum wage against its social costs.    
1.3.2. Prices 
1.3.2.1. Literature review 
Little attention has been paid to the implications of 
minimum wage increases on consumer prices, 
which is a topic that has been largely ignored in 
the analysis of minimum wage policies.  
Theoretically, the impact of the minimum wage on 
prices depends on the structure of the labour 
market. On the one hand, under the assumption of 
a competitive labour market, an increase of the 
minimum wage above the market-clearing wage is 
entirely shifted to consumers as higher 
consumption prices. (
56
) On the other hand, under 
                                                          
(56) The increase in the minimum wage is expected to lead to 
higher marginal cost per worker; firms will respond by 
shedding labour and increasing prices. Yet, the effect on 
the assumption that employers have dominant 
position in the labour market and do not face 
competition in labour market for hiring employees, 
employers have some discretion in setting wages. 
As a consequence, the level of wages would be too 
low and the incentives to accept a job offer weak; a 
moderate increase in the minimum wage (above 
the wage paid by the monopsonist but below the 
wage paid by in perfect competition) increases the 
firm's average labour cost, but decreases the 
marginal cost of hiring an extra employee (as firms 
will not have to hire the wage level to attract more 
employees). The fall in the cost of employing an 
additional worker (marginal cost) reduces the price 
of producing an additional unit of output.  
The first empirical studies on price pass-through 
using data on restaurants in New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania (Katz and Krueger, 1992; Card and 
Krueger, 1994) found no effect of minimum wage 
changes on consumer prices, confirming the 
hypothesis of monopsony in the fast-food industry 
in US. An important shortcoming of these studies 
was the small dataset and limited number of 
minimum wage changes used to identification the 
effects.  
More recently, Aaronson (2001) exploits variation 
in minimum wages across time and states using 
data on fast-food prices from the US and Canada 
in 1978-1995. He finds an elasticity of fast-food 
prices to minimum wage which ranges between 
0.07 and 0.16 depending on the dataset used. 
Subsequent studies (eg Aaronson et al., 2008; and 
Allegretto et al., 2015) found a small impact on 
prices, with elasticity in a ballpark of 0.06 (
57
)  
Outside the US or Canada, few studies have 
analysed the impact of minimum wage changes on 
prices. Compared to the US, the impact of 
minimum wage changes in France on prices of 
restaurants is slightly higher, with an elasticity of 
about 0.10 (e.g. Fougère et al., 2010). Harasztosi 
and Lindner (2015) found for Hungary that firms 
                                                                                   
employment is small if the elasticity of substitution 
between low-wage employment and capital is low. 
(57) Aaronson et al. (2008) analyse the impact of a federal 
minimum wage increase on restaurant prices in the US in 
the period 1996-1997 using detailed store-level micro-data. 
Allegretto and Reich (2015) used information on restaurant 
prices before and after a 25% increase in the minimum 
wage in San Jose.  
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in the manufacturing sector responded to the 2001 
large and persistent increase in the minimum wage 
by raising output prices. In contrast, no significant 
impact on prices in the residential home care sector 
was found for the UK (Machin et al., 2003), partly 
owing to the effect of price regulation in the sector.   
1.3.2.2. Data and econometric approach  
This section provides an original analysis of the 
impact of the minimum wage on consumer prices 
for 12 product categories (
58
) in 20 EU Member 
States (
59
) with statutory minimum wage; the 
analysis on monthly data covers the period January 
2005-March 2016. It follows a similar approach as 
Aaronson et al. (2008). The analysis proceeds in 
two steps.  
First, descriptive evidence on price changes 
following an increase in minimum wage is 
presented. Price changes (increases and decreases) 
after an increase in the minimum wage are 
tabulated. Two cases are considered: (1) an 
increase in the minimum wage in the last two 
months and (2) no increase in the minimum wage 
in the last two months.  
Second, the impact in a specific month of a 
minimum wage change on price is estimated using 
an econometric model lining the percentage 
change in consumer prices for a specific product 
category in a given country on the percentage 
change in the national statutory minimum wage of 
that country.   
In addition to the contemporaneous and lagged 
percentage changes in the minimum wage, the 
model also includes the change in the minimum 
wage of the following year to control for potential 
expectations firms may have on future changes in 
the minimum wage. Further, the model controls for 
the lagged change in prices (to account for 
                                                          
(58) The product categories (COICOP categories - one digit) 
included are alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics; 
clothing and footwear; communications; education; food 
and non-alcoholic beverages; furnishings, household 
equipment and routine household maintenance; health; 
housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels; 
miscellaneous goods and services; recreation and culture; 
restaurants and hotels; and transport. 
(59) The EU Member states included are Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Croatia, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain and 
UK. 
persistency overtime of price changes) and  
product–country, month–country, month-product 
and year fixed effects. These fixed effects are 
introduced to net out the remaining unobserved 
components affecting price changes and isolate the 
effects due to minimum wage changes.  
Finally, the analysis also estimates the impact of 
minimum wage hikes on the price of the consumer 
basket by income level.  
Data on the monthly consumer prices by product 
category are from Eurostat. Data on the monthly 
minimum wages are collected from Eurostat and 
national statistics. Data on consumer baskets refer 
to 2005 and are obtained from Eurostat.   
1.3.2.1. Results 
Table II.1.8 presents the results of the descriptive 
evidence on price changes following an increase in 
the minimum wage. The results show that in case 
there was an increase in the minimum wage in the 
two months before, there were significantly more 
increases in prices (60.1%) compared to periods 
when there was no increase in the minimum wage 
in the past two months (53.4%). The reverse hold 
for price decreases (ie price decreases are less 
frequent in two months that follow minimum wage 
rises). With respect to the magnitude of the price 
changes, the results suggest that price changes 
(both increases and decreases) are larger after 
minimum wage hikes but quite rare compared to 
the case of no minimum wage change.  
 
Table II.1.8: Descriptive evidence: Impact of minimum 
wage increases on consumer prices 
 
(1) Asteriks indicate estimated effects that are statistically 
significant at 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level.  
Source: Commission services, based on data from Eurostat 
and national statistics  
 
Table II.1.9 presents the results of the regressions 
for different specifications of the baseline model. 
Minimum wage increase in the past two months Yes No
Percent increases 60.1 53.4***
Percent decreases 27.5 29.7***
Mean price change (%) increase 0.74 0.82**
Mean price change (%) decrease -1.72 -1.09***
A. Share of price changes
B. Size of the price changes 
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The results are relatively robust across the 
estimations. (
60
)  
The effect of the contemporaneous change in the 
minimum wages on prices is significant in all 
specifications except model A which includes the 
least control variables and can therefore be 
considered as less reliable. In case it is significant  
its effect ranges between 0.021 (model including 
month-country fixed effects) and 0.062 (model 
including month-product fixed effects). In 
addition, in case of model E, which includes 
month-country effects, the effects of the lagged 
and lead minimum wage increase are also found to 
be significant. The combined effect of a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage is expected to lead 
to a price increase of roughly 0.4% 
(0.02+0.01+0.01). (
61
) Hence, overall the results 
                                                          
(60) In an additional robustness check, the probability of a price 
increase is used at the place of the price increases as 
outcome variable. Results are in line with expectations; an 
increase in the minimum wage significantly lowers the 
probability of a price increase.  
(61) Note that in the model that includes month-country fixed 
effects, the effect of a minimum wage increase is lower 
than in the other models. Month-country fixed effects allow 
controlling for country-specific seasonality of prices. 
However, in case for example minimum wage increases 
imply that a 10% increase in the minimum wage 
leads to 0.4% to 0.6% increase in consumer prices.  
In order to provide some insights on the impact of 
minimum wage increases on prices for specific 
goods and services, the analysis is performed per 
product category. Graph II.1.5 presents the results 
of the combined (including the coefficients for the 
contemporaneous time period, lagged time period 
and lead period if significant) effect of a minimum 
wage increases on prices of particular product 
categories using a regression that include month 
and year fixed effects and is equivalent to model E. 
The combined impact ranges from 0.087 for 
clothing and footwear to 0.020 for health. No 
significant effect is been found for education and 
housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels. The 
effect of the minimum wage on consumer prices is 
found to be the highest for the following three 
product categories: clothing and footwear; 
                                                                                   
happen in January and price increases also mainly happen 
in January, this specification will attribute price increases 
to the seasonal price change (ie occurring every 1st 
January), rather than to an increase in the minimum wage. 
 
Table II.1.9: Econometric evidence: Impact of minimum wage increases on consumer prices 
 
(1)  Asterisks indicate estimated effects that are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. 
Source:  Commission services, based on data from Eurostat and national statistics 
 
(1) (3) (2) (5) (4)
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Lagged consumer prices, % change -0.052 -0.153 -0.049 -0.148
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Minimum income, % change 0.0048 0.021*** 0.062*** 0.021*** 0.061***
(0.012) (0.0070) (0.013) (0.0070) (0.012)
Lagged minimum income, % change 0.010** -0.012
(0.0047) (0.0085)
Two period lagged minimum income, % change -0.0012 -0.013
(0.0046) (0.0086)
Future minimum income, % change 0.0051* 0.0044
(0.0031) (0.0042)
Product-country fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month-country fixed-effects No Yes No Yes No
Month-product fixed-effects No No Yes No Yes
Year fixed-effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.202*** -0.099 0.089* -0.087 0.108*
Constant (0.0052) (0.121) (0.054) (0.123) (0.056)
Observations 32158 32158 32158 31439 31439
R-squared 0.000 0.073 0.335 0.073 0.337
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recreation and culture; and furnishings, household 
equipment and routine household maintenance. 
This is not surprisingly as minimum wage earners 
are likely to represent a high share of the work 
force involved in the production and sales of these 
product categories. Unfortunately, there are no 
comparable cross-country data available on the 
exact share of minimum wage earners involved in 
the production or sales of each product category. 
Graph II.1.5: Combined effect of the minimum wage 
variables on prices by product category 
 
(1) Based on an estimation of equation (1) that includes 
month-country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Only 
effects significant at 10% (*) or lower levels or included in 
the combined effect.  
Source: Commission services, based on data from Eurostat 
and national statistics.  
These findings suggest that an increase in the 
minimum wage is only partly offset by increases in 
consumption prices. Yet, since there are 
differences in the consumption patterns of 
households depending on their income level, the 
overall impact of a minimum wage increase on 
household budgets may differ between income 
groups. Depending on whether low-income 
households consume relatively more or less 
products susceptible to price increases following a 
minimum wage change, the impact of minimum 
wage increase can be smaller or bigger for low-
income households compared to high-income 
households. Simulations based on the average 
share of each product category in the 2005 
consumption basket for the 20 countries included 
in the analysis show that those at the bottom of the 
income distribution will face a proportionally 
lower increase in consumer expenditures than 
those with a higher income level, but the 
differences are small. In the first quintile, a 10% 
increase in the minimum wage will lead to a 0.28% 
increase in price of their consumption basket, 
while in the last quintile this is 0.33%. 
In summary, there is evidence of a positive pass-
through of minimum wages to consumer prices, 
but the effect does not make the minimum wage an 
ineffective tool to protect purchasing power of 
workers at the end of the income distribution. The 
impact is the largest in the sectors that employ a 
relatively high share of minimum wage workers, 
such as clothing and footwear; recreation and 
culture; and routine household maintenance.  
1.3.3. Consumption 
1.3.3.1. Literature review 
Few studies have looked at the impact of minimum 
wage on aggregate consumption. Theoretically, the 
impact is ambiguous and will depend on the 
interaction between the employment, wage and 
price effects of a minimum wage increase as well 
as the interaction with the tax and benefit system. 
The effect is likely to be small when 
disemployment effects and price increases are 
small. 
Using detailed US micro-data, Aaronson et al. 
(2012) analyse the implications of minimum wage 
increases on household spending and debt. They 
find that following a minimum wage hike spending 
and debt substantially increases for low-income 
households. A $1 minimum wage increase is 
expected to increase household incomes by 
approximately $250 and spending by $700 per 
quarter in the year following the minimum wage 
hike. The increase in spending is mainly driven by 
an increase in collateralized debt to buy durables 
such as vehicles. 
Tonin (2011) finds that a minimum wage increase 
can even decrease consumption for groups of 
workers who likely earn part of their wage in an 
undeclared way. In their case, the minimum wage 
increase results in increased declared wages and an 
increased tax burden rather than an increased net 
income.  
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1.3.3.2. Data and econometric approach 
This analysis provides a tentative estimate of the 
impact of minimum wage on mean consumption 
expenditure by consumption quintile for 18 
Member States. (
62
) Data on the percentage change 
in mean consumption expenditure per adult 
equivalent (in PPS) between 2005 and 2010 by 
quintile and country is obtained from the 
Household Budget Surveys. The main variable of 
interest is the percentage change in the monthly 
minimum wage in PPS. In order to test whether the 
effect of an increase in the minimum wage varies 
between consumption quintiles, interaction terms 
between quintile dummies and minimum wage 
growth are included. Finally, to isolate the effect of 
minimum wage changes from changes due to 
average wage, the percentage change between 
2005 and 2010 in annual net earnings (in PPS) for 
a single individual earning 100% of the average 
wage is introduced in the regression as control 
                                                          
(62) The Member States included are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the UK.  
variable. As a robustness check, the average wage 
is replaced with the percentage change in GDP per 
capita (in PPS) between 2005 and 2010 obtained 
from Eurostat.  
1.3.3.3. Results 
Table II.1.10 shows the results obtained from four 
different specifications. The first two columns 
present the result of a simple model that includes 
no interaction effects with the consumption 
quintile, but controls for respectively the average 
wage growth (Model A) and GDP per capita 
growth (Model B). The last two columns present 
estimations of the full model, including interaction 
terms with the consumption quintiles and 
respectively average wage growth (Model C) and 
GDP per capita growth (Model D). Interaction 
terms allow identifying the effect that is specific to 
each quintile. 
The results indicate that there is a positive impact 
on aggregate consumption. Yet, this impact is 
more precisely estimated when the response of 
aggregate consumption is conditional to different 
 
Table II.1.10: Econometric evidence:  Impact of the minimum wage on consumption by income quintile 
 
(1)  OLS estimates. Robust standard errors. Model A and C which include the percentage change in the average wage as 
an explanatory variable does not include Estonia and Slovakia because of missing data. Asterisks indicate estimated 
coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level. 
Source:  Commission services, based on Eurostat. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Minimum wage (MW), % in change in PPS 0.48** 0.33**
(0.19) (0.14)
Average wage, % in change in PPS 0.73*** 0.73***
(0.20) (0.19)
GDP per capita, % in change in PPS 1.16*** 1.16***
(0.17) (0.11)
First quintile*  MW 0.80*** 0.67***
(0.20) (0.13)
Second quintile* MW 0.67*** 0.53***
(0.21) (0.11)
Third quintile* MW 0.48* 0.31***
(0.25) (0.11)
Fourth quintile* MW 0.34 0.19*
(0.25) (0.11)
Fifth quintile* MW 0.12 -0.04
(0.26) (0.12)
Constant -0.087** -0.059** -0.087*** -0.059***
(0.033) (0.026) (0.032) (0.024)
Observations 80 90 80 90
R-squared 0.56 0.64 0.63 0.73
Dependent variable: Mean consumption expenditure per adult 
equivalent, % in change in PPS
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income quantiles.  The effect of a minimum wage 
increase is found to be larger for the lowest 
quintile and gradually decreasing across the 
income distribution. The results presented by 
Model C and D show that a 1% increase in the 
minimum wage leads to an increase in 
consumption in the ballpark of 0.7% in the bottom 
quintile and of 0.6% in the second quintile. The 
effect decreases rapidly to respectively 0.4%-0.3% 
in the third quintile. There is no significant effect 
of minimum wage hikes on consumption for the 
two highest quintiles of the consumption 
distribution at a 5% significance level. Graph II.1.6 
summarizes the impact of the minimum wage 
showing the effect per quintile and the 
corresponding confidence interval. 
Graph II.1.6: Impact of the minimum wage on 
consumption by income quintile 
 
(1) OLS estimates based on the results reported in Model C 
in Table II.1.7, using the  percentage change in the 
average wage as an explanatory control variable.  
Source: Commission services, based on Eurostat 
A potential caveat of the analysis is that it does not 
include some time-varying factors that differ 
between countries, such as budgetary restrictions, 
which may affect both consumption and minimum 
wage. This may create endogeneity bias. An 
additional bias could come from the exclusion of 
factors that affect consumption in a specific 
quintile, such as indexation of benefits in line with 
minimum wage changes affecting incomes in the 
lowest quintiles.  As result, the estimates can be 
biased and potentially overestimate the effect of 
the minimum wage. Yet, they show that minimum 
wage changes have a stronger impact on 
consumption at the bottom rather than at the higher 
part of the consumption distribution. 
In summary, there is a positive relation between 
minimum increases and consumption. The impact 
differs across the consumption distribution and is 
the highest for the bottom of the consumption 
distribution and gradually increases across the 
distribution. This is not surprising as the low-
income households are mostly affected by the 
minimum wage hike and most likely to be 
concentrated at the bottom of the consumption 
distribution.  
1.3.4. The macroeconomic effects: A general 
framework 
As evidenced in previous sections, the 
employment effects of minimum wage are often 
elusive, resulting in imprecise estimates for many 
working age groups. This may happen for a 
number of reasons. Low shares of minimum wage 
workers, low price elasticity of the product 
demand and low substitution with respect to other 
inputs may cause a weak response of labour 
demand to minimum wage changes. Thus, even 
when the average wage changes in response to 
minimum wage updates, the estimates of the 
employment effects may be small and highly 
uncertain (Manning, 2016, Cahuc et al 2014).  
Accounting for the possible interactions between 
minimum wage, average wages, employment and 
consumption, including the lagged effects of these 
variables on minimum wage and of the latter on 
the former, provides a better representation of the 
relation linking minimum wages to employment.   
1.3.4.1. Data and econometric approach  
In this section, a more general specification is 
adopted to estimate the employment effects of 
minimum wage increases.  A Vector Auto 
Regressive (VAR) model is a standard tool to take 
into account dynamic interrelationships between 
variables of interest. In particular, the aim is to 
assess the response of employment, wages and 
consumption to a discretionary minimum wage 
change (henceforth shock). One limitation of VAR 
is that the response to a shock is linear in the 
shock, i.e. it does not take into account the 
possibility of thresholds effects. This technical 
limitation is quite relevant as there is a consensus 
that negative effects on employment may emerge 
at high levels of minimum wage. 
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
First
quintile
Second
quintile
Third
quintile
Fourth
quintile
Fifth
quintile
Im
p
a
c
t 
o
f 
a
 1
%
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
 in
 m
in
im
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 o
n
 c
o
n
s
u
m
p
ti
o
n
  
(i
n
 %
)
Part II 
Analytical Chapter 
 
93 
A VAR with 1 lag has been estimated for the 
following variables: the minimum wage level, the 
median wage, the total number of employees, the 
consumption-GDP ratio. (
63
) Excluding the self-
employed helps to control for the effects of 
minimum wage on total employment stemming 
from substitution between employees and self-
employed. The median wage is chosen instead of 
the average wage as the former is more stable with 
respect to changes in the extreme values. 
Consumption as a percentage of GDP captures the 
effect of minimum wage on consumption, while 
netting out the effect of trends in total expenditure. 
Annual data are used to estimate a VAR (Vector 
Auto Regression) model using the panel of 
available countries over the period 1985-2015; the 
panel is unbalanced. Panel VAR allows 
considering the interactions between the variables, 
while controlling for heterogeneity across 
countries in the level of variables. The analysis 
will describe the impulse-response functions, 
which show the dynamic response of one variable 
of interest (wages, employment, consumption) to a 
shock in the minimum wage. Shocks are identified 
based on the assumptions that a minimum wage 
shock affects the median wage, employment and 
consumption within the same year, while it 
responds to a shock to one of these variables only 
with a lag of 1 year. (
64
) Within the same year, 
wage shocks affect both employment and 
consumption, while shocks to these may affect 
wages with lag only. The causal structure implies 
that the minimum wage is the most exogenous 
variable, while consumption is the most 
endogenous.  
Next, the availability of indicators describing the 
institutional flexibility of the minimum wage 
setting allows exploring whether the regime for 
minimum wage setting affects the response to 
discretionary minimum wage changes. The sample 
is split in two groups based on the median of the 
sub-components of the indicator describing the 
institutional flexibility of the minimum wage 
                                                          
(63) All variables are in logs; the panel is estimated with GMM 
method. 
(64) By orthogonalising the impulse response, it is possible to 
identify the effect of a shock while keeping the other 
shocks equal to zero.  Shocks are identified with Choleski 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of 
reduced form residuals with the order: minimum wage, 
median wage, employment and consumption. 
setting framework. In practice, countries are 
divided in two samples on the basis of 
predictability and frequency of discretionary 
changes in the minimum wage and the impulse 
responses are compared for the two groups. Two 
groups are formed according to whether the 
indicator of predictability and frequency of updates 
has value below or above the median; we called 
the first group low and high predictability. (
65
)  
1.3.4.2. Results 
Graph II.1.7 shows the responses of the median 
wage, total number of employees and consumption 
to one-standard-deviation positive shock to the 
minimum wage; the panel with the minimum wage 
response displays the persistency of the minimum 
wage shock. In the chart, the horizontal axis 
represent years after the shock, while the vertical 
the changes in the variable of interest. Bands 
represent the confidence interval, so that all values 
within the bands have the same probability. When 
the band includes zero, the estimated values are 
considered statistically non different form zero.  
Graph II.1.7: Response to a minimum wage shock 
 
(1) The horizontal axis represents years after the shock. The 
vertical axis represents log points. Bands represent the 5% 
confidence interval generated by Monte Carlo simulations. 
All values within the bands are likely probable and if 0 is 
included in the band it cannot be excluded that the effect 
is zero. 
Source: European Commission 
                                                          
(65) Countries belonging to the first group include Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, UK, Spain, Hungary, 
Portugal, Netherlands; Belgium and Luxermbourg coincide 
with the median.  
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The results suggest the following:  
A minimum wage shock results in a variation of 
median wages, consumption and employment 
within the same year; the size of the minimum 
wage shock is about 10%.  The shock is the 
minimum wage change not explained by past 
changes in the underlying variables, and can be 
interpreted as discretionary change. 
Employment falls by less than 0.1% within one 
year, while the median wage rises by 0.3%. 
Consequently, the small increase in   consumption 
by 0.03 reflects the offsetting effect of a temporary 
decline in employment and increase in median 
wage. This suggests that the increase in 
consumption for those in employment after the 
increase in the minimum wage offsets its fall for 
those who have lost a job after the increase of the 
minimum wage. (
66
)  
The effect on employment and consumption 
dissipates quite quickly. In contrast, the effect on 
median wages is more persistent. Thus, the 
minimum wage is quite effective in improving the 
wage distribution at the cost of small and transitory 
negative effects on employment.   
Graph II.A1.1 (in the annex) reports the dynamic 
response of employment, consumption and the 
minimum wage splitting the countries on the basis 
of the frequency of updates and predictability of 
minimum wage changes. On impact the response 
of consumption is higher in the group with low 
predictability and frequency of updates; but the 
effects dies out rapidly with no major differences 
across the two samples. The median wage 
increases on impact in response to the minimum 
wage in the two samples; the pattern of response is 
very similar, although the median wage rises more 
(i.e. the wage distribution becomes more 
compressed) for the group with low predictability 
and frequency of minimum wage updates. Finally, 
in response to a minimum wage shock, 
employment drops temporarily in countries where 
changes in the minimum wage are infrequent and 
unpredictable, while it remains unchanged in the 
rest of the countries. Thus, it is likely that 
whenever minimum wage changes are predictable 
                                                          
(66) Another other offsetting factor may include the effect of 
increasing the minimum wage on consumption those that 
were unemployed before the increase.  
and frequent, the size of discretionary minimum 
wage changes (i.e. unexpected shock) is smaller 
than in countries where the minimum wage policy 
is more erratic. This is visible in the size of the 
shock which is higher in the former group of 
countries. Thus, unexpected changes of minimum 
wage reduce the gap between low and median 
wages; yet, the bigger size of the shock in 
countries with less frequent and predictable 
minimum wage changes lowers (temporarily) 
employment. Thus, minimum wage policy is better 
attuned with the underlying macroeconomic 
variables in countries where minimum wage 
changes are predictable. 
1.4. EFFECT OF MINIMUM WAGE ON POVERTY  
1.4.1.1. Literature review 
There is a large literature examining the effect of 
minimum wages on inequality and poverty. 
Theoretically, the impact of an increase in the 
minimum wage on income inequality and poverty 
is ambiguous. On the one hand, an increase in the 
minimum wage compresses the bottom of the 
wage distribution and as such reduces income 
inequality. In addition, it allows employees at the 
bottom of the wage distribution to receive a higher 
wage and reduces their risk of poverty. On the 
other hand, a higher minimum wage may lead to 
individuals leaving or partially retreating from the 
formal labour market as they become unemployed, 
underemployed or start working in the informal 
labour market. (
67
) This may result in increased 
income inequality and poverty for those 
individuals excluded from the labour market.  
Empirical studies analysing the impact of 
minimum wages on poverty have mainly used 
relative poverty rates as indicators of poverty (e.g. 
Card and Krueger, 1995; Gundersen and Ziliak, 
2004), with some also assessing the impact on the 
poverty gap (e.g. Dube, 2013). (
68
)The impact of 
minimum wage changes is measured as an 
elasticity, which is the percentage change in 
poverty due to the percentage change in the 
                                                          
(67) However, in a search and matching framework, an increase 
in the minimum wage rises workers' outside option in the 
informal sector rising labour costs and lowering 
employment (eg Moser and Stahler 2009).   
(68) Some studies also evaluate the impact on hardship and food 
security (Heflin, 2009; Sabia and Nielsen, 2015). 
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minimum wage. A positive elasticity implies that 
an increase in the minimum wage leads to an 
increase in poverty; a negative elasticity implies 
that an increase in the minimum wage leads to a 
decrease in poverty.  
Available evidence suggests that, if the effect is at 
all significant, an increase in the minimum wage 
leads to a small decrease in poverty (e.g. Addison 
and Blackburn, 1999; Stevens and Sessions, 2001; 
Neumark and Wascher, 2011; Gunderson and 
Ziliak, 2004; Dube, 2013). The effect is likely to 
depend on demographic factors such as age, 
education and family composition of minimum 
wage earners. In a detailed review of 11 studies, 
Dube (2013) finds that a simple average of 53 
minimum wage elasticities across different 
demographic groups yields an elasticity of -0.20 
and an average elasticity of -0.15 in case only 
overall poverty rates (as opposed to for narrow 
subgroups) are taken into account. (
69
). This 
implies that a 10% increase in the minimum wage 
would decrease the poverty rate by about 2%.   
1.4.1.2. Data and empirical approach  
The empirical analysis presented in this section 
consists of two parts. First, the analysis sheds light 
on the relationship between the minimum wage 
and the poverty rate. In this respect the following 
two questions are considered: Are minimum wage 
earners poor? Are the poor earning the minimum 
wage? Second, the analysis simulates what 
happens to poverty in case the minimum wage is 
increased under three different scenarios. Poverty 
rates are compared before and after the increase in 
the minimum wage, assuming constant as well as 
adjusted poverty lines. 
The data cover 21 Member States (
70
) and are 
based on the 2013 micro-level data of the 
European Statistics on Income and Living 
                                                          
(69) Elasticities are more precisely estimated for youngsters and 
low-skilled workers (between -0.50 and -0.21 - found by 
Addison and Blackburn, 1999) and children (elasticities 
between -0.46 and -0.35 found by Morgan and Kickham, 
2001 and Defina, 2008). Others find no significant impact 
on poverty (Card and Krueger, 1995; Neumark and 
Wascher, 2002; Burkhauser and Sabia, 2007; Sabia, 2008; 
Sabia and Burkhauser, 2010; Sabia and Nielsen, 2015). 
(70) The Member states included are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, 
Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Latvia, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia and United Kingdom.  
Conditions (EU-SILC). EU-SILC data are 
complemented with information on national 
statutory minimum wages from Eurostat.  
1.4.1.3. Results 
Are minimum wage earners poor?  
In order to explore the likelihood of being poor for 
minimum wage earners, poverty outcomes for 
minimum wage earners are compared with poverty 
outcomes for other population groups. Five groups 
are considered: employees who earn a wage above 
105% of the minimum wage; minimum wage 
earners (
71
); self-employed, unemployed and 
inactive individuals. Two poverty variables are 
considered: the poverty rate and the poverty gap. 
The first measures the incidence of poverty based 
on the share of individuals in the population with 
an equivalised disposable household income below 
60% of the national median income (referred as the 
"poverty line").. The second is an indicator for the 
depth of poverty and is measured as the difference 
between the median equivalised household income 
of households below the poverty line and the 
poverty line itself, expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line.  
Graph II.1.8 shows that the poverty rate for 
minimum wage earners is at the same level or 
higher than aggregate poverty rates. The poverty 
rate for minimum wage earners is the lowest (15% 
or below) in Ireland and the Netherlands, and 
highest (30% and up) in Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, 
Luxemburg and Latvia. Poverty among minimum 
wage earners is considerably higher than for higher 
wage earners, but at the same time significantly 
lower than for unemployed individuals. In several 
countries, the poverty rate for unemployed is 
(more than) twice as high as for minimum wage 
earners. Poverty rates for minimum wage earners 
are similar to those for self-employed and inactive 
individuals in most countries. (
72
) 
                                                          
(71) Minimum wage earners are defined as the employees 
(older than 15 years) who earn not more than 105% of the 
national statutory minimum wage (in full-time 
equivalents).  
(72) Exceptions are Portugal and Romania where poverty 
among self-employed individuals is almost as high as 
among the unemployed. In particularly, for Romania this 
finding could be related to a high share of self-employment 
on semi-subsistence farms in the agricultural sector. 
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Graph II.1.9 shows that for most countries, the 
poverty gap for minimum wage earners is in the 
same range as for the inactive, while the poverty 
gap for the unemployed and self-employed is in 
general higher. The poverty gap for those earning 
the minimum wage is the lowest in Slovakia (14%) 
and Czech Republic (15%), implying that the 
income of poor minimum wage earners in these 
countries is just below the poverty line. In 
combination with the low observed poverty rate, 
these findings suggest that poverty-related 
problems among minimum wage earners are less 
of a concern for these countries. In contrast, in 
Bulgaria, Greece or Spain, both the poverty rate 
and the poverty gap are high, implying that a large 
share of the minimum wage earners are poor and 
that their incomes are well below the poverty line. 
While poverty-related problems among minimum 
wage earners are more pertinent in these countries, 
the likelihood that an increase of the minimum 
wage would lift them out of poverty will be lower.  
Are the poor earning the minimum wage?  
Overall, the share of minimum wage earners in the 
total number of poor individuals is relatively low, 
notably below 18% in all EU Member States 
(Graph II.1.11). The majority of the poor are either 
inactive or unemployed. Minimum wage earners 
constitute the largest share of the poor in France 
(16%), Luxembourg (17%), and United Kingdom 
(16%). This is the result of the interplay between 
the weight of different population groups in the 
population, and the poverty rates among these 
population groups.  
For example, in Luxembourg, the high share of 
minimum wage earners is being driven by the 
poverty rate among minimum wage earners, which 
is relatively high as compared to other population 
groups. In France and UK, the difference in 
poverty rates between minimum wage earners and 
the rest of the population is less pronounced, but 
these have a higher share of minimum wage 
earners among employees, as well as in the overall 
population. Conversely, in Bulgaria, one of the 
countries with the most severe poverty outcomes, 
the minimum wage earners make up only 3.3% of 
all poor individuals; and the vast majority of the 
poor (82%) are either unemployed or inactive.  
Graph II.1.8: Incidence of poverty by employment status 
 
(1) The poverty rate measures the incidence of poverty which is the share of individuals in the population with an 
equivalised disposable household income below 60% of the national median equivalised disposable household income. It is 
measured at the household level. The figures should be interpreted as follows: in Ireland 10% of the employees earning the 
minimum wage are living in a household that is poor; 2% of the employees earning a wage above the minimum wage are 
living in a household that is poor and there is an overall poverty rate of 14%. The employment status of an individual (older 
than 15 years) is determined based on the status of the individual in most of the months during the income reference period.   
Source: Commission services, based on EU-SILC 
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It is easier to understand the drivers of the share of 
minimum wage earners among the poor (which 
determines the magnitude of the expected impact 
of a minimum wage increase on aggregate 
poverty) by disaggregating the share of minimum 
wage earners among the poor into two components 
as follows: 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝑊 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑟 
= 
𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑀𝑊
𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
∗
𝑀𝑊 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 
𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 
The first term in this formula is an indicator for 
relative poverty among minimum wage earners, 
measured as the ratio of the poverty rate for 
minimum wage earners over the aggregate poverty 
rate. This is referred to as the "probability-effect", 
as it relates to the likelihood of minimum wage 
earners being poor. Graph II.1.10 presents the 
correlation between the share of minimum wage 
earners and the ratio of the poverty rate for 
minimum wage earners over the overall poverty 
rate.  
Graph II.1.10: Main divers of the impact of the minimum 
wage on overall poverty: Probability effect 
 
Source: Commission services, based on EU-SILC 
The second term measures the share of minimum 
wage earners in the total population. It provides an 
indication of the relative importance of the 
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Graph II.1.9: Depth of poverty by employment status 
 
(1) The poverty gap measures the depth or intensity of poverty and provides complementary information to the incidence 
of poverty.  It is measured at the household level. It looks at how far below the poverty line the income of the poor is, and is 
measured as the difference between the median equivalised household income of households below the poverty line and 
the poverty line itself, expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. The poverty gap is a useful measure to assess how 
much extra income would be required to lift a poor household over the poverty line and reduce poverty. If the poverty gap 
is small, a relatively small income increase can be sufficient to lift a household out of poverty. The figures should be 
interpreted as follows: in Slovakia the median equivalised income of poor households with a minimum wage earner is 19% 
lower than the equivalised household income of those households at the poverty line. The employment status of an 
individual (older than 15 years) is determined based on the status of the individual in most of the months during the income 
reference period.   
Source: Commission services, based on EU-SILC 
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affected individuals in the population; therefore it 
is referred to as the volume-effect. 
Graph II.1.12: Main divers of the impact of the minimum 
wage on overall poverty: Volume effect 
 
Source: Commission services, based on EU-SILC 
Graph II.1.12 presents the correlation between the 
share of minimum wage earners in the population 
and the share of minimum wage earners among the 
population. These charts reveal that differences 
across countries in the share of poor earning the 
minimum wages are more strictly related to 
differences in the relevance of the volume effect 
than to differences across countries in the 
probability effect; indeed, simple correlations 
suggest that the volume-effect outweighs the 
probability-effect. 
Simulations: What is the impact of an increase in 
the minimum wage on poverty?  
The impact of an increase in the minimum wage is 
simulated under three different scenarios: (A) an 
increase in the monthly minimum wage for all 
countries by 10%; (B) an increase in the monthly 
minimum wage to 40% of the average wage for 
those countries where the ratio was below 40%; 
and (C) an increase in the monthly minimum wage 
to 50% of the median wage for those countries 
where the ratio was below 50%. 
First, in case the poverty line is kept unadjusted, 
aggregate poverty rate is expected to decline, as 
household incomes increase for a part of the 
population, and some households will be lifted 
over the poverty line. (
73
) The simulations show 
that aggregate poverty outcomes significantly 
decline across all scenarios and across all countries 
(except for Czech Republic) (Table II.1.11). The 
table shows the poverty rate in the population and 
                                                          
(73) The impact on the aggregate poverty gap is not clear ex 
ante, as it depends on the income distribution among the 
poor households. More detailed analysis can be found in 
Van Herck and Vandeplas (2016).  
BEBG
CZ
EE
EL
ES
FR
HR
HU
IE
LT
LU
LV
MT
NL PL
PT
RO
SI
SK
UK
R² = 0.7217
0
6
12
18
0 2 4 6 8
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
p
o
o
r 
th
a
t 
e
a
rn
 t
h
e
 m
in
im
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 (
%
)
Share of MW earners among the population (%)
Graph II.1.11: Distribution of poor individuals by employment status 
 
(1) The distribution includes only individuals older than 15 years for whom the employment status was given. The figure should 
be interpreted as follows: in Luxemburg 17% of the poor are minimum wage earners, 20% are employees earning a wage 
above the minimum wage, 7.2% are self-employed and 44% are inactive.  The employment status of an individual (older 
than 15 years) is determined based on the status of the individual in most of the months during the income reference period.   
Source: Commission services, based on EU-SILC 
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the percentage point change under different 
assumption of minimum wage increases and under 
the assumption of no effects on employment.  
 
Table II.1.11: Impact on the aggregate poverty rate 
(unadjusted poverty line) 
 
(1) Poverty line is unadjusted compared to the baseline 
scenario. The impact is measured in percentage points.  
Source: Commission services, based on EU-SILC 
 
The overall impact on aggregate poverty is 
however rather small as minimum wage earners 
only represent a small share of the poor. In fact, 
the majority of the poor are unemployed or 
inactive and therefore not affected by the increase 
in the minimum wage. Still, there are differences 
in the impact on poverty between countries. For 
the first scenario, the largest impact on the poverty 
rate is observed in France (-0.83 pps or -6.5%), 
Luxemburg (-0.64 pps or -4.6%) and Latvia (-0.68 
pps or -3.6%). The smallest impact is found in the 
Czech Republic (0.0 pps or 0.0%), Croatia (-0.05 
pps or -0.3%) and Bulgaria (-0.08 pps or -0.4%). 
Not surprisingly the impact of minimum wage 
increase is positively correlated with the share of 
minimum wage earners among the poor and in 
particular with the share of minimum wage earners 
among the population (volume effect). 
Second, in case the poverty line is allowed to 
adjust to the new wages received, the impact of a 
change in the minimum wage on the poverty rate 
becomes unclear a priori and will depend on the 
income distribution in the country. In case the 
minimum wage increases, the income of minimum 
wage earners increases, and they may be lifted 
over the poverty line. However, the poverty line in 
itself is expected to shift upwards, as the national 
median equivalised disposable household income 
will increase. This may offset the former effects.  
The results show that the impact differs between 
countries (Table II.1.12). For Romania the poverty 
rate slightly increases compared to the baseline 
under the relevant scenarios. Also in Belgium, 
Croatia and Ireland, there was an increase with 
respect to the baseline scenario, although this 
increase was not statistically significant. In the 
other countries, the poverty rate decreases under 
the relevant scenarios. However, the impact is 
relatively modest and in most countries the change 
in the poverty rate compared to the baseline is 
lower than 1%. A larger impact than 1% is being 
found in Greece, France, Hungary, Luxemburg, 
Latvia (scenario 1), Portugal and Slovakia. The 
impact is the largest in France, where as a result of 
a minimum wage increase of 10% the poverty rate 
decreases by 0.55 percentage points or 4.33%. 
 
Table II.1.12: Impact on the aggregate poverty rate 
(adjusted poverty line) 
 
(1) Poverty line is adjusted in each scenario compared to 
the baseline scenario.  The impact is measured in 
percentage points.  
Source: Commission services, based on EU-SILC 
 
Overall, these simulations show that in general 
increases in the minimum wage may reduce 
aggregate poverty. The impact differs between 
member states and is especially higher in countries 
where the minimum wage earners represent a 
higher share of the population. However, it is 
Belgium 14.66 -0.14 - -0.14
Bulgaria 19.78 -0.08 - -0.08
Czech Republic 8.18 0 -0.01 -0.05
Estonia 18.86 -0.17 -0.31 -0.28
Greece 21.66 -0.27 - -
Spain 19.32 -0.37 -0.35 -0.45
France 12.7 -0.83 - -
Croatia 19.12 -0.05 - -
Hungary 12.63 -0.44 - -
Ireland 13.65 -0.11 -0.11 -0.07
Lithuania 19.46 -0.29 -0.28 -0.28
Luxemburg 14.03 -0.64 - -0.49
Latvia 18.9 -0.68 -0.52 -
Malta 14.06 -0.15 - -0.11
Netherlands 9.92 -0.11 -0.11 -0.18
Poland 16.25 -0.31 - -
Portugal 17.78 -0.39 - -
Romania 20.63 -0.21 - -
Slovenia 14.42 -0.31 - -
Slovakia 11.52 -0.16 - -0.07
United Kingdom 15.36 -0.36 - -
Scenario 3:          
Min. 50% of 
median wage
Scenario 2: Min. 
40% of average 
wage
Scenario 1:  
10% increase
Baseline
Belgium 14.66 0.06 - 0.04
Bulgaria 19.78 -0.08 - -0.08
Czech Republic 8.18 0 -0.01 -0.05
Estonia 18.86 -0.17 -0.16 -0.13
Greece 21.66 -0.23 - -
Spain 19.32 -0.18 -0.17 -0.25
France 12.7 -0.55 - -
Croatia 19.12 0.03 - -
Hungary 12.63 -0.4 - -
Ireland 13.65 -0.01 0 0.02
Lithuania 19.46 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08
Luxemburg 14.03 -0.57 - -0.39
Latvia 18.9 -0.38 -0.27 -
Malta 14.06 -0.12 - -0.09
Netherlands 9.92 -0.03 -0.03 -0.1
Poland 16.25 -0.23 - -
Portugal 17.78 -0.31 - -
Romania 20.63 0.15 - -
Slovenia 14.42 -0.05 - -
Slovakia 11.52 -0.16 - -0.07
United Kingdom 15.36 -0.09 - -
Scenario 3:  
Min. 50% of 
median wage
Scenario 2: Min. 
40% of average 
wage 
Scenario 1: 10% 
increase
Baseline
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important to acknowledge that this analysis does 
not take into account the negative impact that an 
increase in the minimum wage may have on 
employment.  
1.5. CONCLUSIONS 
Statutory minimum wages are a policy tool to 
guarantee a fair wage for those in low pay jobs and 
address cases in which workers are in a weak 
bargaining position. As evidenced by this chapter, 
the minimum wage is an effective tool to improve 
distribution and support consumption of low wage 
earners, with small negative effects on 
employment that disappear over time.  
EU countries differ in their minimum wage setting 
regime. Differences concern not only the level of 
minimum wage as proportion to the average wage, 
but also its institutional setting for minimum wage 
updates. Differences are considerable in the role 
played by the government and factors taken into 
account when adjusting the minimum wage. 
Systems where governments can reset the 
minimum wage without early consultation of 
social partners and other stakeholders and clear 
criteria may allow responding to unexpected 
shocks, but at the cost of making the updating 
unpredictable and at the mercy of the electoral 
cycle. Irregular increases of the minimum wage 
may lead to larger revisions than more regular and 
gradual updates. Rule-based systems reduce the 
political bias and, being predictable and 
transparent, allow employers and employees to 
make their plans. Yet, rule-based systems may 
introduce real wage rigidity for low wage earners 
and lead to excessive rippling (spill over) effects 
on wages close to the minimum.  
A properly designed institutional setting has to 
balance the need of achieving the objectives of a 
minimum wage policy with the uncertainty that an 
unclear and unpredictable framework may entail. 
Moreover, institutional arrangements that allows 
some flexibility in the minimum wage setting 
policy (e.g. through inability-to-pay clauses or 
consensual suspensions of minimum wage 
payments by bipartite or tri-partite agreements) 
could provide the additional lever to deal with 
shocks that hit the most vulnerable more strongly.  
The chapter leaves open a number of questions that 
may be taken on for future analysis. First, the 
minimum wage is one policy lever to reduce in-
work poverty and redistribute income. The design 
of the tax and benefit system and the availability of 
in-work benefits can also be alternative tools. The 
relative effectiveness of these two policy levers 
will have to assessed against the design of 
minimum wage policies and the tax and benefit 
systems. Second, the effect of the minimum wage 
on profits, in particular of companies employing a 
large number of low-wage workers, is less 
prominent. The study of the effect of minimum 
wage on profitability is relevant to determine the 
role of the minimum wage in determining 
international costs competiveness. 
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Graph II.A1.1: Response to a minimum wage shock: value of government and frequency index above median (ie rule based 
minimum wage setting systems) and  below  median (ie more discretionary minimum wage setting systems) 
 
(1) The horizontal axis represents years after the shock. The vertical axis represents log points. Bands represent the 5% 
confidence interval generated by Monte Carlo simulations. All values within the bands are likely probable and if 0 is 
included in the band it cannot be excluded that the effect is zero. 
Source:  European Commission. 
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Belgium 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 10978 11054 11105 11157 11212 0.5 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7220 7242 7257 7266 7281 0.2 %
(% of total population) 65.8 65.5 65.3 65.1 64.9 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4817 4847 4901 4920 4921 0.0 %
Male 2623 2637 2651 2644 2640 -0.2 %
Female 2194 2210 2250 2277 2281 0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 66.7 66.9 67.5 67.7 67.6 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 32.0 31.5 31.0 30.2 30.0 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.7 85.0 85.3 85.6 85.1 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 40.3 41.4 44.1 45.1 46.6 1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 67.2 67.4 68.0 68.1 67.9 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 62.9 63.3 63.7 65.0 65.0 0.0 pps
Male 72.3 72.5 72.7 72.4 72.2 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 34.1 35.0 33.7 32.3 32.8 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.7 90.7 90.8 90.7 89.9 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 47.8 47.9 50.5 51.3 52.2 0.9 pps
Female 61.1 61.3 62.3 63.0 63.0 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 29.8 27.9 28.2 28.1 27.1 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.7 79.1 79.7 80.6 80.2 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 33.0 34.9 37.8 39.0 41.2 2.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 61.9 61.8 61.8 61.9 61.8 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 26.0 25.3 23.6 23.2 23.4 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.3 79.3 79.0 79.1 78.5 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 38.7 39.5 41.7 42.6 44.0 1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 38.4 38.1 37.5 37.3 36.0 -1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 65.6 65.2 65.3 63.8 64.0 0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 82.0 81.7 81.0 82.0 81.8 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.0 63.0 62.9 62.9 62.8 -0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 53.1 52.4 52.5 53.7 55.0 1.3 pps
Male 67.1 66.9 66.4 65.8 65.5 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 27.7 27.8 25.3 24.5 25.0 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.9 84.5 84.0 83.2 82.5 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 46.0 46.0 47.7 48.5 48.9 0.4 pps
Female 56.7 56.8 57.2 57.9 58.0 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 24.2 22.6 21.9 21.8 21.7 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.8 73.9 74.0 75.0 74.5 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 31.6 33.1 35.8 37.0 39.3 2.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4470.5 4479.0 4484.5 4497.3 4499.3 0.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.4 0.4 -0.4 0.3 0.9 0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.0 -0.2 pps
Male 0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 0.5 pps
Female 0.9 0.5 0.9 1.5 0.4 -1.1 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 12.8 13.0 13.7 13.2 13.8 0.5 pps
Male 16.5 16.5 17.8 16.8 17.5 0.8 pps
Female 8.4 8.9 9.0 9.1 9.5 0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 8.9 8.1 8.1 8.6 9.0 0.4 pps
Male 7.7 7.0 7.2 7.6 8.3 0.7 pps
Female 10.3 9.3 9.1 9.7 9.7 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 24.7 24.7 24.3 23.7 24.3 0.6 pps
Male 9.2 9.0 8.7 8.4 9.3 0.9 pps
Female 43.3 43.5 42.5 41.2 41.4 0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.2 7.6 8.4 8.5 8.5 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 18.7 19.8 23.7 23.2 22.1 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.4 6.7 7.4 7.6 7.7 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 4.0 4.5 5.4 5.4 5.6 0.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.1 14.2 16.0 16.4 17.0 0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.8 7.8 8.3 8.8 8.7 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.8 4.0 4.9 4.7 4.6 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.3 6.5 7.4 7.5 7.6 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 15.6 17.2 17.7 17.3 15.4 -1.9 pps
Male 7.1 7.7 8.7 9.0 9.1 0.1 pps
Female 7.2 7.4 8.2 7.9 7.8 -0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 48.4 44.7 46.1 49.9 51.7 1.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.4 41.1 41.3 41.1 41.3 0.5 %
Male 42.4 42.1 42.3 42.0 42.3 0.7 %
Female 39.4 39.1 39.2 39.3 39.3 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -4.0 -1.5 -1.8 -0.8 -0.8 0.0 pps
Building and construction 1.9 0.5 -1.3 -1.7 -0.9 0.8 pps
Services 1.6 0.3 -0.2 0.8 1.6 0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.3 -1.5 -2.3 -2.1 -1.5 0.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.1 3.2 2.6 0.9 0.3 -0.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.1 1.2 1.2 0.3  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.8 2.9 1.9 0.9 0.1 -0.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.8 2.9 1.9 0.9 0.1 -0.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.9 0.5 -0.4 pps
2014-2015
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Bulgaria 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 7348 7306 7265 7224 7197 -0.4 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 5010 4924 4859 4796 4727 -1.4 %
(% of total population) 68.2 67.4 66.9 66.4 65.7 -0.7 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3302 3304 3323 3309 3276 -1.0 %
Male 1760 1758 1766 1763 1744 -1.1 %
Female 1543 1546 1557 1546 1532 -0.9 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 65.9 67.1 68.4 69.0 69.3 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 29.4 30.4 29.6 27.2 26.0 -1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.9 82.3 83.1 83.3 83.2 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 48.9 51.1 54.1 56.6 58.0 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.9 67.1 68.4 69.0 69.3 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 50.0 72.3 60.9 54.2 48.9 -5.3 pps
Male 69.9 71.0 72.2 72.9 73.2 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 33.9 35.3 34.3 31.5 30.5 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 84.8 85.7 86.2 86.4 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 55.8 57.3 59.9 62.5 62.7 0.1 pps
Female 61.9 63.2 64.5 65.0 65.4 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 24.8 25.3 24.7 22.6 21.2 -1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.3 79.8 80.3 80.2 79.8 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 42.8 45.5 49.0 51.4 53.8 2.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.4 58.8 59.5 61.0 62.9 1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 22.1 21.9 21.2 20.7 20.3 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.3 73.1 73.3 74.5 76.1 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 44.6 45.7 47.4 50.0 53.0 2.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 27.5 27.4 27.8 29.7 29.6 -0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 63.5 63.4 63.6 65.2 67.2 2.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 81.2 81.1 80.7 81.7 84.0 2.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.5 58.8 59.5 61.1 62.9 1.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 44.9 60.0 51.7 52.1 45.5 -6.6 pps
Male 61.2 61.3 62.1 63.9 65.9 2.1 pps
Young (15-24) 25.1 24.9 24.0 24.0 24.0 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.7 74.3 75.0 76.4 78.5 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 50.5 50.8 51.9 54.5 56.8 2.3 pps
Female 55.6 56.3 56.8 58.2 59.8 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 19.0 18.7 18.4 17.3 16.5 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.9 71.8 71.5 72.5 73.6 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 39.4 41.3 43.4 46.0 49.5 3.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2927.5 2894.9 2889.4 2927.4 2973.5 1.6 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -2.2 -2.5 -0.4 0.4 0.4 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -3.6 -1.1 -0.2 1.3 1.6 0.3 pps
Male -4.5 -1.6 0.1 1.7 1.8 0.2 pps
Female -2.6 -0.6 -0.5 0.9 1.3 0.4 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 10.8 10.5 11.2 11.5 11.1 -0.4 pps
Male 13.4 13.2 14.2 14.6 14.1 -0.4 pps
Female 8.0 7.5 8.0 8.1 7.7 -0.4 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 4.0 4.4 5.6 5.3 4.4 -0.9 pps
Male 4.4 4.9 6.1 5.6 4.7 -0.9 pps
Female 3.7 4.0 5.1 4.9 4.1 -0.8 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 2.2 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.2 -0.3 pps
Male 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.9 -0.3 pps
Female 2.4 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.5 -0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 11.3 12.3 13.0 11.4 9.2 -2.2 pps
Young (15-24) 25.0 28.1 28.4 23.8 21.6 -2.2 pps
Prime age (25-49) 10.5 11.3 11.8 10.5 8.5 -2.0 pps
Older (55-64) 8.8 10.4 12.4 11.7 8.7 -3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 26.9 28.5 30.3 28.6 25.5 -3.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 10.5 11.7 12.4 10.7 8.4 -2.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.1 5.9 6.4 5.2 4.0 -1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 11.4 12.4 13.0 11.5 9.2 -2.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 12.3 13.5 13.9 12.3 9.8 -2.5 pps
Female 10.1 10.8 11.8 10.4 8.4 -2.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 55.7 55.2 57.3 60.3 61.1 0.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.6 40.5 40.4 40.5 40.5 0.0 %
Male 40.8 40.8 40.6 40.7 40.8 0.2 %
Female 40.4 40.3 40.2 40.2 40.2 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.9 -5.9 1.2 1.6 -2.6 -4.2 pps
Building and construction -11.8 -6.3 -3.5 -0.8 2.5 3.3 pps
Services -0.9 -2.3 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.9 pps
Manufacturing industry -1.4 -1.9 -3.2 0.5 2.3 1.8 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 6.8 7.7 8.8 5.6 1.8 -3.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.1 6.1 9.6 5.1  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 9.0 3.3 4.2 6.5 7.3 0.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 9.0 3.7 4.2 6.2 7.6 1.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.9 2.8 1.7 1.2 2.6 1.4 pps
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Czech Republic 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 10497 10509 10511 10525 10543 0.2 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7296 7229 7154 7081 7026 -0.8 %
(% of total population) 69.5 68.8 68.1 67.3 66.6 -0.6 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 5146 5175 5213 5206 5201 -0.1 %
Male 2903 2909 2917 2914 2900 -0.5 %
Female 2242 2266 2297 2292 2301 0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.5 71.6 72.9 73.5 74.0 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 29.9 31.3 31.6 32.2 32.5 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.0 88.4 89.1 88.8 88.6 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 50.6 52.4 54.8 56.8 58.0 1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.4 71.5 72.7 73.4 73.9 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 77.1 77.9 81.0 78.8 78.0 -0.9 pps
Male 78.7 79.5 80.5 81.2 81.4 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 35.5 36.4 36.8 38.1 37.4 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 95.3 95.5 95.8 95.6 95.4 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 62.6 64.0 66.1 67.9 68.3 0.3 pps
Female 62.2 63.5 65.1 65.6 66.5 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 24.1 25.9 26.1 26.1 27.4 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.4 80.9 81.9 81.6 81.4 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 39.4 41.5 44.2 46.3 48.3 1.9 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 65.7 66.5 67.7 69.0 70.2 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 24.5 25.2 25.6 27.1 28.4 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.8 82.9 83.5 83.8 84.5 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 47.7 49.3 51.6 54.0 55.5 1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 21.4 21.1 22.0 22.9 22.3 -0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 71.0 71.7 72.4 73.6 75.4 1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 81.1 81.2 82.5 82.2 82.6 0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.6 66.4 67.6 68.9 70.1 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.7 73.4 75.3 74.1 74.4 0.4 pps
Male 74.0 74.6 75.7 77.0 77.9 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 29.0 29.2 29.9 32.3 33.1 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.9 90.9 91.2 91.5 91.9 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 58.9 60.3 62.5 64.8 65.5 0.7 pps
Female 57.2 58.2 59.6 60.7 62.4 1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 19.8 21.0 21.0 21.6 23.4 1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.3 74.6 75.5 75.7 76.7 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 37.1 39.0 41.4 43.8 45.9 2.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4796.4 4810.3 4845.9 4883.5 4934.3 1.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -0.3 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.4 0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.3 pps
Male -0.7 0.0 0.4 0.8 0.4 -0.4 pps
Female 0.3 0.7 1.2 0.8 1.8 1.1 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 17.2 17.5 16.5 17.0 16.3 -0.7 pps
Male 21.4 21.6 20.3 21.3 20.2 -1.1 pps
Female 11.7 12.2 11.6 11.5 11.4 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 8.0 8.3 9.1 9.7 10.0 0.3 pps
Male 6.7 6.9 7.6 8.4 8.4 0.0 pps
Female 9.5 9.9 10.9 11.3 11.9 0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 4.7 5.0 5.8 5.5 5.3 -0.2 pps
Male 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.2 -0.3 pps
Female 8.5 8.6 10.0 9.5 9.3 -0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.7 7.0 7.0 6.1 5.1 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 18.1 19.5 19.0 15.9 12.6 -3.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.9 6.1 6.2 5.6 4.6 -1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 5.8 5.8 5.8 4.9 4.4 -0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 24.6 28.8 26.0 22.4 23.1 0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.5 6.5 6.9 6.1 4.8 -1.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.9 2.4 -0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.8 7.1 7.0 6.2 5.1 -1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 5.7 5.7 7.2 6.1 4.5 -1.6 pps
Male 5.8 6.0 5.9 5.1 4.2 -0.9 pps
Female 7.9 8.2 8.3 7.4 6.1 -1.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 40.6 43.4 43.4 43.6 47.4 3.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.4 41.1 40.6 40.4 40.2 -0.5 %
Male 42.6 42.2 41.6 41.4 41.2 -0.5 %
Female 39.6 39.4 39.1 38.9 38.7 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 2.4 1.6 1.0 -0.9 -4.0 -3.1 pps
Building and construction -5.1 -1.3 -2.4 -4.6 -0.1 4.5 pps
Services -1.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 1.2 0.6 pps
Manufacturing industry 3.6 1.0 -0.2 1.3 3.2 1.9 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.9 1.7 -0.3 2.6 2.6 0.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.8 0.3 -1.7 0.1  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 4.0 2.6 1.2 2.6 3.6 1.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 3.9 2.9 0.8 2.8 3.7 0.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.3 -1.2 -0.8 2.2 3.1 0.9 pps
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Denmark 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 5570 5591 5613 5643 5682 0.7 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3613 3611 3615 3626 3644 0.5 %
(% of total population) 64.9 64.6 64.4 64.3 64.1 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2864 2840 2824 2831 2859 1.0 %
Male 1498 1482 1467 1482 1500 1.2 %
Female 1366 1358 1357 1350 1359 0.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 79.3 78.6 78.1 78.1 78.5 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 67.1 64.1 61.7 61.5 62.1 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 87.8 87.5 87.1 87.1 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 63.2 64.4 65.0 66.4 67.6 1.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 79.8 79.3 78.8 78.6 79.1 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.5 71.5 71.7 73.2 73.0 -0.2 pps
Male 82.3 81.4 80.6 81.1 81.6 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 67.1 64.1 61.0 61.0 61.7 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.5 90.6 90.2 90.3 90.8 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 68.3 69.9 70.2 72.6 72.8 0.1 pps
Female 76.1 75.8 75.6 75.0 75.3 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 67.1 64.0 62.4 62.0 62.5 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.7 84.9 84.8 83.8 83.4 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 58.0 58.9 59.9 60.3 62.6 2.3 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 73.1 72.6 72.5 72.8 73.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 57.5 55.0 53.7 53.7 55.4 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.3 81.9 82.0 82.0 82.1 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 59.6 60.8 61.7 63.2 64.7 1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 57.7 55.5 54.3 54.2 54.3 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 77.4 76.7 77.2 77.1 78.2 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.5 86.0 86.1 85.5 85.6 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 74.1 73.7 73.5 73.8 74.7 0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 60.6 60.1 62.5 63.3 63.6 0.2 pps
Male 75.9 75.2 75.0 75.8 76.6 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 56.6 54.6 52.3 52.7 54.6 1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.7 84.6 85.0 85.5 85.9 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 63.8 65.9 66.5 68.9 69.8 0.9 pps
Female 70.4 70.0 70.0 69.8 70.4 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 58.5 55.4 55.0 54.9 56.2 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.9 79.1 79.0 78.4 78.3 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 55.3 55.8 56.8 57.6 59.6 2.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2643.1 2621.3 2622.1 2640.1 2678.3 1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -0.1 -0.6 0.1 0.8 1.1 0.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -0.4 -0.8 0.0 0.7 1.4 0.8 pps
Male 0.2 -1.0 -0.2 1.4 1.7 0.3 pps
Female -1.1 -0.7 0.2 -0.1 1.1 1.2 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.0 7.8 -0.2 pps
Male 11.6 11.4 11.1 10.8 10.5 -0.3 pps
Female 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.9 4.8 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 8.9 8.6 8.8 8.6 8.7 0.1 pps
Male 8.3 7.9 8.1 8.2 7.9 -0.3 pps
Female 9.4 9.3 9.5 9.0 9.4 0.4 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 25.1 24.8 24.7 24.6 24.7 0.1 pps
Male 14.2 14.8 14.8 15.2 15.6 0.4 pps
Female 37.0 35.8 35.3 35.0 34.7 -0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.6 6.2 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 14.2 14.1 13.1 12.6 10.8 -1.8 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.6 6.7 6.3 5.9 5.7 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 5.7 5.5 5.1 4.8 4.4 -0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 11.6 12.1 11.4 10.6 10.0 -0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 6.8 6.9 6.4 6.1 5.4 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.8 4.9 0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.1 7.0 6.7 6.1 5.6 -0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 16.5 16.0 12.9 13.5 12.9 -0.6 pps
Male 7.7 7.5 6.7 6.4 5.9 -0.5 pps
Female 7.5 7.5 7.3 6.8 6.4 -0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 24.4 28.0 25.5 25.2 26.9 1.7 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 39.8 39.6 39.5 39.4 39.6 0.5 %
Male 41.1 40.8 40.7 40.6 40.7 0.2 %
Female 37.8 37.8 37.7 37.7 37.8 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.8 1.4 1.4 0.0 -1.4 -1.4 pps
Building and construction -0.6 -0.6 0.0 1.2 3.0 1.8 pps
Services 1.1 -0.1 0.8 1.7 1.7 0.1 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.0 -1.4 -1.7 1.1 0.7 -0.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.4 1.7 1.2 1.8 1.9 0.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.6 -1.0 -0.2 1.0  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.5 1.6 1.5 1.9 1.7 -0.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.8 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.6 0.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.2 0.5 -0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 pps
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Germany 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 80275 80426 80646 80983 81681 0.9 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 52314 52487 52577 52729 52964 0.4 %
(% of total population) 65.2 65.3 65.2 65.1 64.8 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 40437 40538 40814 40990 41117 0.3 %
Male 21669 21744 21811 21881 21926 0.2 %
Female 18769 18794 19003 19109 19191 0.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 77.3 77.2 77.6 77.7 77.6 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 52.4 50.7 50.8 49.9 48.8 -1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.7 87.7 87.7 87.6 87.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 64.1 65.4 67.5 69.1 69.4 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 78.2 78.1 78.6 78.8 78.7 0.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 68.5 69.2 69.2 69.4 69.3 -0.1 pps
Male 82.7 82.6 82.6 82.5 82.1 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 54.8 53.2 52.9 52.0 50.5 -1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.2 93.1 92.9 92.6 92.5 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 71.8 73.1 74.5 75.5 75.3 -0.3 pps
Female 71.9 71.9 72.6 72.9 73.1 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 50.0 48.0 48.7 47.7 47.1 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.1 82.3 82.4 82.5 82.5 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 56.8 58.2 60.8 62.9 63.8 0.9 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 72.7 73.0 73.5 73.8 74.0 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 47.9 46.6 46.9 46.1 45.3 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.0 83.3 83.4 83.5 83.7 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 60.0 61.6 63.6 65.6 66.2 0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 52.8 52.7 53.3 46.0 46.1 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 76.1 76.5 77.0 77.7 78.0 0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.8 87.7 87.6 87.7 87.8 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 74.0 74.2 74.8 75.1 75.4 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 60.9 62.1 62.5 62.8 62.9 0.1 pps
Male 77.6 77.9 78.0 78.1 78.0 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 49.7 48.6 48.4 47.7 46.5 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.0 88.4 88.2 88.0 88.1 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 67.1 68.6 69.9 71.4 71.3 0.0 pps
Female 67.8 68.1 69.0 69.5 69.9 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 46.1 44.5 45.2 44.3 44.0 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.9 78.2 78.6 78.8 79.2 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 53.2 54.9 57.6 60.0 61.2 1.2 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 38045.4 38320.6 38640.0 38907.7 39175.9 0.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.4 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.0 pps
Male 1.6 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.0 pps
Female 2.3 0.6 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.0 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 10.5 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.6 -0.2 pps
Male 13.3 13.2 12.7 12.4 12.1 -0.2 pps
Female 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.9 6.8 -0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 14.6 13.8 13.4 13.1 13.2 0.1 pps
Male 14.5 13.8 13.3 13.1 13.1 0.0 pps
Female 14.8 13.8 13.5 13.2 13.2 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 25.9 25.8 26.7 26.5 26.8 0.3 pps
Male 8.9 8.9 9.1 9.2 9.3 0.1 pps
Female 45.4 45.3 46.7 46.3 46.6 0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 5.8 5.4 5.2 5.0 4.6 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 8.5 8.0 7.8 7.7 7.2 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.4 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 6.4 5.9 5.7 5.1 4.7 -0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 13.2 12.4 12.0 12.0 11.4 -0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.8 5.3 5.2 4.7 4.3 -0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 5.4 5.0 4.9 4.6 4.2 -0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 11.1 10.3 9.8 9.4 9.2 -0.2 pps
Male 6.1 5.6 5.5 5.3 5.0 -0.3 pps
Female 5.6 5.2 4.9 4.6 4.2 -0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 47.9 45.4 44.6 44.3 44.0 -0.3 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.8 41.6 41.4 41.4 41.2 -0.5 %
Male 42.7 42.5 42.2 42.1 42.0 -0.2 %
Female 40.1 40.0 39.9 39.9 39.8 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 1.4 -0.4 -3.9 1.2 -1.8 -3.0 pps
Building and construction 1.9 1.5 0.6 0.4 -0.2 -0.6 pps
Services 2.0 1.2 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.2 pps
Manufacturing industry 2.1 1.8 0.3 0.6 0.3 -0.3 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.0 2.5 1.8 2.8 2.4 -0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.9 1.0 -0.2 1.0  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.8 3.1 1.2 1.9 2.8 0.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 3.1 3.3 1.2 1.8 3.0 1.2 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.3 -0.7 -0.1 0.8 0.8 0.0 pps
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Estonia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 1330 1325 1320 1316 1313 -0.2 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 890 880 871 862 853 -1.0 %
(% of total population) 67.0 66.4 66.0 65.5 65.0 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 665 659 655 648 654 0.9 %
Male 340 337 336 336 338 0.8 %
Female 325 321 319 313 316 1.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 74.7 74.8 75.1 75.2 76.7 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 40.1 40.8 39.8 39.2 41.8 2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.4 87.8 87.6 87.1 87.9 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 65.1 65.1 66.6 67.7 68.7 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 73.8 74.3 74.9 75.3 77.0 1.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 79.9 77.5 76.4 74.9 75.0 0.1 pps
Male 78.1 78.4 78.6 79.3 80.4 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 43.4 44.2 41.4 41.3 45.8 4.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.1 92.1 92.3 92.2 92.6 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 67.0 65.3 66.8 69.2 67.7 -1.5 pps
Female 71.5 71.4 71.8 71.3 73.0 1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 36.5 37.3 38.1 37.0 37.8 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.7 83.5 82.9 82.0 83.0 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 63.5 64.9 66.4 66.5 69.5 3.0 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 65.3 67.1 68.5 69.6 71.9 2.3 pps
Young (15-24) 31.1 32.2 32.4 33.4 36.3 2.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.2 79.5 80.4 80.9 83.0 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 57.5 60.5 62.6 64.0 64.5 0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 30.9 31.6 35.4 37.0 36.9 -0.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 68.8 69.8 70.0 70.5 73.5 3.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 79.0 81.5 82.2 83.2 85.2 2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.8 67.9 69.1 70.3 72.5 2.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 62.5 63.3 65.3 65.2 68.0 2.8 pps
Male 67.8 69.7 71.3 73.0 75.3 2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 33.1 34.2 34.1 33.4 39.4 6.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.6 83.1 84.7 85.6 87.7 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 57.2 59.2 61.4 65.2 63.0 -2.2 pps
Female 63.0 64.7 65.7 66.3 68.5 2.2 pps
Young (15-24) 29.0 30.4 30.7 33.3 33.1 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.0 75.9 76.1 76.1 78.2 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 57.7 61.4 63.6 63.1 65.8 2.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 581.5 591.0 596.6 599.5 613.1 2.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 6.5 1.6 1.2 0.8 2.9 2.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 6.1 1.6 0.9 0.5 2.3 1.8 pps
Male 9.5 1.7 1.7 1.3 2.6 1.2 pps
Female 2.8 1.6 0.2 -0.4 1.9 2.3 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 8.3 8.5 8.8 8.8 9.3 0.5 pps
Male 11.8 12.2 12.1 12.1 11.9 -0.2 pps
Female 4.7 4.7 5.4 5.4 6.4 1.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 4.5 3.5 3.5 3.1 3.4 0.3 pps
Male 5.7 4.7 4.1 3.3 3.9 0.6 pps
Female 3.4 2.4 2.9 3.0 3.0 0.0 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 9.3 9.2 8.9 8.3 9.5 1.2 pps
Male 5.0 5.1 5.5 5.7 6.0 0.3 pps
Female 13.8 13.3 12.4 11.2 13.4 2.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 12.3 10.0 8.6 7.4 6.2 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 22.4 20.9 18.7 15.0 13.1 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 11.5 9.5 8.3 7.2 5.5 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 11.6 7.2 6.0 5.4 6.0 0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 26.9 24.3 15.7 13.8 13.8 0.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 12.9 10.7 9.8 8.4 6.8 -1.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 8.2 6.1 5.9 4.9 4.0 -0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 10.8 8.7 7.8 6.6 5.8 -0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 21.8 18.3 14.5 12.8 9.3 -3.5 pps
Male 13.1 10.9 9.1 7.9 6.2 -1.7 pps
Female 11.6 9.1 8.2 6.8 6.1 -0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 57.3 54.7 44.5 45.2 38.8 -6.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.6 40.3 40.1 39.7 39.7 0.0 %
Male 41.1 40.9 40.7 40.2 40.2 0.0 %
Female 40.0 39.6 39.5 39.1 39.2 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 12.7 3.1 -6.0 -9.2 7.5 16.7 pps
Building and construction 24.7 2.6 0.2 1.7 8.1 6.4 pps
Services 5.7 2.0 3.8 2.0 0.8 -1.1 pps
Manufacturing industry 12.6 -4.1 1.2 -2.3 5.8 8.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 0.8 6.6 4.6 4.2 5.7 1.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -4.2 3.3 0.7 2.5  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 4.8 6.6 7.9 6.1 4.7 -1.4 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 4.9 6.4 8.1 6.3 4.8 -1.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.0 2.6 0.2 2.0 -1.4 -3.4 pps
2014-2015
 
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 2016 
 
116 
Ireland 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 4577 4590 4602 4615 4642 0.6 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3064 3042 3022 3007 3002 -0.2 %
(% of total population) 66.9 66.3 65.7 65.2 64.7 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2120 2105 2109 2098 2102 0.2 %
Male 1169 1156 1156 1149 1149 0.0 %
Female 951 949 954 949 952 0.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 69.2 69.2 69.8 69.8 70.0 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 41.5 40.5 39.7 37.3 36.3 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.2 80.4 80.8 81.0 81.2 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 55.4 55.1 57.4 58.4 60.1 1.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 68.6 68.7 69.3 69.5 69.9 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.6 72.1 72.9 71.3 70.7 -0.7 pps
Male 76.6 76.5 77.0 77.1 77.4 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 42.7 41.3 40.6 38.8 38.3 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.0 89.3 89.2 89.6 89.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 65.0 64.6 67.9 69.0 71.5 2.5 pps
Female 61.9 62.0 62.7 62.6 62.8 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 40.4 39.7 38.7 35.8 34.2 -1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.5 71.7 72.5 72.7 73.2 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 45.7 45.6 47.1 48.0 49.0 1.0 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.9 58.8 60.5 61.7 63.3 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 29.5 28.2 29.0 28.4 28.7 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.3 69.5 71.0 72.6 74.1 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 50.0 49.3 51.3 53.0 55.6 2.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 35.2 33.8 35.4 33.9 35.0 1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 59.4 59.6 60.7 62.7 63.8 1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 79.3 78.9 79.2 80.2 81.2 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.7 58.7 60.4 61.8 63.4 1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 60.0 59.4 61.0 61.4 62.5 1.1 pps
Male 62.6 62.7 65.1 66.9 68.7 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 27.8 26.3 28.5 28.5 29.3 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.0 74.5 76.7 78.8 80.5 1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 57.1 55.8 59.3 61.4 64.9 3.6 pps
Female 55.1 55.1 55.9 56.7 57.9 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 31.2 30.2 29.6 28.3 28.2 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 64.6 64.6 65.6 66.6 68.1 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 43.0 42.7 43.4 44.7 46.4 1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1803.6 1790.1 1828.0 1856.3 1899.5 2.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -0.5 -0.6 2.5 1.7 2.5 0.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -1.8 -0.7 2.1 1.5 2.3 0.8 pps
Male -2.2 -1.0 3.3 2.0 2.4 0.4 pps
Female -1.5 -0.4 0.8 1.0 2.3 1.2 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 14.7 14.5 15.2 15.1 14.9 -0.2 pps
Male 22.1 21.7 22.4 22.3 21.8 -0.6 pps
Female 6.5 6.4 6.9 6.8 6.9 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 10.2 10.1 10.0 9.3 8.7 -0.6 pps
Male 9.8 9.9 10.1 9.2 8.7 -0.5 pps
Female 10.6 10.4 9.8 9.4 8.6 -0.8 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 23.1 23.5 23.5 23.0 22.2 -0.8 pps
Male 12.5 13.3 13.5 13.1 12.2 -0.9 pps
Female 35.2 34.9 35.0 34.4 33.8 -0.6 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 14.7 14.7 13.1 11.3 9.4 -1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 29.1 30.4 26.8 23.9 20.9 -3.0 pps
Prime age (25-49) 13.7 13.5 12.0 10.4 8.7 -1.7 pps
Older (55-64) 9.6 10.5 10.6 9.3 7.6 -1.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 24.4 25.9 22.2 20.4 17.6 -2.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 17.4 17.7 16.1 13.7 11.5 -2.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 7.9 7.6 7.3 6.6 5.5 -1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 14.4 14.5 12.8 11.1 9.3 -1.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 17.5 17.6 16.3 13.8 11.5 -2.3 pps
Male 17.8 17.7 15.0 12.9 10.9 -2.0 pps
Female 10.8 11.0 10.7 9.4 7.7 -1.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 59.3 61.7 60.6 59.2 57.6 -1.6 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 39.7 39.8 40.1 40.1 39.9 -0.5 %
Male 41.6 41.7 42.0 42.0 41.9 -0.2 %
Female 36.5 36.6 36.9 36.9 36.6 -0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.7 3.3 24.5 2.1 0.9 -1.2 pps
Building and construction -0.2 -4.9 0.2 6.3 12.8 6.5 pps
Services 5.5 -0.4 2.2 2.2 1.1 -1.1 pps
Manufacturing industry -9.8 -2.5 2.9 -0.1 3.6 3.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.8 2.8 1.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -3.1 -1.8 0.0 3.1  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) -1.1 2.2 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) -0.3 1.4 0.4 1.0 1.1 0.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.5 -0.5 -1.4 6.7 23.2 16.5 pps
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Greece 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 11105 11045 10965 10892 10858 -0.3 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 7224 7156 7090 7040 6987 -0.8 %
(% of total population) 65.1 64.8 64.7 64.6 64.4 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4859 4828 4784 4747 4738 -0.2 %
Male 2763 2719 2692 2646 2621 -0.9 %
Female 2096 2109 2092 2101 2117 0.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 67.3 67.5 67.5 67.4 67.8 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 29.1 29.1 28.4 28.0 26.0 -2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.1 83.7 83.9 84.3 85.4 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 43.1 42.1 42.4 41.1 41.6 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.6 66.9 66.9 66.8 67.4 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 74.1 73.6 74.9 75.0 73.8 -1.2 pps
Male 77.2 76.9 76.9 76.0 75.9 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 31.7 31.2 31.6 30.0 27.7 -2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.5 93.6 93.6 93.1 93.1 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 57.3 55.2 55.0 53.4 54.9 1.5 pps
Female 57.5 58.3 58.3 59.0 59.9 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 26.6 27.0 25.3 26.1 24.3 -1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.8 74.0 74.3 75.6 77.7 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 29.9 30.1 31.0 29.9 29.5 -0.3 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 55.1 50.8 48.8 49.4 50.8 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 16.1 13.0 11.8 13.3 13.0 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 68.8 63.9 61.3 62.4 64.5 2.1 pps
Older (55-64) 39.5 36.5 35.6 34.0 34.3 0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 45.2 40.4 38.3 39.0 39.7 0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 53.8 49.1 46.3 47.0 48.8 1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 74.0 70.2 68.2 67.6 67.9 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 54.7 51.0 49.0 49.3 50.8 1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 58.7 49.0 46.3 50.4 51.0 0.6 pps
Male 65.4 60.1 57.9 58.0 59.3 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 19.4 16.1 14.6 15.8 15.1 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.9 73.9 71.4 71.7 73.7 1.9 pps
Older (55-64) 52.3 47.7 46.0 44.0 44.9 1.0 pps
Female 45.0 41.7 39.9 41.1 42.5 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 12.9 10.0 9.1 10.9 10.9 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 57.8 53.9 51.4 53.1 55.4 2.3 pps
Older (55-64) 27.5 26.1 26.0 25.0 24.7 -0.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3979.0 3636.0 3459.0 3479.5 3548.0 2.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -6.9 -6.3 -3.6 0.1 1.9 1.8 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -7.6 -8.6 -4.9 0.6 2.0 1.4 pps
Male -8.0 -9.1 -4.6 -0.5 1.6 2.1 pps
Female -7.0 -8.0 -5.2 2.2 2.5 0.4 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 30.0 31.1 31.7 30.7 29.9 -0.9 pps
Male 35.4 36.6 37.1 36.4 35.3 -1.2 pps
Female 22.4 23.3 23.9 22.9 22.5 -0.4 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 11.8 10.2 10.2 11.6 11.9 0.3 pps
Male 10.7 8.9 9.3 11.0 11.4 0.4 pps
Female 13.2 11.8 11.3 12.4 12.6 0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 6.7 7.7 8.4 9.3 9.4 0.1 pps
Male 4.3 4.7 5.4 6.5 6.7 0.2 pps
Female 10.1 11.8 12.6 13.0 13.1 0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 17.9 24.5 27.5 26.5 24.9 -1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 44.7 55.3 58.3 52.4 49.8 -2.6 pps
Prime age (25-49) 17.2 23.7 26.9 26.0 24.4 -1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 8.4 13.5 16.2 17.2 17.5 0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 18.6 26.5 30.2 28.7 27.2 -1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 20.4 27.8 31.3 30.3 27.7 -2.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 14.3 18.5 20.5 20.1 20.0 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 17.8 23.8 26.7 26.1 24.6 -1.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 20.8 33.4 38.2 32.8 30.9 -1.9 pps
Male 15.2 21.6 24.5 23.7 21.8 -1.9 pps
Female 21.5 28.2 31.4 30.2 28.9 -1.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 49.3 59.1 67.0 73.4 73.0 -0.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 42.4 42.6 42.8 42.8 42.8 0.0 %
Male 43.5 43.7 44.0 44.1 44.2 0.2 %
Female 40.6 40.7 40.8 40.7 40.6 -0.2 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -6.6 -1.7 -0.3 -0.2 -1.4 -1.2 pps
Building and construction -23.1 -14.3 -16.5 -6.6 -3.9 2.7 pps
Services -5.5 -5.7 -3.3 1.4 4.4 3.0 pps
Manufacturing industry -9.0 -8.3 -5.9 -1.8 5.5 7.3 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee -3.8 -3.0 -7.0 -2.1 -1.7 0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -4.5 -2.7 -4.6 0.1  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) -5.6 -5.5 -6.5 -0.7 -3.7 -3.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) -4.6 -5.6 -11.6 -1.0 -2.8 -1.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) -2.4 -1.1 0.4 0.5 -2.1 -2.6 pps
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Spain 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 46736 46766 46593 46464 46426 -0.1 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 31496 31348 31024 30750 30642 -0.4 %
(% of total population) 67.4 67.0 66.6 66.2 66.0 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 23280 23281 23043 22814 22767 -0.2 %
Male 12773 12648 12437 12277 12232 -0.4 %
Female 10508 10633 10606 10537 10535 0.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 73.9 74.3 74.3 74.2 74.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 40.9 39.0 37.8 35.7 34.7 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.2 86.9 87.2 87.3 87.4 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 52.4 53.5 54.1 55.4 57.6 2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 73.0 73.5 73.7 73.7 73.8 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 79.7 79.2 78.4 77.7 78.0 0.3 pps
Male 80.4 80.1 79.8 79.5 79.5 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 42.6 40.3 39.6 37.3 36.2 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.5 92.6 92.4 92.6 92.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 63.5 63.6 63.3 64.3 66.2 2.0 pps
Female 67.3 68.4 68.7 68.8 69.0 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 39.2 37.6 35.9 34.0 33.2 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.7 81.1 81.8 82.0 82.0 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 41.8 43.9 45.2 46.9 49.4 2.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 58.0 55.8 54.8 56.0 57.8 1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 22.0 18.4 16.8 16.7 17.9 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 69.1 66.7 65.8 67.4 69.4 2.0 pps
Older (55-64) 44.5 43.9 43.2 44.3 46.9 2.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 47.4 44.2 43.2 44.0 46.2 2.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 59.0 57.0 55.2 56.0 57.5 1.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 76.9 75.2 74.1 75.3 76.7 1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 58.7 56.5 55.6 56.6 58.3 1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 53.6 50.7 49.4 50.8 54.2 3.3 pps
Male 63.4 60.3 59.2 60.7 62.9 2.3 pps
Young (15-24) 22.1 18.5 17.3 17.4 18.6 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.6 71.3 70.4 72.5 75.1 2.6 pps
Older (55-64) 53.8 52.1 50.5 51.2 54.0 2.8 pps
Female 52.6 51.2 50.3 51.2 52.7 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 22.0 18.3 16.3 16.0 17.3 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 63.4 62.0 61.2 62.3 63.7 1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 35.6 36.0 36.3 37.8 40.1 2.4 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 18270.9 17476.8 17001.6 17210.5 17717.5 2.9 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -2.7 -4.1 -2.9 0.9 2.9 2.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -1.6 -4.3 -2.7 1.2 2.9 1.7 pps
Male -2.6 -5.4 -3.0 1.4 3.3 2.0 pps
Female -0.4 -3.0 -2.4 1.1 2.5 1.4 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 15.4 16.3 16.9 16.7 16.4 -0.3 pps
Male 18.9 20.2 21.0 20.7 20.2 -0.5 pps
Female 11.0 11.6 12.0 11.9 11.8 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 25.2 23.4 23.2 24.0 25.2 1.2 pps
Male 24.0 22.1 22.2 23.6 25.1 1.5 pps
Female 26.5 25.0 24.2 24.6 25.3 0.7 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 13.5 14.4 15.7 15.8 15.6 -0.2 pps
Male 5.8 6.4 7.7 7.7 7.8 0.1 pps
Female 22.8 23.9 25.2 25.5 25.1 -0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 21.4 24.8 26.1 24.5 22.1 -2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 46.2 52.9 55.5 53.2 48.3 -4.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 19.9 23.3 24.5 22.8 20.6 -2.2 pps
Older (55-64) 15.1 18.0 20.0 20.0 18.6 -1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 29.0 33.9 35.5 34.0 31.2 -2.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 21.2 24.2 25.9 24.2 21.6 -2.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 12.6 15.0 16.1 14.8 13.3 -1.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 19.6 23.1 24.6 23.2 21.0 -2.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 32.7 36.0 37.0 34.6 30.5 -4.1 pps
Male 21.1 24.6 25.6 23.6 20.8 -2.8 pps
Female 21.8 25.1 26.7 25.4 23.6 -1.8 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 41.6 44.3 49.7 52.8 51.6 -1.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.7 40.6 40.9 40.7 40.6 -0.2 %
Male 41.6 41.5 41.8 41.7 41.5 -0.5 %
Female 39.2 39.2 39.5 39.3 39.1 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -4.3 -2.5 -0.7 -1.4 0.9 2.3 pps
Building and construction -15.2 -17.6 -13.6 -3.9 6.3 10.2 pps
Services -1.4 -3.4 -2.2 1.8 3.5 1.7 pps
Manufacturing industry : : -4.3 0.4 3.0 2.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 0.7 -1.4 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.8 -0.6 1.0 0.2  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.8 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.6 1.2 -0.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.7 1.2 1.3 0.5 0.3 -0.2 pps
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France 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 65294 65615 65927 66227 66504 0.4 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 40010 39939 39876 40973 40927 -0.1 %
(% of total population) 61.3 60.9 60.5 61.9 61.5 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 28051 28242 28368 29148 29164 0.1 %
Male 14676 14776 14787 15132 15127 0.0 %
Female 13375 13467 13580 14016 14037 0.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.1 70.7 71.1 71.1 71.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 37.9 37.4 37.4 36.9 37.1 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 88.2 88.3 87.9 87.5 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 43.9 47.4 49.0 50.7 52.6 1.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.5 71.1 71.5 71.5 71.8 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 65.1 64.9 65.9 65.5 64.1 -1.4 pps
Male 74.6 75.3 75.5 75.3 75.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 41.3 40.8 40.8 40.3 40.2 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.7 93.6 93.3 92.9 92.4 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 46.8 50.8 52.3 53.1 55.1 2.0 pps
Female 65.7 66.3 66.9 67.2 67.3 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 34.5 34.0 33.9 33.5 33.9 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.0 83.0 83.5 83.0 82.7 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 41.2 44.3 46.0 48.5 50.3 1.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 63.9 64.0 64.0 63.8 63.8 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 29.6 28.6 28.4 28.0 27.9 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.5 80.9 80.6 79.8 79.4 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 44.5 45.6 46.9 48.7 1.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 45.2 44.7 42.9 41.2 39.7 -1.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 67.3 66.8 66.2 65.7 65.9 0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 80.5 80.9 81.3 81.1 81.4 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.6 64.8 64.8 64.6 64.8 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 53.8 52.9 53.3 52.5 50.8 -1.6 pps
Male 68.2 68.1 67.9 67.3 67.1 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 32.5 31.0 31.0 30.2 29.9 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.8 86.0 85.2 84.4 83.7 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 44.1 47.5 48.4 48.9 50.7 1.9 pps
Female 59.7 60.1 60.4 60.4 60.6 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 26.7 26.1 25.6 25.8 26.0 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.2 76.0 76.2 75.4 75.2 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 38.9 41.6 43.0 45.2 46.9 1.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 25564.0 25568.1 25540.1 26128.8 26118.5 0.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.8 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -0.1 0.0 -0.1 2.3 0.0 -2.3 pps
Male -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 1.7 -0.3 -2.1 pps
Female 0.0 0.4 0.4 2.9 0.3 -2.6 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 10.9 10.7 10.6 10.8 10.8 0.0 pps
Male 14.6 14.3 14.0 14.2 14.1 -0.1 pps
Female 6.7 6.8 6.8 7.2 7.3 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 15.3 15.2 15.3 15.3 16.0 0.7 pps
Male 14.6 14.3 14.7 14.5 15.4 0.9 pps
Female 16.0 16.1 16.0 16.1 16.6 0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 17.6 17.7 18.1 18.6 18.4 -0.2 pps
Male 6.5 6.4 6.7 7.4 7.4 0.0 pps
Female 29.9 30.0 30.4 30.6 30.1 -0.5 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 9.2 9.8 10.3 10.3 10.4 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 21.9 23.7 24.1 24.2 24.7 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.7 8.3 8.7 9.2 9.3 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 5.7 6.2 7.0 7.4 7.4 0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.5 15.4 16.4 17.3 17.8 0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.5 9.5 10.1 10.7 10.9 0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.2 5.5 6.0 6.4 6.4 0.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.3 8.9 9.4 9.7 9.8 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 17.4 18.4 19.1 19.9 20.7 0.8 pps
Male 8.9 9.8 10.4 10.6 10.8 0.2 pps
Female 9.6 9.8 10.2 10.0 9.9 -0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 41.1 39.9 40.4 44.2 44.2 0.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 39.8 39.6 38.9 38.8 38.8 0.0 %
Male 41.0 40.7 40.0 39.8 39.9 0.3 %
Female 38.0 37.9 37.2 37.2 37.3 0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -0.8 0.0 -0.3 0.4 0.7 0.3 pps
Building and construction -0.1 -0.4 -0.1 -1.3 -2.3 -1.0 pps
Services 2.0 0.7 -0.1 0.6 1.0 0.4 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.9 -0.6 -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -0.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.3 2.2 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.6 1.2 0.8 0.7  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 3.4 2.2 0.4 1.0 1.2 0.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.8 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.6 -0.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.3 -0.1 0.3 0.2 0.8 0.6 pps
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Croatia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 4282 4268 4257 4233 4213 -0.5 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 2870 2857 2844 2826 2802 -0.9 %
(% of total population) 67.0 66.9 66.8 66.8 66.5 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1841 1825 1811 1868 1872 0.2 %
Male 1013 997 979 1003 1002 0.0 %
Female 828 828 832 865 870 0.6 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 64.1 63.9 63.7 66.1 66.8 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 32.5 30.1 29.9 33.6 33.3 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.6 80.9 80.8 84.1 84.4 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 41.8 41.9 41.0 44.1 3.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.2 63.9 63.7 66.1 66.9 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 56.0 53.6 55.2 53.8 44.4 -9.4 pps
Male 70.7 69.8 68.9 70.9 71.5 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 37.8 34.6 34.7 38.5 38.3 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.4 85.2 84.7 86.6 86.8 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 54.2 53.9 51.0 52.1 54.7 2.6 pps
Female 57.6 58.0 58.5 61.3 62.2 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 26.9 25.3 24.8 28.5 28.2 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.8 76.6 76.8 81.5 81.9 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 29.6 30.6 33.4 30.6 34.2 3.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 55.2 53.5 52.5 54.6 55.8 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 20.6 17.4 14.9 18.3 19.0 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.6 69.2 68.3 71.2 72.2 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 38.2 37.5 37.8 36.2 39.0 2.8 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 32.7 29.5 27.5 26.9 28.2 1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 59.0 56.7 55.5 57.0 58.0 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 77.4 76.5 75.7 78.4 78.6 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 55.2 53.5 52.5 54.6 55.9 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 50.0 42.0 44.8 40.0 38.9 -1.1 pps
Male 60.9 58.5 56.5 59.1 60.1 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 23.8 20.0 17.4 21.2 22.3 1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.1 73.0 71.6 74.5 75.2 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 49.6 48.0 45.0 45.8 48.0 2.2 pps
Female 49.5 48.5 48.5 50.0 51.5 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 17.2 14.7 12.4 15.3 15.6 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 66.1 65.2 64.9 67.9 69.1 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 27.7 27.7 31.0 27.3 30.6 3.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1583.8 1528.1 1493.6 1541.8 1563.7 1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -3.9 -3.5 -2.7 2.7 1.5 -1.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -3.9 -3.5 -2.3 3.2 1.4 -1.8 pps
Male -3.0 -4.3 -3.8 4.0 0.9 -3.2 pps
Female -5.1 -2.6 -0.4 2.3 2.1 -0.2 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 17.7 16.0 15.4 13.4 12.9 -0.5 pps
Male 19.9 18.5 18.2 16.7 16.3 -0.4 pps
Female 15.0 13.1 12.1 9.6 8.8 -0.7 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 13.5 13.3 14.5 16.9 20.3 3.4 pps
Male 13.1 13.3 14.8 16.6 20.5 3.9 pps
Female 14.0 13.4 14.1 17.1 20.0 2.9 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 7.2 5.6 5.4 5.3 5.9 0.6 pps
Male 5.6 4.6 4.6 4.2 4.7 0.5 pps
Female 9.2 6.9 6.4 6.7 7.3 0.6 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 13.7 16.0 17.3 17.3 16.3 -1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 36.7 42.1 50.0 45.5 43.0 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 12.4 14.5 15.5 15.3 14.4 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 7.7 10.4 9.9 11.6 11.6 0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 18.7 19.9 22.7 26.4 22.8 -3.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 14.3 17.4 18.7 18.8 18.2 -0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 9.3 10.8 11.4 9.6 9.4 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 14.0 16.2 17.5 17.4 16.5 -0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 13.7 16.0 17.7 16.5 15.7 -0.8 pps
Female 13.8 16.1 16.8 18.3 17.0 -1.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 61.4 63.7 63.6 58.5 63.0 4.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.2 40.7 40.4 40.4 39.6 -2.0 %
Male 41.7 41.1 40.8 40.8 40.1 -1.7 %
Female 40.5 40.1 39.9 39.8 38.9 -2.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.6 -19.1 -14.3 -9.4 -2.2 7.2 pps
Building and construction -7.5 -7.5 -0.7 -3.8 5.1 8.9 pps
Services -3.9 -0.6 -2.6 4.9 2.9 -2.0 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.2 -2.3 -4.5 2.8 -0.9 -3.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 4.4 0.1 -0.6 -5.4 -0.3 5.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.7 -1.5 -1.4 -5.4  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 3.2 3.6 1.8 -0.5 1.7 2.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.5 2.6 1.4 -0.5 1.8 2.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 3.8 1.4 1.7 -3.0 0.1 3.1 pps
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Italy 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 60060 60339 60646 60789 60731 -0.1 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 39115 39108 39172 39161 39035 -0.3 %
(% of total population) 65.1 64.8 64.6 64.4 64.3 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 24272 24832 24816 25039 24997 -0.2 %
Male 14131 14303 14253 14327 14382 0.4 %
Female 10141 10530 10563 10712 10615 -0.9 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 62.1 63.5 63.4 63.9 64.0 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 27.1 28.6 27.1 27.1 26.2 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.9 77.8 77.1 77.0 76.8 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 39.3 42.5 45.3 48.9 51.1 2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.3 62.8 62.6 63.2 63.3 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.9 70.5 70.5 70.4 70.3 -0.1 pps
Male 72.8 73.7 73.3 73.6 74.1 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 31.2 32.9 30.7 31.0 30.4 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.2 89.4 88.3 87.7 87.7 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 50.5 53.6 56.6 60.2 63.3 3.1 pps
Female 51.4 53.4 53.6 54.4 54.1 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 22.8 24.0 23.4 23.1 21.7 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 64.7 66.5 66.1 66.4 65.9 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 28.8 32.2 34.7 38.3 39.6 1.3 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 56.8 56.6 55.5 55.7 56.3 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 19.2 18.5 16.3 15.6 15.6 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.1 70.4 68.5 67.9 68.2 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 37.8 40.3 42.7 46.2 48.2 2.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 43.4 43.3 42.0 41.8 42.2 0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 65.0 64.1 62.5 62.6 62.9 0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 77.1 76.7 75.9 75.5 76.3 0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 56.3 56.3 55.2 55.4 56.0 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 62.3 60.6 58.3 58.5 58.9 0.4 pps
Male 67.3 66.3 64.7 64.7 65.5 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 22.8 21.8 18.7 18.2 18.6 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.4 81.7 79.2 78.2 78.6 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 48.2 50.4 52.8 56.5 59.3 2.7 pps
Female 46.5 47.1 46.5 46.8 47.2 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 15.5 15.0 13.7 12.8 12.4 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 59.0 59.2 58.0 57.6 57.9 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 28.1 30.8 33.2 36.6 37.9 1.3 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 22214.9 22149.2 21755.3 21809.5 21972.6 0.7 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.3 -0.3 -1.8 0.1 0.6 0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.3 -0.3 -1.8 0.2 0.7 0.5 pps
Male -0.3 -1.4 -2.2 0.0 1.0 1.0 pps
Female 1.1 1.2 -1.1 0.5 0.4 -0.1 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 22.6 22.5 22.4 22.2 21.9 -0.3 pps
Male 27.5 27.3 27.2 26.7 26.2 -0.5 pps
Female 15.6 15.9 15.8 16.0 15.9 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 13.3 13.8 13.2 13.6 14.1 0.5 pps
Male 12.2 12.9 12.4 13.1 13.6 0.5 pps
Female 14.6 14.9 14.2 14.2 14.6 0.4 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 15.2 16.8 17.6 18.1 18.3 0.2 pps
Male 5.4 6.6 7.4 7.8 8.0 0.2 pps
Female 29.1 30.9 31.7 32.1 32.4 0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.4 10.7 12.1 12.7 11.9 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 29.2 35.3 40.0 42.7 40.3 -2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.5 9.6 11.2 11.8 11.2 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 3.8 5.3 5.7 5.5 5.5 0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 10.8 13.9 16.2 17.0 15.9 -1.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.9 10.1 11.5 12.0 11.5 -0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.4 6.7 7.3 8.0 7.2 -0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.1 10.4 11.7 12.4 11.6 -0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 12.1 14.1 17.3 17.0 16.3 -0.7 pps
Male 7.5 9.8 11.5 11.9 11.3 -0.6 pps
Female 9.5 11.8 13.1 13.8 12.7 -1.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 52.0 53.1 56.9 61.4 58.9 -2.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 39.9 39.5 39.6 39.6 39.7 0.3 %
Male 41.2 40.7 40.8 40.8 40.9 0.2 %
Female 37.4 37.2 37.4 37.5 37.5 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.8 -2.5 -2.9 -0.2 2.2 2.4 pps
Building and construction -2.3 -4.8 -7.6 -4.0 -1.6 2.4 pps
Services 1.3 0.6 -1.2 0.5 1.3 0.8 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.7 -1.9 -2.9 -1.8 -0.9 0.9 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.0 -1.1 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.8 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.3 -1.0 0.1 -1.0  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.4 2.0 2.2 0.5 -0.1 -0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.3 2.1 1.9 0.5 0.5 0.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.3 -2.5 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 pps
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Cyprus 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 851 864 862 853 848 -0.6 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 571 580 578 572 559 -2.3 %
(% of total population) 67.1 67.2 67.0 67.0 65.9 -1.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 420 426 425 425 413 -2.8 %
Male 219 223 221 218 210 -3.3 %
Female 202 204 204 207 202 -2.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 73.6 73.5 73.6 74.3 73.9 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 38.8 38.9 38.4 40.3 37.8 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.3 87.6 87.7 88.4 87.9 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 57.6 56.1 56.6 56.0 57.4 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.9 71.7 72.4 73.2 72.9 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 79.6 79.9 78.4 79.4 78.3 -1.0 pps
Male 80.4 80.7 80.6 80.0 78.8 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 41.4 42.7 40.7 41.1 36.9 -4.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.1 93.8 94.0 93.5 92.6 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 72.9 71.2 71.3 69.9 70.0 0.1 pps
Female 67.4 66.9 67.2 69.1 69.4 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 36.5 35.6 36.3 39.5 38.9 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.0 82.0 82.0 83.9 83.8 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 42.8 41.3 42.3 42.3 45.3 3.0 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 67.6 64.6 61.7 62.1 62.7 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 30.2 28.2 23.4 25.8 25.4 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.3 78.4 75.5 76.2 76.5 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 54.9 50.6 49.6 46.9 48.5 1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 50.3 43.7 40.5 40.4 40.7 0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 68.5 66.0 62.4 62.5 62.4 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 81.2 78.8 76.3 77.3 78.3 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 66.5 63.3 60.7 60.8 61.6 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 71.8 69.3 65.9 68.1 67.5 -0.6 pps
Male 73.7 70.4 67.0 66.1 66.7 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 31.8 30.4 24.0 25.9 24.0 -1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 86.4 83.3 80.4 79.6 80.6 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 69.2 63.6 61.1 57.2 57.7 0.5 pps
Female 62.2 59.4 56.9 58.6 59.0 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 28.8 26.0 23.0 25.8 26.7 0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.7 74.0 71.1 73.1 72.7 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 40.7 38.2 38.4 36.9 39.4 2.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 386.3 375.0 356.7 355.1 350.0 -1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.0 -3.2 -5.9 -1.9 0.8 2.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.0 -2.9 -4.9 -0.4 -1.4 -1.0 pps
Male 0.6 -3.1 -5.2 -2.4 -0.9 1.4 pps
Female 1.6 -2.8 -4.5 1.7 -1.9 -3.6 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 14.7 13.7 14.9 15.2 13.0 -2.3 pps
Male 19.9 18.9 20.4 20.3 15.9 -4.4 pps
Female 9.1 8.1 9.0 10.0 9.9 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 14.2 15.1 17.5 19.0 18.4 -0.6 pps
Male 7.1 9.0 10.3 13.1 13.2 0.1 pps
Female 20.9 20.9 24.2 24.4 23.4 -1.0 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 9.0 9.7 11.9 13.5 13.0 -0.5 pps
Male 6.1 6.4 8.4 10.3 10.3 0.0 pps
Female 12.1 13.1 15.6 16.8 15.8 -1.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.9 11.9 15.9 16.1 15.0 -1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 22.4 27.7 38.9 36.0 32.8 -3.2 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.8 10.5 13.9 13.9 13.1 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 4.9 9.7 12.4 16.3 15.6 -0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.9 14.2 20.2 20.3 19.4 -0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.9 12.9 17.2 18.4 16.7 -1.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 7.3 10.3 13.3 13.0 12.1 -0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.5 11.7 16.1 16.9 15.5 -1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.8 13.2 15.9 14.1 13.7 -0.4 pps
Male 8.1 12.6 16.6 17.1 15.1 -2.0 pps
Female 7.7 11.1 15.2 15.1 14.8 -0.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 20.8 30.0 38.2 47.7 45.6 -2.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.7 40.9 40.8 40.5 40.5 0.0 %
Male 41.6 41.7 41.6 41.7 41.7 0.0 %
Female 39.6 39.9 39.7 39.3 39.1 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -7.5 0.3 -12.0 -3.9 -1.8 2.1 pps
Building and construction -5.8 -14.0 -20.1 -9.5 -2.3 7.2 pps
Services 1.1 -1.6 -3.7 0.1 2.2 2.1 pps
Manufacturing industry -3.3 -7.3 -9.9 -4.7 0.9 5.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.0 0.6 -3.4 -4.0 -0.9 3.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.2 -1.4 -2.1 -2.8  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 1.6 0.2 -2.9 -3.3 -0.8 2.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 1.6 0.0 -2.6 -3.7 -0.7 3.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.4 0.8 0.0 -0.6 0.8 1.4 pps
2014-2015
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Latvia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 2059 2034 2013 1995 1978 -0.8 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 1382 1352 1333 1295 1275 -1.6 %
(% of total population) 67.1 66.5 66.2 64.9 64.4 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1007 1006 986 966 965 -0.1 %
Male 502 499 491 486 486 0.1 %
Female 505 507 495 480 479 -0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 72.8 74.4 74.0 74.6 75.7 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 37.5 40.2 39.4 40.4 41.3 0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.0 88.4 87.6 87.2 87.6 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 59.4 61.9 61.2 62.6 65.5 2.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 72.6 74.3 74.3 74.9 76.1 1.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 74.1 75.0 72.0 72.6 73.3 0.7 pps
Male 75.8 77.1 76.6 77.8 78.9 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 41.2 44.0 42.6 45.3 45.2 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.9 91.2 90.6 90.5 90.7 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 62.5 63.2 62.2 63.7 68.0 4.3 pps
Female 70.1 72.0 71.6 71.6 72.8 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 33.6 36.0 36.0 35.3 37.1 1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.4 85.8 84.8 84.0 84.6 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 57.1 60.9 60.5 61.7 63.6 1.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 60.8 63.0 65.0 66.3 68.1 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 25.8 28.7 30.2 32.5 34.5 2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.0 76.3 77.9 78.2 79.2 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 50.5 52.7 54.8 56.4 59.4 3.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 29.0 31.5 31.8 32.6 34.7 2.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 62.4 62.8 65.6 67.7 68.8 1.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 83.4 85.3 84.2 83.4 85.1 1.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.4 64.0 66.0 67.0 68.8 1.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 57.6 57.8 59.4 61.9 63.6 1.7 pps
Male 61.5 64.4 66.8 68.4 69.9 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 28.2 31.7 33.2 36.5 37.1 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.1 77.6 79.9 80.3 81.2 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 51.7 53.2 55.1 56.4 60.1 3.8 pps
Female 60.2 61.7 63.4 64.4 66.4 2.1 pps
Young (15-24) 23.4 25.4 27.0 28.2 31.9 3.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.8 75.0 76.1 76.0 77.3 1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 49.7 52.4 54.6 56.4 58.9 2.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 840.6 851.8 866.5 858.6 867.9 1.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.5 1.4 2.3 -1.3 1.4 2.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.4 1.3 1.7 -0.9 1.1 2.0 pps
Male 3.5 2.5 2.6 -0.3 1.0 1.2 pps
Female -0.4 0.2 0.9 -1.5 1.2 2.8 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 10.1 10.2 10.5 10.6 11.6 1.0 pps
Male 12.4 12.6 12.6 13.2 14.7 1.5 pps
Female 7.9 8.0 8.4 8.0 8.5 0.5 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 6.7 4.7 4.3 3.3 3.8 0.5 pps
Male 8.0 6.3 5.3 4.3 4.6 0.3 pps
Female 5.5 3.3 3.4 2.4 3.0 0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 8.8 8.9 7.5 6.8 7.2 0.4 pps
Male 7.0 6.7 5.7 4.7 4.5 -0.2 pps
Female 10.4 11.0 9.4 8.9 10.0 1.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 16.2 15.0 11.9 10.8 9.9 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 31.0 28.5 23.2 19.6 16.3 -3.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 14.8 13.7 11.0 10.4 9.5 -0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 14.9 14.7 10.5 9.9 9.3 -0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 30.0 27.4 25.7 24.5 22.3 -2.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 18.5 17.8 13.3 11.9 11.1 -0.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 7.3 6.6 6.1 5.7 5.0 -0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 15.4 13.9 11.3 10.5 9.6 -0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 22.2 22.9 17.5 14.8 13.2 -1.6 pps
Male 18.6 16.2 12.6 11.8 11.1 -0.7 pps
Female 13.8 14.0 11.1 9.8 8.6 -1.2 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 54.5 52.1 48.7 43.0 45.5 2.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.3 40.1 39.9 40.0 39.8 -0.5 %
Male 40.8 40.5 40.3 40.3 40.1 -0.5 %
Female 39.8 39.7 39.5 39.7 39.5 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 3.6 -0.9 -0.3 -3.8 8.6 12.4 pps
Building and construction 5.6 -1.4 6.2 3.3 2.7 -0.6 pps
Services -0.5 1.8 3.6 0.5 2.0 1.5 pps
Manufacturing industry 3.3 4.7 0.1 -5.0 -1.0 4.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.7 6.1 5.0 8.5 7.0 -1.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -2.5 2.5 3.7 7.2  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 3.4 4.2 4.8 5.9 7.4 1.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 3.8 4.3 4.9 7.1 7.4 0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 4.6 2.5 0.7 3.8 1.4 -2.4 pps
2014-2015
 
European Commission 
Labour Market and Wage Developments in Europe 2016 
 
124 
Lithuania 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 3028 2988 2958 2932 2905 -0.9 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 2037 2007 1984 1961 1935 -1.3 %
(% of total population) 67.3 67.2 67.1 66.9 66.6 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1454 1441 1436 1446 1434 -0.8 %
Male 722 713 716 721 710 -1.5 %
Female 732 728 721 724 724 -0.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 71.4 71.8 72.4 73.7 74.1 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 28.2 29.3 31.5 34.2 33.8 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.8 89.7 89.5 89.7 89.3 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 58.0 58.7 60.1 63.0 66.2 3.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.4 71.8 72.4 73.7 74.1 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 64.6 79.3 81.7 82.1 73.3 -8.8 pps
Male 73.5 73.7 74.7 76.0 75.8 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 32.1 32.4 35.8 38.6 36.7 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.7 90.5 90.6 90.8 90.4 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 64.3 64.6 65.3 68.2 69.8 1.7 pps
Female 69.4 70.1 70.3 71.6 72.5 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 24.1 26.1 27.0 29.6 30.8 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.9 89.0 88.3 88.7 88.2 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 53.1 54.2 56.1 58.9 63.3 4.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 60.2 62.0 63.7 65.7 67.2 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 19.0 21.5 24.6 27.6 28.3 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.9 78.5 79.6 80.8 81.6 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 50.2 51.7 53.4 56.2 60.4 4.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.4 15.7 17.1 19.5 19.9 0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 59.7 61.7 63.0 64.6 66.1 1.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 87.2 87.0 87.6 88.4 88.7 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 60.3 62.0 63.7 65.6 67.2 1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 49.6 64.7 73.1 72.6 67.5 -5.1 pps
Male 60.1 62.3 64.7 66.6 68.0 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 20.9 22.8 27.6 31.0 30.9 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.7 77.7 79.8 80.7 81.8 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 54.1 55.9 56.1 58.8 62.4 3.6 pps
Female 60.2 61.8 62.8 64.9 66.5 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 17.0 20.1 21.5 24.0 25.7 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.1 79.1 79.4 80.9 81.4 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 47.2 48.6 51.2 54.3 58.8 4.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 1225.7 1244.4 1264.3 1288.0 1300.6 1.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.5 1.8 1.3 2.0 1.3 -0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.1 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.0 -0.9 pps
Male 2.0 2.1 2.9 1.9 0.9 -1.0 pps
Female -1.5 1.0 0.4 1.9 1.1 -0.8 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 9.0 9.6 10.5 10.6 10.8 0.3 pps
Male 11.0 12.0 13.0 12.6 13.4 0.8 pps
Female 7.1 7.3 8.1 8.6 8.4 -0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 2.7 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.1 -0.7 pps
Male 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.6 2.4 -1.2 pps
Female 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 1.8 -0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 8.3 8.9 8.4 8.6 7.6 -1.0 pps
Male 6.7 6.9 6.4 6.4 5.5 -0.9 pps
Female 9.9 10.7 10.2 10.6 9.7 -0.9 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 15.4 13.4 11.8 10.7 9.1 -1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 32.6 26.7 21.9 19.3 16.3 -3.0 pps
Prime age (25-49) 14.3 12.6 11.0 9.9 8.6 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 13.4 11.9 11.2 10.7 8.7 -2.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 40.2 36.2 33.9 30.7 27.3 -3.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 19.2 16.7 14.5 13.7 11.9 -1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 6.3 5.7 5.2 4.3 3.7 -0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 15.6 13.6 12.0 10.9 9.3 -1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 17.9 15.2 13.1 12.2 10.1 -2.1 pps
Female 12.9 11.6 10.5 9.2 8.2 -1.0 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 52.1 49.2 42.9 44.6 42.8 -1.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 39.9 39.8 39.7 39.6 39.6 0.0 %
Male 40.4 40.2 40.2 40.1 40.1 0.0 %
Female 39.4 39.3 39.2 39.1 39.1 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -3.4 5.5 -3.0 11.0 0.2 -10.8 pps
Building and construction -2.0 5.1 10.9 0.0 5.8 5.8 pps
Services 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.6 -0.1 -2.7 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.6 2.8 -0.4 -0.4 2.1 2.5 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 6.4 4.2 5.4 3.8 4.6 0.7 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.1 1.5 4.0 2.6  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.9 4.9 6.8 4.5 5.5 1.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 3.1 4.1 6.4 4.9 5.9 1.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 5.5 2.0 2.2 1.0 0.3 -0.7 pps
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Luxembourg 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 519 532 545 558 569 1.9 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 344 355 359 364 386 5.9 %
(% of total population) 66.3 66.8 65.9 65.3 67.9 2.6 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 234 247 251 258 274 6.0 %
Male 131 137 139 143 149 4.5 %
Female 103 110 112 116 125 7.9 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 68.0 69.4 69.8 70.8 70.9 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 24.9 26.8 25.9 26.4 35.2 8.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.7 87.0 87.6 88.0 87.7 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 40.3 41.9 42.5 44.4 40.4 -3.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.7 64.7 65.1 66.3 66.8 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.8 74.7 75.0 75.6 75.1 -0.6 pps
Male 75.0 75.9 76.3 77.2 76.0 -1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 26.2 29.0 30.0 29.5 36.3 6.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.9 94.7 94.4 95.0 93.9 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 48.4 48.3 50.7 52.0 45.4 -6.6 pps
Female 60.7 62.8 63.2 64.2 65.6 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 23.2 24.6 21.9 22.9 34.2 11.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.1 79.1 80.5 80.9 81.4 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 32.0 35.0 34.4 36.5 35.1 -1.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.6 65.8 65.7 66.6 66.1 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 20.7 21.7 21.9 20.3 29.0 8.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.0 83.1 82.9 83.8 82.6 -1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 39.2 41.1 40.6 42.5 38.4 -4.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 44.2 44.7 43.2 41.9 46.8 4.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 64.4 65.8 65.4 65.9 65.9 0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 83.7 83.5 82.9 83.0 83.3 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.5 62.6 62.8 63.8 63.9 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 68.2 69.4 69.0 69.7 68.4 -1.3 pps
Male 72.1 72.4 72.1 72.6 71.3 -1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 22.8 23.5 24.2 21.9 29.5 7.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.8 91.1 90.1 90.6 89.3 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 47.0 47.2 48.3 49.7 42.9 -6.7 pps
Female 56.9 59.1 59.1 60.5 60.8 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 18.4 19.9 19.5 18.8 28.9 10.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.8 75.0 75.5 76.8 75.7 -1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 31.2 34.3 32.3 35.2 33.5 -1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 222.4 233.7 236.1 242.8 255.2 5.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 3.0 2.4 1.8 2.5 2.5 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.7 5.1 1.0 2.8 5.1 2.3 pps
Male 1.9 3.6 0.9 1.9 4.3 2.4 pps
Female 1.7 6.9 1.1 4.1 6.1 2.0 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 7.7 8.0 7.9 7.8 8.6 0.8 pps
Male 8.7 8.7 8.4 9.0 9.4 0.5 pps
Female 6.4 7.1 7.2 6.4 7.5 1.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 7.1 7.6 7.0 8.1 10.2 2.1 pps
Male 6.3 7.2 5.6 7.1 10.2 3.1 pps
Female 8.2 8.2 8.8 9.2 10.2 1.0 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 18.0 18.5 18.7 18.5 18.5 0.0 pps
Male 4.3 4.7 5.1 4.7 5.6 0.9 pps
Female 35.9 36.1 35.9 35.6 34.2 -1.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.8 5.1 5.9 6.0 6.4 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 16.8 18.8 15.5 22.6 17.3 -5.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.3 4.5 5.3 4.9 5.8 0.9 pps
Older (55-64) 2.8 2.1 4.7 4.3 4.7 0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.3 8.5 10.3 10.2 10.7 0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.4 5.2 5.9 6.3 6.3 0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.7 3.6 3.9 4.0 4.7 0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 3.5 3.3 3.6 3.8 4.3 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 6.4 7.0 8.1 7.8 8.9 1.1 pps
Male 3.9 4.5 5.6 5.8 5.9 0.1 pps
Female 6.0 5.8 6.2 6.4 7.1 0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 28.6 30.3 30.4 27.3 28.4 1.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.8 41.4 41.5 41.3 -0.5 %
Male 42.1 42.5 42.2 42.1 42.2 0.2 %
Female 39.6 40.4 39.9 40.3 39.7 -1.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.4 0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.7 -0.4 pps
Building and construction 2.2 1.2 -0.1 1.0 1.8 0.8 pps
Services 3.1 2.5 2.1 2.8 3.1 0.3 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.0 -1.2 -2.2 -0.6 1.1 1.7 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.0 1.6 3.6 2.9 0.8 -2.1 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -2.1 -2.4 1.3 2.0  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 3.0 2.7 3.3 3.2 0.6 -2.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 3.1 2.6 3.3 3.4 0.7 -2.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) -0.4 -3.2 2.5 1.5 2.3 0.8 pps
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Hungary 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 9972 9920 9893 9866 9843 -0.2 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 6719 6694 6647 6588 6530 -0.9 %
(% of total population) 67.4 67.5 67.2 66.8 66.3 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4190 4265 4300 4413 4483 1.6 %
Male 2252 2291 2324 2384 2426 1.7 %
Female 1938 1974 1977 2029 2057 1.4 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 62.4 63.7 64.7 67.0 68.6 1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 24.3 25.7 27.4 29.5 31.0 1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.3 82.9 83.3 85.0 85.8 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 38.8 39.5 41.2 44.6 48.1 3.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 62.3 63.7 64.6 66.9 68.6 1.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 64.5 68.8 72.6 74.9 70.6 -4.3 pps
Male 68.4 69.6 71.0 73.4 75.3 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 27.0 27.9 31.0 33.0 34.4 1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.2 89.4 89.5 91.2 92.0 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 43.7 45.4 49.0 53.2 57.8 4.6 pps
Female 56.6 58.0 58.6 60.7 62.2 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 21.5 23.4 23.6 25.9 27.5 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.4 76.5 77.1 78.8 79.6 0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 34.8 34.5 34.7 37.4 39.9 2.5 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 55.4 56.7 58.1 61.8 63.9 2.2 pps
Young (15-24) 18.0 18.4 20.1 23.5 25.7 2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 73.0 74.6 75.7 79.2 80.6 1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 35.3 36.1 37.9 41.8 45.3 3.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 25.5 26.0 26.9 31.5 33.9 2.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 60.8 61.9 63.3 66.7 68.8 2.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 78.5 78.5 78.8 80.8 82.1 1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 55.4 56.6 58.0 61.7 63.9 2.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 58.3 61.2 64.6 71.0 67.5 -3.5 pps
Male 60.7 61.6 63.7 67.8 70.3 2.4 pps
Young (15-24) 19.7 19.8 23.0 26.4 28.1 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.5 80.2 81.4 85.3 86.8 1.6 pps
Older (55-64) 39.3 41.4 44.8 49.6 54.4 4.8 pps
Female 50.3 51.9 52.6 55.9 57.8 1.9 pps
Young (15-24) 16.2 17.0 17.0 20.5 23.1 2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 66.6 69.0 70.0 73.2 74.4 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 31.9 31.7 32.1 35.2 37.7 2.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3724.2 3792.8 3860.0 4069.9 4175.8 2.6 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.0 0.1 0.9 4.8 2.7 -2.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.6 1.8 1.8 5.4 2.6 -2.8 pps
Male 1.3 1.4 2.8 5.7 2.8 -2.9 pps
Female -0.2 2.4 0.6 5.2 2.4 -2.8 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 11.4 11.0 10.6 10.3 10.2 -0.1 pps
Male 14.6 13.7 13.2 13.0 12.6 -0.4 pps
Female 7.7 8.0 7.5 7.1 7.4 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 9.1 9.5 10.9 10.8 11.4 0.6 pps
Male 9.7 10.5 11.4 11.2 11.6 0.4 pps
Female 8.4 8.5 10.4 10.3 11.1 0.8 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 6.4 6.7 6.4 6.0 5.7 -0.3 pps
Male 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 -0.1 pps
Female 8.7 9.4 9.0 8.3 7.7 -0.6 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 11.0 11.0 10.2 7.7 6.8 -0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 26.0 28.2 26.6 20.4 17.3 -3.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 10.2 10.0 9.1 6.8 6.0 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 9.2 8.4 8.1 6.4 5.8 -0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 25.2 25.0 23.8 18.6 17.4 -1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 10.7 10.8 10.0 7.4 6.4 -1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.3 4.5 4.0 3.2 2.4 -0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 11.1 11.1 10.2 7.8 6.9 -0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.8 11.1 10.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 11.1 11.3 10.2 7.6 6.6 -1.0 pps
Female 11.0 10.6 10.1 7.9 7.0 -0.9 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 47.6 45.4 48.5 47.4 45.5 -1.9 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.3 39.6 39.4 39.3 39.3 0.0 %
Male 40.9 40.3 40.0 39.8 39.9 0.3 %
Female 39.5 38.9 38.6 38.7 38.6 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -3.9 4.3 -2.7 1.5 3.5 2.0 pps
Building and construction -2.3 -0.6 0.0 3.3 1.4 -1.9 pps
Services 0.7 1.7 3.2 4.6 2.4 -2.2 pps
Manufacturing industry 3.4 -3.3 -5.7 6.7 2.3 -4.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.1 2.1 1.8 0.9 3.5 2.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.9 -1.4 -1.2 -2.3  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 5.6 5.7 2.3 3.5 3.8 0.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 5.5 5.7 3.8 3.9 4.2 0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.7 -1.8 0.9 -1.1 0.2 1.3 pps
2014-2015
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Malta 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 416 419 423 427 432 1.1 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 284 284 285 285 285 0.1 %
(% of total population) 68.3 67.7 67.2 66.7 66.0 -0.6 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 176 179 185 189 193 2.0 %
Male 113 113 115 116 118 1.3 %
Female 63 67 70 73 75 3.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 61.9 63.1 65.0 66.3 67.6 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 51.9 51.0 52.7 52.3 51.7 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.7 76.5 78.1 79.6 80.9 1.4 pps
Older (55-64) 34.2 36.0 38.5 40.3 42.3 2.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 61.8 62.9 65.0 66.2 67.5 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 61.6 67.4 65.3 68.3 68.3 -0.1 pps
Male 78.6 78.3 79.3 79.9 80.8 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 55.8 54.1 56.0 52.9 53.3 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 94.9 94.3 94.5 95.1 95.4 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 53.1 54.9 57.1 60.1 62.2 2.2 pps
Female 44.7 47.5 50.2 52.2 53.8 1.6 pps
Young (15-24) 47.8 47.8 49.6 51.7 50.0 -1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 53.9 58.2 61.1 63.5 65.8 2.3 pps
Older (55-64) 15.5 17.2 19.7 20.7 22.8 2.1 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 57.8 59.1 60.8 62.4 63.9 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 45.0 43.7 46.0 46.2 45.6 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.6 72.6 74.0 75.9 77.4 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 33.2 34.6 36.3 37.8 40.3 2.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 47.9 48.0 48.9 50.4 52.0 1.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 64.0 66.5 68.3 69.8 69.6 -0.2 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 86.2 85.4 86.6 86.5 88.6 2.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 57.9 59.0 60.9 62.5 63.9 1.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 57.5 61.4 58.5 61.2 63.4 2.3 pps
Male 73.9 73.8 74.1 74.9 76.2 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 48.1 46.6 47.5 45.7 46.0 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.0 89.7 89.6 90.6 91.2 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 51.7 53.2 54.1 56.0 58.8 2.9 pps
Female 41.5 44.0 47.1 49.4 51.0 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 41.9 40.7 44.4 46.7 45.3 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 50.8 55.0 57.9 60.6 62.8 2.2 pps
Older (55-64) 15.2 16.2 18.6 20.0 21.8 1.8 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 164.4 167.8 173.0 177.9 182.2 2.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.9 2.5 3.7 5.1 3.4 -1.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.4 2.1 3.1 2.8 2.4 -0.4 pps
Male 1.1 0.0 0.9 1.4 2.0 0.6 pps
Female 4.9 6.0 6.8 4.9 3.0 -1.8 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 13.1 13.1 13.3 13.2 13.3 0.2 pps
Male 16.9 17.1 17.7 17.3 17.6 0.3 pps
Female 5.8 6.0 6.1 6.7 6.7 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 6.5 6.8 7.5 7.7 7.4 -0.3 pps
Male 5.6 6.1 6.8 6.6 6.5 -0.1 pps
Female 8.1 8.0 8.4 9.3 8.7 -0.6 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 12.6 13.2 14.2 15.5 14.5 -1.0 pps
Male 5.4 5.7 6.7 7.0 6.3 -0.7 pps
Female 25.8 26.2 26.5 28.8 27.3 -1.5 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 6.4 6.3 6.4 5.8 5.4 -0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 13.3 14.1 13.0 11.7 11.8 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.4 5.1 5.2 4.6 4.4 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 2.9 3.8 5.7 6.3 4.8 -1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 9.1 9.6 10.0 9.2 8.8 -0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 5.2 4.1 4.2 3.7 3.6 -0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 1.8 2.6 2.6 2.6 1.8 -0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 6.4 6.3 6.3 5.7 5.4 -0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 8.4 8.7 10.9 10.1 6.9 -3.2 pps
Male 6.0 5.7 6.5 6.1 5.5 -0.6 pps
Female 7.1 7.3 6.3 5.3 5.2 -0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 47.4 48.4 45.6 46.9 43.4 -3.5 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.3 40.4 40.3 40.1 40.0 -0.2 %
Male 41.3 41.4 41.3 41.1 41.1 0.0 %
Female 38.0 38.1 38.1 38.0 37.7 -0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.5 -2.8 -3.0 -3.7 0.5 4.2 pps
Building and construction 2.8 0.6 -2.2 2.0 2.8 0.8 pps
Services 2.1 4.2 4.6 6.1 5.6 -0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.5 -2.8 1.3 2.2 -0.4 -2.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.3 3.5 1.9 1.1 2.7 1.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.0 1.6 0.0 -0.9  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 6.7 4.3 4.9 3.3 2.1 -1.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 6.9 4.3 5.0 3.2 2.1 -1.1 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) -1.1 0.3 0.7 -1.6 2.7 4.3 pps
2014-2015
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Netherlands 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 16693 16752 16800 16863 16932 0.4 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 10994 10992 11014 10980 10950 -0.3 %
(% of total population) 65.9 65.6 65.6 65.1 64.7 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8582 8684 8743 8677 8719 0.5 %
Male 4590 4632 4663 4638 4641 0.1 %
Female 3993 4053 4079 4040 4078 1.0 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 78.1 79.0 79.4 79.0 79.6 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 68.1 69.2 69.2 67.4 68.5 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.4 87.6 87.4 87.1 87.1 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 57.9 60.8 63.5 64.9 67.1 2.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 78.6 79.5 80.0 79.6 80.2 0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 67.3 69.8 68.9 69.1 69.0 -0.2 pps
Male 83.2 83.9 84.3 84.2 84.6 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 67.0 67.7 68.4 67.0 67.6 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.0 93.0 92.3 92.2 92.1 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 67.5 70.6 74.2 75.5 77.6 2.2 pps
Female 72.9 74.0 74.4 73.8 74.7 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 69.2 70.8 70.0 67.7 69.4 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.8 82.3 82.6 81.9 82.1 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 48.2 51.0 52.8 54.3 56.7 2.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 74.2 74.4 73.6 73.1 74.1 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 61.3 61.1 60.1 58.8 60.8 2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.0 83.6 82.2 81.7 82.2 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 55.2 57.6 59.2 59.9 61.7 1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 58.9 58.8 57.2 55.6 57.0 1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 77.7 77.6 76.2 76.0 76.5 0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 86.2 86.6 86.9 86.8 87.4 0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 74.8 75.0 74.4 73.9 74.9 1.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 60.4 62.1 59.3 60.5 59.8 -0.7 pps
Male 79.3 79.3 78.2 78.1 79.0 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 60.0 59.7 59.2 58.7 59.9 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.8 89.1 86.8 86.9 87.5 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 64.5 66.9 68.9 69.4 71.1 1.7 pps
Female 68.9 69.4 69.0 68.1 69.2 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 62.6 62.5 61.0 58.8 61.7 2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.1 78.1 77.5 76.5 77.0 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 45.9 48.3 49.5 50.4 52.4 2.0 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8152.2 8174.5 8103.6 8028.5 8115.5 1.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.9 -0.2 -1.2 -0.2 0.9 1.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -0.9 0.3 -0.9 -0.9 1.1 2.0 pps
Male -1.1 0.0 -1.2 -0.5 0.7 1.2 pps
Female -0.7 0.6 -0.5 -1.5 1.5 3.0 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 13.9 14.0 14.8 15.1 15.3 0.2 pps
Male 17.1 17.2 18.1 18.4 18.3 -0.1 pps
Female 10.2 10.4 11.0 11.4 12.0 0.6 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 18.1 19.2 20.2 21.1 20.0 -1.1 pps
Male 16.9 18.1 19.2 20.2 18.8 -1.4 pps
Female 19.5 20.4 21.3 22.0 21.2 -0.8 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 48.3 49.0 49.8 49.6 50.0 0.4 pps
Male 23.9 24.6 26.0 26.1 26.5 0.4 pps
Female 76.6 77.0 77.1 76.7 76.9 0.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 5.0 5.8 7.3 7.4 6.9 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 10.0 11.7 13.2 12.7 11.3 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 3.9 4.6 6.0 6.2 5.6 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 4.7 5.3 6.8 7.7 8.1 0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 7.8 9.4 11.5 12.3 11.3 -1.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.6 5.6 7.3 7.5 7.0 -0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 3.2 3.4 4.1 4.0 3.8 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.7 5.6 7.0 7.2 6.6 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 10.4 11.0 13.9 12.4 13.3 0.9 pps
Male 4.6 5.5 7.2 7.2 6.5 -0.7 pps
Female 5.4 6.2 7.3 7.8 7.3 -0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 33.1 33.5 35.3 39.4 43.2 3.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.4 41.3 41.3 41.7 41.5 -0.5 %
Male 42.0 41.8 41.9 42.2 42.1 -0.2 %
Female 39.2 39.4 39.3 39.8 39.6 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.0 -1.0 -1.5 -1.5 -0.5 1.0 pps
Building and construction -0.2 -2.5 -6.1 -3.3 -1.1 2.2 pps
Services 1.5 0.1 -0.8 0.7 2.4 1.7 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.9 -1.1 -1.8 -0.5 0.3 0.8 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.8 2.1 2.1 1.6 0.2 -1.4 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.2 1.1 0.8 1.5  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.1 3.0 1.7 1.2 0.6 -0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 1.6 2.0 1.1 -0.3 2.5 2.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.8 -0.9 1.0 1.7 1.0 -0.7 pps
2014-2015
 
Statistical annex 
Labour market data 
 
129 
Austria 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 8389 8426 8477 8544 8630 1.0 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 5601 5621 5643 5676 5721 0.8 %
(% of total population) 66.8 66.7 66.6 66.4 66.3 -0.1 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4176 4222 4261 4279 4319 0.9 %
Male 2223 2241 2257 2260 2287 1.2 %
Female 1953 1981 2004 2018 2032 0.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 74.6 75.1 75.5 75.4 75.5 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 59.2 59.2 58.8 58.0 57.4 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 88.1 88.3 88.0 88.0 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 43.1 45.5 46.9 48.6 1.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.2 75.8 76.3 76.0 76.2 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 69.9 70.4 70.4 71.6 71.5 -0.1 pps
Male 79.9 80.2 80.4 80.0 80.1 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 63.6 63.1 62.3 60.7 60.7 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.0 92.3 92.1 91.5 91.6 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 50.3 52.3 55.1 56.8 57.4 0.6 pps
Female 69.3 70.1 70.7 70.8 70.9 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 54.8 55.4 55.3 55.4 54.1 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.2 84.0 84.5 84.5 84.4 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 33.0 34.5 36.4 37.5 40.2 2.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 71.1 71.4 71.4 71.1 71.1 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 53.9 53.7 53.1 52.1 51.4 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.1 84.3 84.0 83.4 83.5 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 39.9 41.6 43.8 45.1 46.3 1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 49.0 48.3 47.3 47.5 47.2 -0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 75.7 75.8 76.2 73.8 73.5 -0.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.3 86.2 85.3 83.3 83.3 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 72.2 72.5 72.7 72.3 72.5 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 63.5 63.7 63.3 63.6 63.3 -0.2 pps
Male 76.2 76.2 76.0 75.3 75.1 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 58.1 57.1 56.4 54.3 54.0 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.4 88.3 87.5 86.6 86.6 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 48.2 50.2 52.8 54.3 54.1 -0.2 pps
Female 66.1 66.7 66.9 66.9 67.1 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 49.8 50.3 49.7 49.9 48.7 -1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.8 80.4 80.5 80.3 80.3 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 32.2 33.5 35.2 36.4 38.8 2.4 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 3982.3 4013.4 4030.0 4034.2 4067.6 0.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.6 1.0 0.3 0.9 0.6 -0.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 1.0 0.8 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.7 pps
Male 0.8 0.4 0.2 -0.3 0.9 1.2 pps
Female 1.2 1.2 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.2 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 10.9 10.8 11.0 10.9 11.0 0.1 pps
Male 13.4 13.2 13.3 13.3 13.3 0.0 pps
Female 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.3 8.4 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 9.6 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.1 -0.1 pps
Male 9.7 9.3 9.4 9.2 9.1 -0.1 pps
Female 9.4 9.3 9.0 9.2 9.1 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 24.5 25.2 26.0 26.9 27.3 0.4 pps
Male 7.8 8.0 9.0 9.6 9.8 0.2 pps
Female 43.5 44.6 45.1 46.3 46.8 0.5 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 4.6 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.7 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 8.9 9.4 9.7 10.3 10.6 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 4.0 4.3 4.9 5.2 5.2 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 3.6 3.4 3.8 3.8 4.7 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 9.3 10.1 10.6 11.8 11.5 -0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 4.0 4.5 4.8 5.1 5.5 0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 2.6 2.4 3.5 4.0 3.9 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 4.0 4.3 4.7 4.8 4.9 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.2 9.5 10.1 11.3 11.4 0.1 pps
Male 4.6 5.0 5.4 5.9 6.1 0.2 pps
Female 4.6 4.8 5.3 5.4 5.3 -0.1 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 26.2 24.9 24.6 27.2 29.2 2.0 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 42.0 41.6 41.4 41.3 40.9 -1.0 %
Male 42.8 42.4 42.2 42.0 41.5 -1.2 %
Female 40.5 40.2 39.9 39.9 39.5 -1.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -1.6 -5.5 -1.4 3.2 -6.4 -9.6 pps
Building and construction 2.0 0.9 -0.7 0.5 0.1 -0.4 pps
Services 2.4 1.7 0.5 1.0 1.2 0.2 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.7 1.3 -0.7 0.1 0.6 0.5 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.0 2.7 2.1 1.9 1.9 0.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.2 0.7 0.5 0.1  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.5 4.2 2.6 2.7 3.3 0.6 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.6 4.0 2.6 2.9 3.4 0.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 0.3 0.6 pps
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Poland 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 38526 38534 38502 38484 38455 -0.1 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 25814 25697 25525 25278 25128 -0.6 %
(% of total population) 67.0 66.7 66.3 65.7 65.3 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 16968 17086 17101 17153 17112 -0.2 %
Male 9350 9394 9409 9419 9389 -0.3 %
Female 7618 7691 7692 7734 7723 -0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 65.7 66.5 67.0 67.9 68.1 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 33.5 33.6 33.3 33.9 32.8 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.2 84.6 84.6 85.1 85.1 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 39.6 41.8 44.0 45.6 46.9 1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 65.7 66.5 67.0 67.8 68.1 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.5 71.7 71.3 73.7 67.8 -5.9 pps
Male 72.6 73.3 73.9 74.6 74.8 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 38.7 38.5 38.4 38.8 38.4 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.7 90.0 90.0 90.5 90.6 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 51.6 53.5 55.9 57.2 57.5 0.4 pps
Female 58.9 59.7 60.1 61.1 61.4 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 28.1 28.4 27.9 28.7 26.9 -1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.6 79.1 79.1 79.6 79.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 29.0 31.3 33.3 35.2 37.3 2.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 59.3 59.7 60.0 61.7 62.9 1.2 pps
Young (15-24) 24.9 24.7 24.2 25.8 26.0 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.3 77.2 77.0 78.4 79.5 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 36.9 38.7 40.6 42.5 44.3 1.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 23.4 23.4 22.4 22.7 23.3 0.6 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 62.0 61.7 61.6 62.9 64.0 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 82.2 82.1 82.3 83.9 85.0 1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 59.3 59.7 60.0 61.7 62.9 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 62.4 66.1 60.8 66.0 62.4 -3.6 pps
Male 66.0 66.3 66.6 68.2 69.2 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 29.6 29.3 28.6 30.0 30.5 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.0 82.9 82.7 83.9 84.9 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 47.8 49.3 51.3 53.1 54.2 1.0 pps
Female 52.7 53.1 53.4 55.2 56.6 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 20.0 19.9 19.5 21.4 21.3 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.5 71.5 71.2 72.7 73.9 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 27.2 29.2 31.0 32.9 35.5 2.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 15312.8 15340.3 15313.3 15591.0 15811.6 1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.6 0.1 -0.1 1.7 1.4 -0.3 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.5 0.2 -0.2 1.8 1.4 -0.4 pps
Male 0.9 0.0 -0.1 1.4 1.0 -0.5 pps
Female 0.0 0.4 -0.2 2.3 2.0 -0.3 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 18.7 18.4 18.1 17.9 17.9 0.0 pps
Male 22.3 22.2 21.9 21.9 21.8 0.0 pps
Female 14.2 13.8 13.4 13.0 13.1 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 26.8 26.8 26.8 28.3 28.0 -0.3 pps
Male 27.5 27.3 27.2 28.5 28.0 -0.5 pps
Female 26.1 26.2 26.3 28.0 27.9 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.1 6.8 -0.3 pps
Male 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.2 -0.2 pps
Female 10.5 10.6 10.4 10.3 9.9 -0.4 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 9.7 10.1 10.3 9.0 7.5 -1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 25.8 26.5 27.3 23.9 20.8 -3.1 pps
Prime age (25-49) 8.2 8.8 9.0 7.9 6.6 -1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 6.9 7.4 7.7 6.8 5.4 -1.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 19.1 20.3 21.3 19.7 17.3 -2.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 10.5 11.0 11.5 10.2 8.4 -1.8 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.3 5.7 5.7 4.7 4.0 -0.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 9.8 10.2 10.4 9.1 7.6 -1.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 14.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 9.0 9.4 9.7 8.5 7.3 -1.2 pps
Female 10.4 10.9 11.1 9.6 7.7 -1.9 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 37.2 40.3 42.5 42.7 39.3 -3.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.1 41.0 40.8 41.1 41.1 0.0 %
Male 42.5 42.4 42.2 42.3 42.3 0.0 %
Female 39.2 39.2 39.0 39.4 39.4 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -0.5 -2.4 -4.8 -2.6 1.7 4.3 pps
Building and construction 2.1 -2.8 -5.5 -0.9 1.6 2.5 pps
Services 1.2 1.2 -0.5 3.6 1.4 -2.2 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.3 -0.5 2.2 2.2 2.5 0.3 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 5.3 3.6 1.7 2.2 -0.1 -2.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.0 1.2 1.3 1.7  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 4.3 3.1 3.4 3.5 4.0 0.5 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 4.3 3.1 3.4 3.5 3.9 0.4 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 4.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 2.2 0.7 pps
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Portugal 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 10558 10515 10457 10401 10358 -0.4 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 6979 6930 6859 6794 6743 -0.8 %
(% of total population) 66.1 65.9 65.6 65.3 65.1 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 5138 5087 5010 4976 4949 -0.5 %
Male 2655 2609 2550 2523 2501 -0.8 %
Female 2484 2478 2460 2454 2448 -0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 73.6 73.4 73.0 73.2 73.4 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 38.2 37.1 35.0 34.3 33.5 -0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.4 88.5 88.3 88.6 88.8 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 53.6 53.3 54.4 55.3 57.0 1.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 73.3 73.2 72.9 73.2 73.3 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 81.9 80.0 77.5 76.3 76.7 0.5 pps
Male 78.0 77.3 76.5 76.7 76.7 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 40.4 39.2 36.2 34.8 34.2 -0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.4 92.1 91.1 91.6 91.7 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 61.6 60.4 62.7 64.0 65.0 1.0 pps
Female 69.5 69.7 69.8 70.0 70.3 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 35.9 34.9 33.8 33.8 32.8 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.5 85.0 85.5 85.8 86.0 0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 46.4 47.0 46.9 47.5 49.9 2.4 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 63.8 61.4 60.6 62.6 63.9 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 26.6 23.0 21.7 22.4 22.8 0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.8 75.5 74.6 77.4 78.8 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 47.8 46.5 46.9 47.8 49.9 2.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 59.1 56.2 54.7 55.4 56.3 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 65.5 62.9 63.5 65.9 66.9 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 81.0 78.7 76.9 79.4 80.4 0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 63.8 61.5 60.8 62.7 64.0 1.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 63.6 58.7 54.9 59.4 61.4 2.0 pps
Male 67.7 64.5 63.5 65.8 66.9 1.1 pps
Young (15-24) 28.7 24.8 22.9 22.9 24.1 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.7 78.6 77.1 80.6 81.8 1.2 pps
Older (55-64) 54.2 51.6 53.5 54.3 56.0 1.7 pps
Female 60.1 58.5 57.9 59.6 61.1 1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 24.5 21.2 20.4 21.9 21.5 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.1 72.5 72.2 74.3 76.1 1.8 pps
Older (55-64) 42.0 42.0 41.0 42.0 44.5 2.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4453.2 4255.9 4158.0 4254.5 4309.0 1.3 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -1.9 -4.1 -2.9 1.4 1.4 0.0 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -2.7 -4.4 -2.3 2.3 1.3 -1.0 pps
Male -3.5 -5.6 -2.8 2.2 0.8 -1.4 pps
Female -1.8 -3.2 -1.8 2.4 1.7 -0.7 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 16.8 17.0 17.1 15.5 14.5 -1.0 pps
Male 20.1 20.4 20.4 19.3 17.8 -1.4 pps
Female 13.2 13.4 13.6 11.7 11.1 -0.6 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 22.0 20.5 21.4 21.4 22.0 0.6 pps
Male 21.7 20.7 21.2 21.6 22.4 0.8 pps
Female 22.2 20.4 21.6 21.1 21.5 0.4 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 10.3 11.2 11.1 10.1 9.8 -0.3 pps
Male 7.1 8.4 8.2 7.6 7.1 -0.5 pps
Female 13.8 14.2 14.0 12.6 12.5 -0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 12.9 15.8 16.4 14.1 12.6 -1.5 pps
Young (15-24) 30.3 37.9 38.1 34.8 32.0 -2.8 pps
Prime age (25-49) 11.9 14.7 15.5 12.7 11.2 -1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 10.8 12.7 13.7 13.5 12.5 -1.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.6 17.4 18.4 16.2 14.2 -2.0 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 13.5 17.7 17.5 15.3 14.0 -1.3 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 9.1 11.8 12.8 10.1 9.3 -0.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 13.0 16.0 16.6 14.3 12.7 -1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 22.3 26.6 29.2 22.1 20.0 -2.1 pps
Male 12.6 15.9 16.3 13.8 12.4 -1.4 pps
Female 13.2 15.6 16.6 14.5 12.9 -1.6 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 48.3 48.7 56.3 59.5 57.2 -2.3 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.3 41.5 41.5 41.5 41.4 -0.2 %
Male 42.3 42.6 42.6 42.4 42.4 0.0 %
Female 40.1 40.2 40.3 40.4 40.3 -0.2 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.8 1.9 -5.4 -4.6 -7.0 -2.4 pps
Building and construction -9.3 -20.3 -10.2 -4.7 1.5 6.2 pps
Services -0.6 -4.4 -2.2 4.8 3.2 -1.7 pps
Manufacturing industry -1.9 -3.8 -1.8 2.3 3.7 1.4 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee -1.8 -3.1 3.6 -1.8 -0.3 1.5 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -1.6 -2.7 1.3 -2.5  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 1.4 -5.7 -0.7 -1.0 2.8 3.8 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 0.2 -4.4 -1.3 -1.2 3.1 4.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.1 0.1 1.8 -0.5 0.2 0.7 pps
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Romania 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 20148 20060 19986 19913 19871 -0.2 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 13726 13658 13606 13527 13404 -0.9 %
(% of total population) 68.1 68.1 68.1 67.9 67.5 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8799 8849 8832 8883 8858 -0.3 %
Male 4952 5003 5021 5061 5099 0.8 %
Female 3847 3846 3811 3822 3759 -1.6 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 64.1 64.8 64.9 65.7 66.1 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 30.7 30.5 30.1 29.6 31.3 1.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.9 81.5 81.5 82.1 82.5 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 43.0 43.4 44.6 42.7 -1.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.1 64.8 64.9 65.7 66.1 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 72.1 73.2 73.4 74.3 75.3 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 35.3 35.3 35.1 34.8 37.0 2.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 89.0 89.9 90.0 90.5 91.6 1.1 pps
Older (55-64) 51.3 53.6 53.9 55.4 53.8 -1.6 pps
Female 56.1 56.4 56.3 56.9 56.7 -0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 25.8 25.5 24.7 23.9 25.2 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 72.6 72.9 72.7 73.3 72.9 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 32.7 33.7 34.1 35.0 32.8 -2.2 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 59.3 60.2 60.1 61.0 61.4 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 23.4 23.7 22.9 22.5 24.5 2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 75.8 76.6 76.3 77.1 77.4 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 39.9 41.6 41.8 43.1 41.1 -2.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 40.9 42.0 42.2 44.4 42.6 -1.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 63.6 64.2 63.7 65.0 64.9 0.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 83.1 82.5 82.6 82.5 85.3 2.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 59.3 60.2 60.1 61.0 61.4 0.4 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) : 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 66.3 67.6 67.6 68.7 69.5 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 26.8 27.5 27.0 26.6 29.4 2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.1 84.1 83.7 84.6 85.2 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 48.6 51.2 51.4 53.2 51.2 -1.9 pps
Female 52.3 52.8 52.6 53.3 53.2 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 19.7 19.6 18.6 18.0 19.3 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 68.3 68.9 68.6 69.3 69.2 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 32.2 33.1 33.2 34.2 32.1 -2.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 8139.4 8221.6 8178.9 8254.4 8234.8 -0.2 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -0.8 -4.8 -0.9 0.8 -0.9 -1.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -2.0 1.0 -0.5 0.9 -0.2 -1.2 pps
Male -2.8 1.5 0.0 1.2 0.6 -0.6 pps
Female -0.9 0.4 -1.2 0.5 -1.3 -1.8 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 18.6 18.9 18.8 18.4 17.6 -0.8 pps
Male 24.1 24.5 24.3 23.8 22.5 -1.2 pps
Female 11.6 11.8 11.7 11.5 11.1 -0.3 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 -0.1 pps
Male 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.7 1.6 -0.1 pps
Female 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 -0.1 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 9.5 9.3 9.0 8.7 8.8 0.1 pps
Male 8.8 8.7 8.6 8.2 8.5 0.3 pps
Female 10.3 10.0 9.6 9.5 9.2 -0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.2 6.8 7.1 6.8 6.8 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 23.9 22.6 23.7 24.0 21.7 -2.3 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.3 6.1 6.4 6.1 6.2 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 3.7 3.4 3.7 3.3 3.7 0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 8.5 7.9 7.9 7.7 9.1 1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.9 7.4 7.8 7.2 7.3 0.1 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.8 5.1 5.4 5.9 4.1 -1.8 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.5 7.1 7.4 7.1 7.0 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 7.7 7.4 7.7 7.3 7.5 0.2 pps
Female 6.5 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.8 -0.3 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 41.0 44.2 45.2 41.1 43.9 2.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.6 40.5 40.4 40.4 40.1 -0.7 %
Male 41.2 41.1 40.9 40.8 40.5 -0.7 %
Female 39.9 39.7 39.7 39.8 39.5 -0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -6.0 -2.7 -2.2 -2.1 -10.1 -8.0 pps
Building and construction -3.5 -6.5 -1.1 1.6 -4.7 -6.3 pps
Services 3.3 -3.8 1.2 3.3 6.0 2.7 pps
Manufacturing industry 2.0 -7.8 0.2 3.9 -2.2 -6.1 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee -4.1 9.4 3.8 5.3 2.7 -2.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -8.4 4.5 0.4 3.5  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 6.6 6.5 3.9 5.4 7.6 2.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 7.1 6.4 3.4 6.8 7.6 0.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.9 5.7 4.4 2.1 4.7 2.6 pps
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Slovenia 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 2053 2057 2060 2062 2063 0.1 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 1421 1415 1404 1397 1382 -1.1 %
(% of total population) 69.2 68.8 68.2 67.8 67.0 -0.8 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 998 996 990 991 992 0.1 %
Male 540 536 536 535 536 0.1 %
Female 459 460 454 456 456 0.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 70.3 70.4 70.5 70.9 71.8 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 37.4 34.4 33.9 33.6 35.3 1.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.1 90.8 90.7 90.3 90.8 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 33.3 35.1 36.0 38.4 39.7 1.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 70.2 70.3 70.4 71.0 71.5 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 73.2 74.4 75.4 67.8 77.6 9.8 pps
Male 73.9 73.7 74.2 74.3 75.4 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 41.9 38.2 37.2 36.6 38.9 2.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.8 92.4 92.6 92.2 92.9 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 42.7 43.6 45.1 45.7 46.3 0.7 pps
Female 66.4 66.9 66.6 67.2 67.9 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 32.3 30.0 30.2 30.5 31.7 1.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 88.4 89.1 88.7 88.3 88.6 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 23.7 26.4 27.0 31.1 32.9 1.8 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.4 64.1 63.3 63.9 65.2 1.3 pps
Young (15-24) 31.5 27.3 26.5 26.8 29.6 2.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.1 83.3 81.9 81.9 82.9 1.0 pps
Older (55-64) 31.2 32.9 33.5 35.4 36.6 1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 35.3 34.6 33.7 36.1 35.7 -0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 66.4 65.8 64.6 64.9 65.9 1.0 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 85.5 84.2 82.4 82.0 83.1 1.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.4 64.1 63.5 64.2 65.2 1.0 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 64.6 62.8 56.7 55.1 66.3 11.2 pps
Male 67.7 67.4 67.1 67.5 69.2 1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 35.7 30.4 29.7 29.5 32.0 2.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.8 85.4 84.3 84.6 86.1 1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 39.5 40.7 41.8 41.7 42.6 0.8 pps
Female 60.9 60.5 59.2 60.0 61.0 1.0 pps
Young (15-24) 26.9 23.8 23.0 23.9 27.0 3.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 81.3 81.0 79.3 79.1 79.5 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 22.8 25.1 25.3 29.0 30.5 1.5 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 914.8 906.5 888.1 892.5 901.6 1.0 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) -1.7 -0.9 -1.1 0.4 1.1 0.7 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -2.8 -0.9 -2.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 pps
Male -2.9 -0.9 -1.2 0.3 1.2 0.9 pps
Female -2.7 -1.0 -3.0 0.7 0.8 0.1 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 11.9 11.6 11.6 12.1 12.1 0.0 pps
Male 15.5 15.3 15.3 15.9 15.7 -0.1 pps
Female 7.6 7.3 7.2 7.7 7.8 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 18.0 17.0 16.3 16.5 17.8 1.3 pps
Male 16.4 15.6 15.6 16.0 17.0 1.0 pps
Female 19.7 18.5 17.1 17.1 18.7 1.6 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 9.5 9.0 9.3 10.0 10.1 0.1 pps
Male 7.1 6.3 6.5 6.8 7.0 0.2 pps
Female 12.2 12.2 12.6 13.7 13.7 0.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.2 8.9 10.1 9.7 9.0 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 15.7 20.6 21.6 20.2 16.3 -3.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 7.8 8.3 9.7 9.3 8.7 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 6.3 6.2 7.0 7.8 7.8 0.0 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.4 15.7 18.8 16.4 14.6 -1.8 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.7 9.2 10.8 10.5 10.0 -0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 5.8 -0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.3 8.8 9.8 9.6 8.9 -0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 11.9 15.5 25.0 18.8 14.6 -4.2 pps
Male 8.2 8.4 9.5 9.0 8.1 -0.9 pps
Female 8.2 9.4 10.9 10.6 10.1 -0.5 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 44.2 47.9 51.0 54.5 52.3 -2.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.7 40.6 40.9 41.0 41.0 0.0 %
Male 41.3 41.2 41.4 41.5 41.6 0.2 %
Female 40.0 39.8 40.1 40.4 40.2 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.5 -1.0 0.0 -0.1 -2.4 -2.3 pps
Building and construction -11.7 -7.6 -7.0 -1.1 0.4 1.5 pps
Services -1.4 -0.5 -0.7 0.7 2.1 1.4 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.4 -1.5 -2.1 0.2 1.4 1.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.5 -1.0 0.5 1.3 1.4 0.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.4 -1.3 -0.4 0.5  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.2 0.7 -1.1 2.4 1.4 -1.0 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.4 1.3 -1.1 2.5 1.0 -1.5 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 2.4 -1.8 0.0 2.7 1.2 -1.5 pps
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Slovak Republic 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 5398 5406 5413 5419 5422 0.1 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3882 3881 3870 3853 3834 -0.5 %
(% of total population) 71.9 71.8 71.5 71.1 70.7 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2668 2695 2703 2707 2719 0.4 %
Male 1488 1500 1498 1501 1493 -0.5 %
Female 1180 1195 1205 1206 1226 1.7 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 68.7 69.4 69.9 70.3 70.9 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 30.1 30.5 30.8 31.0 31.7 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.0 87.1 87.2 87.3 87.3 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 46.0 48.5 49.5 50.1 51.8 1.7 pps
Nationals (15-64) 68.7 69.4 69.8 70.2 70.9 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 72.9 78.7 87.5 81.5 81.8 0.3 pps
Male 76.6 77.1 77.2 77.6 77.5 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 37.2 37.1 37.5 38.0 38.3 0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.5 93.8 93.6 94.0 93.6 -0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 58.8 60.3 59.5 58.9 58.4 -0.5 pps
Female 60.8 61.7 62.5 62.9 64.3 1.4 pps
Young (15-24) 22.7 23.6 23.7 23.6 24.9 1.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.4 80.4 80.5 80.4 80.8 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 34.6 38.0 40.4 42.2 45.8 3.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 59.3 59.7 59.9 61.0 62.7 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 20.0 20.1 20.4 21.8 23.3 1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 76.5 76.4 76.0 76.8 78.2 1.3 pps
Older (55-64) 41.4 43.1 44.0 44.8 47.0 2.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.8 15.0 15.8 17.7 18.4 0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 65.4 65.8 65.6 66.9 68.6 1.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 76.7 74.8 74.7 75.6 76.5 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 59.3 59.7 59.9 60.9 62.7 1.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 67.8 68.9 78.1 77.8 77.3 -0.5 pps
Male 66.1 66.7 66.4 67.6 69.5 1.8 pps
Young (15-24) 24.8 24.1 24.4 26.9 28.4 1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.5 83.0 82.2 83.2 85.1 1.9 pps
Older (55-64) 52.5 53.7 53.2 53.2 53.6 0.4 pps
Female 52.5 52.7 53.4 54.3 55.9 1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 15.0 15.9 16.2 16.5 18.0 1.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.4 69.6 69.6 70.2 71.0 0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 31.4 33.6 35.7 37.2 41.0 3.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2303.2 2317.2 2317.7 2349.2 2405.1 2.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.8 0.1 -0.8 1.4 2.0 0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) -0.2 0.6 0.0 1.4 2.4 1.0 pps
Male 0.5 0.9 -0.6 1.5 2.3 0.7 pps
Female -1.0 0.2 0.8 1.2 2.5 1.4 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 15.8 15.3 15.4 15.2 14.9 -0.4 pps
Male 20.8 19.7 20.1 19.6 18.8 -0.8 pps
Female 9.6 9.7 9.6 9.7 10.0 0.2 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 6.5 6.7 6.8 8.8 10.5 1.7 pps
Male 6.3 6.4 6.6 9.0 9.8 0.8 pps
Female 6.8 7.2 7.0 8.5 11.3 2.8 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.8 0.7 pps
Male 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.7 4.0 0.3 pps
Female 5.6 5.5 6.2 6.8 8.0 1.2 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 13.7 14.0 14.2 13.2 11.5 -1.7 pps
Young (15-24) 33.4 34.0 33.7 29.7 26.5 -3.2 pps
Prime age (25-49) 12.1 12.4 12.8 12.0 10.5 -1.5 pps
Older (55-64) 10.1 11.2 11.0 10.6 9.3 -1.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 42.6 44.7 42.6 41.4 37.7 -3.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 13.4 13.5 14.0 12.6 11.0 -1.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.9 6.9 7.3 6.4 6.1 -0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 13.7 14.0 14.3 13.2 11.6 -1.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 pps
Male 13.7 13.5 14.0 12.8 10.3 -2.5 pps
Female 13.7 14.5 14.5 13.6 12.9 -0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 67.9 67.3 70.2 70.2 65.8 -4.4 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.4 40.4 40.5 40.0 40.2 0.5 %
Male 41.2 41.2 41.3 40.9 40.9 0.0 %
Female 39.2 39.3 39.4 38.9 39.2 0.8 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -0.1 -3.4 4.8 -2.1 2.6 4.7 pps
Building and construction -3.5 -3.1 -3.0 -1.4 -1.3 0.1 pps
Services 3.1 2.0 -0.9 1.6 3.0 1.4 pps
Manufacturing industry 4.0 -0.7 -1.5 2.0 2.0 0.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.0 2.6 2.6 1.8 3.1 1.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.4 1.3 2.0 2.0  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 4.5 2.4 2.7 4.9 4.0 -0.9 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 4.0 2.3 1.5 5.1 4.3 -0.8 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.0 1.6 2.3 1.1 1.8 0.7 pps
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Finland 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 5388 5414 5439 5463 5481 0.3 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 3518 3505 3489 3472 3455 -0.5 %
(% of total population) 65.3 64.7 64.1 63.6 63.0 -0.5 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2637 2637 2622 2617 2619 0.1 %
Male 1366 1359 1350 1344 1343 -0.1 %
Female 1271 1278 1272 1274 1277 0.3 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 74.9 75.2 75.2 75.4 75.8 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 50.5 51.6 51.8 52.1 52.2 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.6 87.3 86.8 86.6 86.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 60.9 62.3 62.9 63.8 65.2 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.2 75.4 75.3 75.6 76.1 0.5 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 67.6 70.2 70.2 68.8 67.9 -0.9 pps
Male 77.2 77.1 76.8 76.8 77.2 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 50.5 51.2 50.7 51.5 51.1 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.9 90.4 90.1 89.5 89.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 61.4 61.6 61.5 61.9 63.2 1.2 pps
Female 72.7 73.4 73.4 73.9 74.4 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 50.5 52.0 52.9 52.6 53.3 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.3 84.1 83.3 83.6 83.6 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 60.4 62.9 64.3 65.5 67.2 1.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 69.0 69.4 68.9 68.7 68.5 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 40.4 41.8 41.5 41.4 40.5 -0.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.3 82.0 81.0 80.5 80.0 -0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 57.0 58.2 58.5 59.1 60.0 0.9 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 41.2 41.0 39.7 39.3 37.9 -1.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 72.2 72.2 71.2 70.6 70.2 -0.4 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 84.3 84.2 83.8 83.3 82.9 -0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 69.4 69.7 69.2 69.2 69.0 -0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 56.1 58.9 58.7 56.7 55.9 -0.8 pps
Male 70.6 70.5 69.9 69.5 69.3 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 39.5 41.0 39.1 39.8 38.2 -1.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 84.8 84.4 83.9 82.7 82.5 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 56.8 56.6 56.5 56.8 57.4 0.6 pps
Female 67.4 68.2 67.8 68.0 67.7 -0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 41.2 42.7 43.9 43.0 42.8 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.6 79.4 78.1 78.1 77.3 -0.8 pps
Older (55-64) 57.2 59.7 60.5 61.4 62.5 1.1 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 2428.5 2431.0 2403.2 2385.9 2367.9 -0.8 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 1.3 0.9 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.8 0.1 -1.1 -0.7 -0.8 0.0 pps
Male 1.2 -0.4 -1.3 -1.1 -0.7 0.3 pps
Female 0.3 0.6 -1.0 -0.4 -0.8 -0.4 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 12.2 12.3 12.2 12.6 12.7 0.1 pps
Male 16.2 16.4 16.3 16.5 16.7 0.1 pps
Female 8.0 8.0 7.9 8.4 8.5 0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 15.5 15.5 15.3 15.4 15.1 -0.3 pps
Male 12.6 12.6 12.2 12.3 12.3 0.0 pps
Female 18.4 18.2 18.3 18.2 17.8 -0.4 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 14.1 14.1 14.0 14.1 14.1 0.0 pps
Male 9.4 9.1 8.8 9.2 9.7 0.5 pps
Female 19.0 19.4 19.4 19.3 18.7 -0.6 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.8 7.7 8.2 8.7 9.4 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 20.1 19.0 19.9 20.5 22.4 1.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.1 6.1 6.6 7.1 7.7 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 6.4 6.6 7.0 7.3 8.0 0.7 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 16.7 16.6 17.8 18.0 18.7 0.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.3 8.3 8.9 9.5 10.4 0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.0 3.9 4.5 5.1 6.1 1.0 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.7 7.6 8.1 8.5 9.3 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 16.8 16.3 16.5 17.6 17.6 0.0 pps
Male 8.4 8.3 8.8 9.3 9.9 0.6 pps
Female 7.1 7.1 7.5 8.0 8.8 0.8 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 22.2 21.3 20.8 22.4 24.6 2.2 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 39.0 38.7 38.5 38.4 38.5 0.3 %
Male 40.5 40.2 40.0 39.8 40.0 0.5 %
Female 37.1 36.9 36.7 36.7 36.7 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -3.6 -0.5 -2.1 -0.9 -3.0 -2.1 pps
Building and construction 2.7 -0.3 -1.3 -1.3 1.0 2.3 pps
Services 1.6 1.6 -0.3 0.4 0.0 -0.4 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.1 -0.3 -3.8 -2.8 -1.3 1.5 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.6 2.8 1.3 1.0 1.6 0.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.0 -0.2 -1.2 -0.7  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.5 4.2 1.8 1.7 1.4 -0.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.3 4.2 2.0 1.5 1.2 -0.3 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.3 -2.3 0.0 -0.2 0.6 0.8 pps
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Sweden 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 9449 9519 9600 9696 9799 1.1 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 6115 6114 6120 6141 6170 0.5 %
(% of total population) 64.7 64.2 63.8 63.3 63.0 -0.4 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4887 4909 4963 5005 5044 0.8 %
Male 2561 2567 2592 2612 2624 0.5 %
Female 2326 2342 2371 2393 2420 1.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 79.9 80.3 81.1 81.5 81.7 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 53.0 52.6 54.5 55.4 55.1 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 90.3 90.6 90.9 90.8 90.9 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 76.0 77.0 77.5 78.2 78.7 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 80.6 81.0 81.8 82.2 82.5 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 70.6 70.3 72.5 73.5 73.1 -0.4 pps
Male 82.4 82.6 83.3 83.6 83.5 -0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 53.2 51.8 53.9 54.9 53.8 -1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 93.2 93.5 93.6 93.5 93.3 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 79.9 80.9 81.6 81.5 81.8 0.3 pps
Female 77.3 77.9 78.8 79.3 79.9 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 52.8 53.4 55.2 56.1 56.5 0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.3 87.6 88.1 88.0 88.4 0.4 pps
Older (55-64) 72.1 73.0 73.4 74.9 75.5 0.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 73.6 73.8 74.4 74.9 75.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 40.9 40.2 41.7 42.8 43.9 1.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.1 85.2 85.4 85.4 85.6 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 72.0 73.0 73.6 74.0 74.5 0.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 46.9 46.3 45.5 45.9 46.0 0.1 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 79.6 79.7 80.3 80.2 80.9 0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 86.9 87.0 87.3 87.3 87.7 0.3 pps
Nationals (15-64) 74.8 75.1 75.8 76.2 77.0 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 56.0 55.6 57.3 58.4 57.7 -0.7 pps
Male 75.8 75.6 76.3 76.5 77.0 0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 40.8 38.8 40.5 41.6 42.4 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 87.9 87.8 88.0 87.9 87.9 0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 75.2 76.3 76.9 76.5 76.8 0.4 pps
Female 71.3 71.8 72.5 73.1 74.0 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 41.0 41.6 42.9 44.0 45.5 1.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 82.2 82.5 82.7 82.8 83.3 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 68.9 69.6 70.3 71.5 72.1 0.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 4498.1 4509.6 4554.3 4597.5 4659.9 1.4 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 2.1 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.5 0.1 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 2.2 0.3 1.0 0.9 1.4 0.4 pps
Male 1.9 -0.2 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.5 pps
Female 2.5 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.3 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 9.3 9.2 9.4 9.1 8.9 -0.2 pps
Male 12.9 12.8 12.9 12.4 12.1 -0.3 pps
Female 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.4 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 16.5 15.9 16.3 16.8 16.6 -0.2 pps
Male 14.5 13.8 14.0 14.7 14.9 0.2 pps
Female 18.5 18.0 18.6 18.8 18.3 -0.5 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 25.2 25.0 24.7 24.6 24.3 -0.3 pps
Male 12.3 12.5 12.8 12.8 13.2 0.4 pps
Female 39.3 38.6 37.7 37.3 36.3 -1.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 7.8 8.0 8.0 7.9 7.4 -0.5 pps
Young (15-24) 22.8 23.6 23.5 22.9 20.4 -2.5 pps
Prime age (25-49) 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.0 5.8 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.3 -0.1 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 17.1 18.2 19.5 20.0 19.7 -0.3 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.1 6.4 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 -0.1 pps
Nationals (15-64) 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.2 6.6 -0.6 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 20.7 21.0 21.0 20.6 21.1 0.5 pps
Male 7.8 8.2 8.2 8.2 7.5 -0.7 pps
Female 7.7 7.7 7.9 7.7 7.3 -0.4 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 19.6 19.0 18.6 19.0 20.8 1.8 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 39.7 39.6 39.4 39.2 39.1 -0.3 %
Male 40.5 40.3 40.2 39.9 39.8 -0.3 %
Female 38.4 38.4 38.2 38.1 37.9 -0.5 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture 9.3 1.7 0.5 -0.1 3.6 3.7 pps
Building and construction 4.9 1.8 0.9 2.5 2.4 -0.1 pps
Services 2.5 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.7 0.2 pps
Manufacturing industry 1.3 -1.9 -2.2 -1.1 -0.5 0.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 3.2 3.1 1.9 2.2 3.5 1.2 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 2.0 2.0 0.9 0.4  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.7 4.0 1.8 2.7 2.8 0.1 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.4 3.4 2.2 2.5 2.5 0.0 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 0.5 -1.0 0.3 1.2 2.6 1.4 pps
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United Kingdom 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 63285 63705 64106 64597 65110 0.8 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 40980 40970 40991 41118 41291 0.4 %
(% of total population) 64.8 64.3 63.9 63.7 63.4 -0.2 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 30943 31161 31334 31534 31754 0.7 %
Male 16553 16650 16685 16755 16849 0.6 %
Female 14390 14511 14649 14779 14905 0.9 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 75.5 76.1 76.4 76.7 76.9 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 58.2 58.6 58.3 57.8 58.6 0.8 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.3 85.5 85.7 86.0 85.8 -0.2 pps
Older (55-64) 59.7 61.1 62.8 63.5 64.4 0.9 pps
Nationals (15-64) 75.7 76.3 76.6 76.9 77.0 0.1 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 74.1 73.8 74.5 74.9 75.9 1.1 pps
Male 81.5 82.0 82.1 82.2 82.2 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 60.7 60.9 60.2 59.5 60.1 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.7 92.0 92.0 92.2 91.9 -0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 68.4 69.5 70.6 70.9 71.4 0.4 pps
Female 69.6 70.2 70.9 71.3 71.7 0.4 pps
Young (15-24) 55.7 56.3 56.4 56.1 57.1 1.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 79.0 79.2 79.5 79.9 79.9 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 51.3 53.0 55.3 56.4 57.7 1.3 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 69.3 69.9 70.5 71.9 72.7 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 45.8 46.2 46.3 48.0 50.1 2.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 80.1 80.5 80.8 82.1 82.4 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 56.7 58.1 59.8 61.0 62.2 1.2 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 52.4 53.0 53.2 55.0 55.9 0.9 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 71.5 71.3 71.4 72.7 73.3 0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 82.6 83.1 83.8 84.3 84.7 0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 69.6 70.2 70.9 72.2 72.9 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 67.1 66.9 67.6 69.4 71.0 1.5 pps
Male 74.3 75.0 75.4 76.8 77.6 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 46.3 46.4 46.4 48.2 50.4 2.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.9 86.6 86.7 88.0 88.3 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 64.1 65.4 66.8 67.8 68.7 0.9 pps
Female 64.4 64.9 65.8 67.1 67.9 0.9 pps
Young (15-24) 45.3 46.0 46.2 47.8 49.7 1.9 pps
Prime age (25-54) 74.4 74.5 75.1 76.2 76.6 0.3 pps
Older (55-64) 49.5 51.0 53.0 54.4 56.0 1.6 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 28404.2 28650.0 28916.7 29559.8 30027.5 1.6 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.5 1.1 1.2 2.4 1.8 -0.6 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.4 0.9 0.9 2.2 1.6 -0.6 pps
Male 0.4 1.0 0.6 2.2 1.5 -0.7 pps
Female 0.4 0.8 1.3 2.2 1.6 -0.6 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 13.1 13.5 13.4 14.0 13.6 -0.3 pps
Male 17.3 17.7 17.4 18.0 17.4 -0.5 pps
Female 8.3 8.7 8.9 9.5 9.4 -0.1 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 6.0 6.2 6.1 6.3 6.1 -0.2 pps
Male 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.8 5.6 -0.2 pps
Female 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.8 6.5 -0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 25.6 26.0 25.6 25.4 25.2 -0.2 pps
Male 11.0 11.6 11.5 11.2 11.2 0.0 pps
Female 42.2 42.3 41.5 41.3 41.0 -0.3 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 8.1 7.9 7.6 6.1 5.3 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 21.3 21.2 20.7 17.0 14.6 -2.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 6.1 6.0 5.7 4.6 4.0 -0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.0 3.4 -0.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 14.6 14.4 14.4 11.7 10.0 -1.7 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.7 8.7 8.4 7.0 6.1 -0.9 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 4.4 4.3 4.0 3.2 3.0 -0.2 pps
Nationals (15-64) 8.1 7.9 7.6 6.2 5.3 -0.9 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 9.5 9.3 9.2 7.2 6.5 -0.7 pps
Male 8.7 8.4 8.0 6.4 5.5 -0.9 pps
Female 7.4 7.4 7.1 5.8 5.1 -0.7 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 33.4 34.6 36.2 35.7 30.6 -5.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 41.1 41.3 41.3 41.3 41.3 0.0 %
Male 42.4 42.6 42.6 42.6 42.6 0.0 %
Female 38.6 38.9 38.9 39.1 39.0 -0.3 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.1 0.6 -11.2 13.1 -6.2 -19.3 pps
Building and construction -1.4 -0.7 -0.1 3.1 4.7 1.6 pps
Services 1.2 2.1 1.7 3.0 2.4 -0.5 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.3 0.6 -0.7 1.1 2.1 1.0 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.1 1.7 2.1 0.4 1.0 0.6 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP -0.9 0.2 0.2 -1.2  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.0 1.2 1.1 1.7 3.9 2.2 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 1.9 0.9 1.0 1.7 3.6 1.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.0 0.2 0.7 0.7 0.5 -0.2 pps
2014-2015
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European Union (28 countries) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 504784 505981 506986 508139 509657 0.3 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 330488 329878 329066 329419 328936 -0.1 %
(% of total population) 65.5 65.2 64.9 64.8 64.5 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 234931 236367 236803 238134 238514 0.2 %
Male 127534 127931 127818 128266 128421 0.1 %
Female 107397 108436 108985 109868 110093 0.2 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 71.1 71.7 72.0 72.3 72.5 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 42.5 42.3 42.0 41.7 41.5 -0.2 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.0 85.4 85.4 85.5 85.4 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 50.6 52.5 54.3 55.9 57.3 1.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.0 71.6 72.0 72.3 72.6 0.3 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 71.9 71.8 71.8 71.7 71.6 -0.1 pps
Male 77.5 77.8 77.9 78.1 78.3 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 45.4 45.2 44.8 44.4 44.1 -0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 91.6 91.8 91.5 91.5 91.4 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 59.3 61.0 62.6 63.9 65.0 1.1 pps
Female 64.8 65.5 66.0 66.5 66.8 0.3 pps
Young (15-24) 39.4 39.3 39.2 38.8 38.7 -0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.4 79.0 79.2 79.4 79.4 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 42.6 44.6 46.5 48.4 50.0 1.6 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.2 64.1 64.1 64.8 65.6 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 33.3 32.5 32.1 32.4 33.0 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.7 77.3 76.9 77.4 78.0 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 47.2 48.7 50.1 51.8 53.3 1.5 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 45.2 44.4 43.7 43.3 43.7 0.4 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 68.2 68.0 67.7 68.4 69.0 0.6 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 82.0 81.8 81.7 82.0 82.7 0.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.5 64.5 64.5 65.2 66.0 0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 59.8 59.0 58.8 59.8 60.7 0.9 pps
Male 70.0 69.6 69.4 70.1 70.8 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 35.3 34.4 33.9 34.2 34.8 0.6 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.9 83.3 82.6 83.1 83.8 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 54.9 56.2 57.4 58.8 60.1 1.3 pps
Female 58.4 58.6 58.8 59.5 60.4 0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 31.2 30.5 30.2 30.5 31.2 0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 71.4 71.3 71.1 71.7 72.2 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 40.0 41.7 43.3 45.2 46.9 1.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 212033.0 211350.9 210776.9 213421.8 215726.1 1.1 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.1 -0.4 -0.3 1.0 1.2 0.2 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.0 -0.3 -0.3 1.3 1.1 -0.2 pps
Male -0.3 -0.7 -0.6 1.1 1.0 -0.1 pps
Female 0.3 0.1 0.1 1.4 1.1 -0.3 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 14.4 14.5 14.4 14.4 14.1 -0.2 pps
Male 18.4 18.4 18.3 18.2 17.8 -0.4 pps
Female 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.9 9.9 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 14.0 13.7 13.6 13.9 14.1 0.2 pps
Male 13.5 13.2 13.2 13.5 13.8 0.3 pps
Female 14.6 14.2 14.1 14.3 14.5 0.2 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 18.8 19.2 19.6 19.6 19.6 0.0 pps
Male 8.0 8.4 8.7 8.8 8.9 0.1 pps
Female 31.5 31.9 32.4 32.2 32.1 -0.1 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 9.7 10.5 10.9 10.2 9.4 -0.8 pps
Young (15-24) 21.7 23.2 23.7 22.2 20.3 -1.9 pps
Prime age (25-49) 8.6 9.5 10.0 9.4 8.7 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 6.8 7.3 7.7 7.4 7.0 -0.4 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 16.7 18.6 19.7 19.0 17.8 -1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 9.0 9.7 10.1 9.5 8.8 -0.7 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 5.6 6.1 6.5 6.2 5.7 -0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 9.2 10.0 10.4 9.9 9.1 -0.8 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 16.8 17.7 18.1 16.5 15.2 -1.3 pps
Male 9.6 10.4 10.8 10.1 9.3 -0.8 pps
Female 9.8 10.5 10.9 10.3 9.5 -0.8 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 42.9 44.5 47.3 49.6 48.5 -1.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.8 40.7 40.6 40.5 40.5 0.0 %
Male 41.9 41.7 41.6 41.5 41.5 0.0 %
Female 39.1 39.0 38.9 38.9 38.9 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.7 -2.1 -2.6 -0.4 -2.4 -2.0 pps
Building and construction -2.7 -3.6 -3.2 -0.8 0.8 1.6 pps
Services 1.1 0.3 0.0 1.6 1.9 0.3 pps
Manufacturing industry 0.3 -1.1 -1.1 0.6 0.8 0.2 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 1.9 2.8 0.9 1.7 3.1 1.3 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.1  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.7 2.4 1.3 1.5 2.2 0.7 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.6 2.3 1.4 1.6 2.5 0.9 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.5 -0.1 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 pps
2014-2015
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Euro Area 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
1 - Population (LFS, total, 1000 pers.) 335707 336567 337252 337959 338977 0.3 %
2 - Population (LFS, working age:15-64, 1000 pers.) 218346 218124 217705 218438 218215 -0.1 %
(% of total population) 65.0 64.8 64.6 64.6 64.4 -0.3 pps
3 - Labour force (15-64, 1000 pers.) 155991 156954 157102 157934 158055 0.1 %
Male 84690 84881 84658 84874 84888 0.0 %
Female 71301 72073 72443 73060 73167 0.1 %
4 - Activity rate (% of population 15-64) 71.4 72.0 72.2 72.3 72.4 0.1 pps
Young (15-24) 41.7 41.3 40.8 40.1 39.6 -0.5 pps
Prime age (25-54) 85.2 85.6 85.5 85.4 85.3 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 50.7 52.8 54.6 56.4 58.0 1.6 pps
Nationals (15-64) 71.4 72.0 72.3 72.4 72.6 0.2 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 71.4 71.4 71.2 70.9 70.5 -0.4 pps
Male 77.9 78.1 78.1 78.0 78.1 0.0 pps
Young (15-24) 44.4 44.0 43.3 42.6 41.9 -0.7 pps
Prime age (25-54) 92.2 92.2 91.8 91.5 91.4 -0.1 pps
Older (55-64) 58.8 60.7 62.4 63.8 65.2 1.5 pps
Female 65.0 65.8 66.3 66.6 66.8 0.2 pps
Young (15-24) 39.0 38.5 38.2 37.5 37.1 -0.4 pps
Prime age (25-54) 78.3 79.0 79.2 79.3 79.3 0.0 pps
Older (55-64) 43.0 45.3 47.3 49.5 51.1 1.7 pps
5 -  Employment rate (% of population 15-64) 64.1 63.7 63.4 63.8 64.5 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 32.9 31.6 30.9 30.6 30.7 0.1 pps
Prime age (25-54) 77.3 76.5 75.9 76.0 76.6 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 47.0 48.6 50.0 51.7 53.3 1.6 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 46.9 45.7 44.7 43.6 44.1 0.5 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 69.1 68.6 68.2 68.4 68.8 0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 81.7 81.3 80.9 81.0 81.5 0.5 pps
Nationals (15-64) 64.7 64.3 64.1 64.4 65.1 0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 58.4 57.4 56.9 57.7 58.4 0.7 pps
Male 70.0 69.3 68.7 68.9 69.6 0.6 pps
Young (15-24) 34.9 33.5 32.7 32.3 32.3 0.0 pps
Prime age (25-54) 83.8 82.7 81.7 81.8 82.4 0.6 pps
Older (55-64) 54.3 55.6 56.7 58.0 59.5 1.5 pps
Female 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.7 59.4 0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 30.8 29.6 29.1 28.8 29.0 0.3 pps
Prime age (25-54) 70.7 70.4 70.1 70.3 70.8 0.5 pps
Older (55-64) 40.0 41.9 43.6 45.7 47.4 1.7 pps
6 - Employed persons (15-64, 1000 pers.) 140003.6 138982.1 138102.6 139356.5 140666.8 0.9 %
7 - Employment growth (%, National accounts) 0.1 -0.4 -0.7 0.6 1.1 0.5 pps
Employment growth (%, 15-64, LFS) 0.0 -0.7 -0.6 0.9 0.9 0.0 pps
Male -0.4 -1.2 -1.0 0.7 0.9 0.2 pps
Female 0.4 -0.2 -0.2 1.2 1.0 -0.2 pps
8 - Self employed (15-64, % of total employment ) 14.3 14.4 14.3 14.2 14.0 -0.1 pps
Male 18.2 18.2 18.2 17.9 17.6 -0.3 pps
Female 9.7 9.8 9.9 9.9 9.9 0.0 pps
9 - Temporary employment (15-64, % of total employment) 15.6 15.0 14.9 15.1 15.4 0.3 pps
Male 14.9 14.4 14.3 14.6 15.1 0.5 pps
Female 16.3 15.8 15.5 15.5 15.8 0.3 pps
10 - Part-time (15-64, % of total employment ) 20.1 20.7 21.5 21.5 21.6 0.1 pps
Male 8.0 8.4 8.9 9.1 9.3 0.2 pps
Female 34.6 35.3 36.1 36.0 36.0 0.0 pps
11 - Unemployment rate (harmonised:15-74) 10.2 11.4 12.0 11.6 10.9 -0.7 pps
Young (15-24) 21.2 23.4 24.2 23.8 22.4 -1.4 pps
Prime age (25-49) 9.4 10.6 11.3 11.0 10.3 -0.7 pps
Older (55-64) 7.3 8.0 8.5 8.4 8.1 -0.3 pps
Low-skilled (15-64) 17.0 19.5 20.9 20.6 19.4 -1.2 pps
Medium-skilled (15-64) 8.9 9.9 10.4 10.2 9.7 -0.5 pps
High-skilled (15-64) 6.1 6.9 7.5 7.3 6.9 -0.4 pps
Nationals (15-64) 9.5 10.7 11.3 11.1 10.4 -0.7 pps
Non-nationals (15-64) 18.3 19.5 20.0 18.6 17.2 -1.4 pps
Male 10.0 11.2 11.9 11.5 10.7 -0.8 pps
Female 10.4 11.5 12.1 11.8 11.0 -0.8 pps
12 - Long-term unemployment (% of total unemployment) 45.3 46.4 49.6 52.6 51.5 -1.1 pps
13 - Worked hours (full-time, average actual weekly hours) 40.8 40.6 40.5 40.4 40.4 0.0 %
Male 41.8 41.6 41.5 41.4 41.4 0.0 %
Female 39.0 38.9 38.8 38.7 38.7 0.0 %
14 - Sectoral employment growth (% change)
Agriculture -2.1 -1.1 -1.7 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 pps
Building and construction -3.4 -4.4 -4.0 -1.8 0.1 1.9 pps
Services 1.1 0.0 -0.5 0.9 1.6 0.7 pps
Manufacturing industry -0.1 -0.8 -1.4 -0.2 0.4 0.6 pps
15 - Indicator board on wage developments (% change)
Compensation per employee 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.3 0.0 pps
Real compensation per employee based on GDP 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.4  :   : pps
Labour cost index (compens. of employees plus taxes minus subs.) 2.7 2.5 1.2 1.3 1.6 0.3 pps
Labour cost index (wages and salaries, total) 2.6 2.5 1.4 1.4 2.1 0.7 pps
Labour productivity (GDP/person employed) 1.4 -0.4 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.4 pps
2014-2015
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